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This dissertation advances two interrelated claims. First, I examine the concept of 
responsibility and show how it operates as a rhetorical form that mediates a large segment 
of political life. Framing responsibility as a distinctly political problem, I argue that it 
functions to produce, discipline and govern subjects as well as legislate forms of identity, 
difference and community. Second, I argue that the definitional space of responsibility is 
not sacred, but contested. It is within this contested space that political battles regarding 
how we ought to understand the world and what it means to live in common with others 
plays out. Focusing on the ways in which responsibility is used to impose order allows 
me to understand how a politics of responsibility impacts discussions as far ranging as 
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Chapter One: Introduction: Toward a Politics of Responsibility  
 
That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it provides no 
ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the 
lambs say among themselves: “these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is as 
little as possible like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb – would not he 
be good? There is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except 
perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: “we don’t 
dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more 
tasty than a tender lamb.” 
- Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 
 
The condition of possibility of this thing, responsibility, is a certain experience of 
the possibility of the impossible: the trial of the aporia from which one may invent 
the only possible invention, the impossible invention. 
- Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading 
  
 
Let’s begin with a true story. On April 20th, 2010 a gas explosion occurred on the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig stationed in the Gulf of Mexico. Within two days, the 
rig had sunk and an oil leak that would last more than three months, wreaking 
havoc on an entire ecosystem, had begun.1 Years later, the environmental, 
economic and psychological effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill continue to be 
felt.2 Predictably, and almost instantly, the rhetoric of responsibility came to 
dominate and shape the discourse surrounding the ecological crisis. Political 
actors, pundits and commentators from across the political spectrum made the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For resources on the Deepwater Horizon spill see, for example, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Office of Response and 
Restoration: http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/deepwaterhorizon, For an excellent 
account of the rig’s final hours leading up to the explosion see, David Rohde David 
Barstow, Stephanie Saul, "Deepwater Horizon's Final Hours," The New York Times, 
December 26, 2010. 
2 For examples of the oil spill’s continued economic impact see: Laurel Calkins Allen 
Johnson Jr., Margaret Cronin Fisk, "BP Spill Victims Face Economic Fallout Two Years 
Later" Bloomberg, February 23, 2012. For continued environmental impact see: Suzanne 
Goldenberg, "Study Links BP Oil Spill to Dolphin Deaths," The Guardian, December 18, 
2013 2013., For psychological impacts see: Sparkle Roberts Lynn M. Grattan, William T. 
Mahan, Jr., Patrick K. McLaughlin, W. Steven Otwell, and J. Glenn Morris, Jr., "The 
Early Psychological Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Florida and Alabama 
Communities," Environmental Health Perpectives 119, no. 6 (2011). 
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question of responsibility central in an attempt to explain the event by unearthing 
the responsible party, or parties, at the heart of the devastation. Forbes magazine 
best articulated this fervor with a three part series on its Corporate Social 
Responsibility Blog under the very literal, if not revealing, headline, “The BP Oil 
Spill: Who’s Responsible?”3  
 By May 1st, the Obama Administration named British Petroleum (BP), the 
company in charge of the drilling, as the responsible party.4 Shortly thereafter, US 
Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced that the federal government would 
open a criminal inquiry into the oil spill to ensure that none of the responsible 
parties escaped accountability.5 BP reacted quickly by announcing major changes 
in its corporate structure, as well as a review of risk management protocols, and 
initiated a public relations campaign with an emphasis on the company’s response 
to the disaster. Under the slogan, “Making it Right,” BP launched a variety of 
advertisements, as well as a digital media campaign, in an attempt to demonstrate 
that they were doing everything they could to take responsibility.6 The intended 
message was clear (if not messy, linguistically speaking) – we are responding by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See for example, Dirk Olin to The CSR Blog, May 17, 2010., Elliot Clark ibid., May 18, 
2010., Richard Crespin ibid. 
4 Bryan Walsh, "With Oil Spill (and Blame) Spreading, Obama Will Visit Gulf," Time, 
May 1, 2010. 
5 Helene Cooper and Peter Baker, "U.S. Opens Criminal Inquiry into Oil Spill," The New 
York Times, June 1, 2010. 
6 To be sure, the Making it Right campaign was an all out public relations offensive that 
deployed just about every type of communications platform from traditional print and 
television ads to online and social media messaging as well as short form video content 
that typically showed BP workers “on the ground” with members of the local community. 
However, not surprisingly, the dissonance between BP’s public relations efforts and its 
lobbying efforts in Washington could not have been greater, which of course raises an 
important question as to what “taking responsibility actually means. See for example, 
British Petroleum, "Making It Right," (2010). and Scott Edwards, "BP: Making It Right 
(for BP)," The Huffington Post, February 8, 2011. 
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taking responsibility and performing responsibly in response. However, though 
BP came out in the early days of the crisis to assume responsibility for their role 
in the Deepwater Horizon mess, it did not take long for them to begin ascribing 
responsibility to others. In preparation for the impending lawsuits, BP began 
pointing the finger at contractors Halliburton and Transocean Ltd., operators of 
the Deepwater Horizon rig.7 
 President Obama also deployed the language of responsibility when 
referring to his own role in stemming the crisis, stating, “in case you’re 
wondering who is responsible, I take responsibility…it’s my job to make sure 
everything is done to shut this down.”8 An important affective assemblage that 
included heartbreak, regret, rage and indignation also accompanied Obama’s calls 
for responsibility. “I’ve seen rage from him,” then-Press Secretary Robert Gibbs 
commented. He has been in a whole bunch of different meetings – clenched jaw – 
even in the midst of these briefings, saying everything has to be done, I think this 
was an anecdote shared last week, to plug the damn hole.”9 Indeed, Obama’s 
emotional state served as a critical gauge by which observers assessed whether or 
not he was responding to events in an urgent and decisive manner.10   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 "BP Will Pay for Gulf Oil Spill Disaster, CEO Says,"  (NPR)., Tom Bergin and Ayesha 
Rascoe, "BP Points Fingers in Oil Spill Blame Game," Reuters, September 8, 2010. 
8 Neal Connan, "Obama on Oil Mess: I Take Responsibility" in Talk of the Nation (NPR). 
9 Ruth Marcus, "During Oil Spill Crisis, Do We Need Obama to Play Angry Daddy?," 
The Washington Post, June 3, 2010. 
10 Writing for Salon, reporter Alex Pareene catalogued the number of high profile 
commentators that criticized the president for not being “angry enough” in his reaction to 
unfolding events. For example, Pareene highlights an actual line of questioning from 
CBS White House correspondent Chip Reid that asked for specifics regarding whether or 
not Obama felt rage or frustration and even asked if Obama was yelling and screaming in 
response. See, Alex Pareene, "Why Won't Obama Just Get Even Madder About This Oil 
Spill?," Salon, June 2, 2010. 
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 Nearly four years later, the Deepwater Horizon spill is back in the news. 
BP, despite much organizational handwringing and its insistence on “making it 
right,” is now engaged in legal battles disputing a 9.2 billion dollar settlement 
ruling by a New Orleans court for victims of the oil spill not covered in BP’s 
initial settlement offers, making it clear that “making it right” does not involve 
ensuring financial remuneration for all impacted parties.11 BP’s intransigence, 
however, is instructive of the ways in which the public face of “taking 
responsibility” is performative, diverging sharply from the private back rooms 
occupied by lawyers and lobbyists whose sole responsibility lies with protecting 
profits and shareholder interest and not with ensuring justice or restitution for the 
victims. 
 Beyond the BP oil crisis, responsibility discourse pervades American 
politics, animating and shaping conversations as diverse as immigration policy, 
environmental politics, health care reform and economic crisis. Obama began his 
presidency by heralding a call for a “New Era of Responsibility” in his in first 
inaugural address, and titled his first budget proposal: “A New Era of 
Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise.”12 Not to be outdone, Obama’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The issue is a complex one from a legal standpoint. Though BP brokered an initial 
settlement in March 2012 prior to a non-jury trial regarding liability for the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion and subsequent spill, the settlement “excluded claims of financial 
institutions, casinos, private plaintiffs in parts of Florida and Texas, and residents and 
businesses claiming harm from the Obama administration’s deep-water drilling 
moratorium prompted by the spill. It also didn’t cover claims by governments.” As a 
result, a class action lawsuit was ultimately filed against the company, which is now 
being disputed on the grounds that the plaintiffs do meet the legal standard for a “class.” 
For more background on the dispute, see Laurel Brubaker Calkins and Margaret Cronin 
Fisk, "BP Oil Spill Settlement Fight Wages On," Insurance Journal, January 13, 2014.  
12 Laura Meckler and Jonathan Weisman, "Obama to Call for a New Era of 
Responsibility: Huge Crowds Gather as First African-American President Takes Office; 
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opponents have made their own calls for responsibility, mostly in response to 
what they decry as the irresponsible practices of the current administration.13 
Indeed, across the political spectrum from Left to Right, political actors advocate 
and deploy responsibility in one form or another. Indeed, in contemporary 
American politics, invoking the language of responsibility has become something 
of a requirement. 
With all the talk of responsibility there is, of course, that which goes 
unspoken. Accordingly, understanding the politics of responsibility requires 
attention to spaces and absences, noticing where calls for responsibility appear 
and where they do not. The ubiquitous nature of responsibility cries out for what 
Gayatri Spivak calls a “reexamination of the familiar,”14 interrogating calls and 
failures to call alike insofar as they are part of a distinct American political culture 
of responsibility. It is precisely at this juncture of reexamining the familiar that 
my project begins to take shape. This dissertation holds that the rhetoric of 
responsibility is central to American political life and even constitutes a critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Aides Expect Steps on Iraq War, Bank Policy This Week," The Wall Street Journal, 
January 20, 2009. See also, Office of Management and Budget, "A New Era of 
Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise," The White House, 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Re
sponsibility2.pdf.  
13 In fact, throughout both of Obama’s terms in office his opponents have consistently 
labeled him either irresponsible and have accused his administration of encouraging 
irresponsibility in the American public. From the Affordable Care Act role out to 
Benghazi, his administration has been continuously criticized for its absence of 
accountability. See for example, "The Obama Administration, Why Is It Not 
Accountable?," in The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News)., Ron Fournier, "President Obama and 
His Gang That (Still) Isn't Shooting Straight," National Journal, November 18, 2013., 
Ruth Marcus, "Benghazi, Obamacare and the Absence of Accountability," The 
Washington Post, January 21, 2014; Sean Sullivan, "Rand Paul: It's Irresponsible of 
Obama to Talk About Default," ibid., October 6, 2013.  
14 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1st American ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976). 
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theater in which and through which American politics is carried out. Simply put, 
responsibility does political work. This project aims to demonstrate 
responsibility’s specific political functions.  
In attempting to queer the familiar, a number of questions animate my 
thinking. How is responsibility used to make claims about political life? When 
and why do we begin to speak in these terms? What is at stake in the rhetoric of 
responsibility? What authorizing and legitimating functions does responsibility 
perform? What conceptions of subjectivity and political community do 
articulations of responsibility both rely upon and conjure? What imaginings of the 
present, past and future do uses of responsibility call upon and help produce?  
 This study examines the political work of responsibility by analyzing a 
series of concrete political problems - the economic crisis of 2008, the question of 
torture post 9/11 and debates concerning environmental policy - in which 
responsibility rhetoric does not simply circulate, but dominates the conversation. 
To make responsibility a political problem is to attend to how it is used, by whom 
and with what effects. Rather than approach responsibility as a pre-discursive 
concept or an a priori moral value – a fixed value that precedes politics – I trace 
the mutually constitutive relationship between responsibility and politics that 
functions to produce, discipline and govern subjects as well legislate forms of 
identity, difference and community. Mutually constitutive because while 
responsibility rhetoric is used to address subjects and shape narratives around 
political events, its various meanings and uses emerge within the context of 
political norms, ideological commitments and discursive regimes of power. In this 
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regard, I take as my aim the desire to understand responsibility in terms of what 
William Connolly referred to as “not only the discourse of politics but also the 
politics of discourse.”15 To do so, I attend to responsibility as a rhetorical form 
that produces specific ways of seeing and thinking political moments, impacting 
and limiting the range of appropriate responses and precluding certain questions 
while opening spaces for others. In approaching responsibility rhetorically, I am 
able to discern the politics at stake when it comes to not only what can be said but 
also what can be heard.  
 Of course, this raises a number of initial problems. What exactly does it 
mean to “make responsibility a political problem?” How do I demarcate what is 
germane to the political and what lies beyond the scope of this inquiry? At the 
outset I want to acknowledge the inherent complexity that comes with designating 
something a “political problem.” In fact, Sheldon Wolin recognizes the question, 
“what is political” to be one of the most basic problems “confronting the political 
philosopher when he tries to assert the distinctiveness of his subject matter.”16 
Expanding on the idea that the political theorist’s field of inquiry is in fact a 
matter of marking a distinct disciplinary territory around specific ideas, he goes 
on to clarify that: 
Concepts like power, authority, consent and so forth are not real 
things, although they are intended to point to some significant 
aspect about political things. Their function is to render political 
facts significant, either for purposes of analysis, criticism, 
justification, or a combination of all three…When such concepts 
become more or less stable in their meaning, they serve as pointers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). Preface to the Second Edition 
16 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought, Expanded ed. (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). 5 
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that “cue” us to look for certain things or to keep certain 
considerations in mind when we try to understand a political 
situation or make a judgment about it. In this way, the concepts 
and categories that make up our political understanding help us to 
draw connections between political phenomena; they impart some 
order to what might otherwise appear to be a hopeless chaos of 
activities; they mediate between us and the political world we seek 
to render intelligible; they create an area of determinate awareness 
and thus help to separate the relevant phenomena from the 
irrelevant.17 
 
Similarly to Wolin, I place responsibility in the pantheon of core political 
concepts along side power, authority, and consent because responsibility, as I 
demonstrate throughout this project, is used time and again to render political 
facts significant, to create interpretive frames through which we come to 
understand political events and to provide a foundation for making political 
judgments. However, it is precisely the ways in which responsibility is used to, in 
Wolin’s terms, mediate between “us and the political world” that this project 
seeks to interrogate.  
 
The Problems of Responsibility  
 
The study of responsibility is complicated by a number of factors, metaphysical as 
well as methodological. Although on the surface the language of responsibility is 
a familiar component of public discourse, that familiarity is a reason to pause. 
Opening the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) means confronting a litany of 
different words that are often, in everyday language, used interchangeably with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid. 7 
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the terms responsible and responsibility: accountability, liability, blame, guilt, 
reliable, trustworthy, respectability, answerable, rational, and cause.18  
It is not surprising that the OED offers such a range of definitions for a 
concept as complex as responsibility. Definition, as Raymond Williams suggests, 
is a problematic endeavor. He argues that dictionaries perform the act of 
definition by fixing meanings to words within the finite space of a specific place 
and time.19 And when it comes to dealing with concepts, such as responsibility, 
the limitations of definition are even more apparent. Definition, “for those 
(words) which involve ideas and values, is not only impossible but an irrelevant 
procedure.”20 Williams is helpful here in highlighting the fact that the task of 
definition is beside the point. The important work does take place somewhere else. 
But where?  
In some sense his argument on the limitations of definition echoes Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances.”21 For Wittgenstein the important 
work to be done does not reside in isolating a core or essence to the meaning of 
responsibility that can then be found in all words associated with it. Meaning, for 
Wittgenstein, is about usage. As a result, Wittgenstein suggests that we view the 
myriad number of definitions and associated terms as “a complicated network of 
similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing.”22 Similarly, in The Terms of Political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Oxford University Press., Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), http://dictionary.oed.com/ For subscribers only; follow links to 
resource. 
19 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Rev. ed. 
(London: Fontana, 1983). 17 
20 Ibid. 17 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).  
22 Ibid. 66 
	   10	  
Discourse, Connolly provides further insight into the difficulty associated with 
defining concepts. He argues that, “to define a concept is necessarily to connect it 
with several others that need clarification if the first is to be clear, and those 
others are in turn connected to a still wider network of concepts deserving of 
equally close attention.”23  
That both Wittgenstein and Connolly use the term “network” to describe 
the challenges of conceptual definition is instructive. Viewing the OED entry on 
responsibility as evidence of a network rather than a linear page of sequential 
definitions helps illustrate the way in which all of these terms are not only related 
but also interactive. It is in the constant and continual play of these terms that we 
can see both the absence of a single core as well as the ways in which the concept 
of responsibility, like all language, operates metaphorically.24 However, while 
thinking politically about responsibility requires attending to definitional attempts 
to stabilize meaning and the contexts in which these definitions emerge, 
ultimately, both Williams and Wittgenstein elide the politics of definition. In 
addition, while Connolly does take seriously the political stakes involved in 
contestations over the terms of political discourse, his focus remains fixed on 
laying bare the philosophical basis for why conceptual clarity remains elusive in 
the hopes of refining our understanding of politics.  
By examining responsibility as rhetoric, I seek to not only interrogate uses 
of the word itself but instead the entire network of metaphors, related terms and 
linguistic conventions, which involves attempts to fix and stabilize meaning at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse. 3 
24 Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978). 
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particular moments and on particular bodies. A crucial part of my project in the 
coming chapters is to examine these attempts at stabilization with an eye towards 
how they mobilize and operate in conjunction with other discursive and emotional 
regimes.25 When responsibility (or its larger network) is invoked, it presents an 
opportunity to reflect on how, when and why it is being put into practice.  
To complicate matters further, responsibility often appears in public 
discourse accompanied by a range of adjectival modifiers. In addition to speaking 
in terms of responsibility, there are those moments where people speak in terms of 
moral responsibility, political responsibility, social responsibility, corporate 
responsibility, legal responsibility, personal responsibility, sexual responsibility, 
environmental responsibility, and so on. However, far from clarifying, these 
adjectival modifiers generate their own set of questions. What rhetorical work do 
these modifiers do in relation to responsibility? When are these modifiers 
deployed most often? Indeed, these adjectival modifiers conceal and suppress the 
political nature of responsibility, cloaking the politics at work regardless of the 
specific modifier responsibility traffics under at any given moment. As I 
demonstrate in Chapters Three and Four, to speak of personal, corporate or even 
environmental responsibility is to mark those categories as something other than 
political. By attempting to carve a space for responsibility outside of political 
discourse, adjectival modifiers operate like Ranciere’s notion of the police, 
shouting: “There is no politics here, there is nothing to see here, there is nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For a deeper exploration of the term, “emotional regimes,” see William M. Reddy, The 
Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, U.K; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
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to do but move along.”26 In response, an important take away of this project is to 
push back against the apolitical framing of responsibility by exposing the various 
ways in which responsibility often operates as a powerful rhetoric of 
depoliticization.27 
 In the face of so much definitional confusion, theorists often rely on 
etymology as a pathway towards conceptual clarity.28 The OED identifies the 
etymology of responsibility in the Latin, respondeo and the now obsolete French, 
respondere, which are roots of the word response, meaning to answer to, or to 
promise in return.29 However, methodologies concerned with etymology are also 
problematic. Calling upon etymology to legitimize a specific way of defining or 
thinking about a concept should provoke suspicion. In part, because etymology in 
its attempt to return to origins seeks to recover lost truths or meanings rather than 
engage with the ways in which language and meaning making actually function. 
Reliance on etymology also means an escape from, rather than a confrontation 
with, responsibility’s political uses and grasps at semantic closure by imposing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Davide Panagia, The Political Life of Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2009). 121 
27 Here I am greatly indebted to Wendy Brown’s analysis of tolerance as a discourse of 
depoliticization in her book, Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age 
of Identity and Empire (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006). Here she 
argues that depoliticization “involves construing inequality, subordination, 
marginalization and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political 
solutions, as personal and individual on the one hand, or as natural, religious or cultural 
on the other. Tolerance works along both vectors of depoliticization – it personalizes and 
it naturalizes or culturalizes – and sometimes it intertwines them.” (15) Specifically, I 
take up these themes in relation to responsibility in chapters two, three and four.  
28 No doubt there are a number of thinkers in the Western cannon that return to 
etymology time and again in the course of their arguments including Frederic Nietzsche, 
Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and Quentin Skinner.  
29 Oxford University Press., Oxford English Dictionary. 
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meaning construed as originary and foundational.30 Indeed, the question of who 
guards the archive of meaning and who can lay claim to its contents also 
complicates any sense of a simple or objective return to origins.  
 Accordingly, this is not a project of definition or an attempt at reclaiming 
the long lost origins of responsibility. Yet, to begin with the persistent problems 
of definition and etymology do provide an important entry point for making 
responsibility a distinctly political problem. Definitions and origins, after all, are 
themselves political. For instance, while not eliminating confusion, a brief turn to 
responsibility’s etymology does signal its social and relational character. Thinking 
about the relationship between responsibility and response provokes the question, 
to whom, or to what, am I responding? In this regard, responsibility always 
implies the existence of another, of something other than and beyond myself. But 
to approach responsibility as a political problem means treating these questions – 
to whom, for what and how do I respond to the Other, as well as to which Others I 
am supposed to respond, as questions that do not stand outside of or adjacent to 
political life.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For instance, in Jacques Derrida’s work, Archive Fever, he argues that the search for 
this type of foundational truth, “is to have a compulsive, repetitive, and nostalgic desire 
for the archive, an irrepressible desire to return to the origin, a homesickness, a nostalgia 
for return to the most archaic place of absolute commencement.” Jacques Derrida, 
Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 91 
31 For more on the relationship with the Other as it relates to responsibility see, 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, European Perspectives (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Otherwise Than Being, or, Beyond Essence 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1998); Emmanuel Lévinas and Philippe 
Nemo, Ethics and Infinity, 1st ed. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985); 
Emmanuel Lévinas and Nidra Poller, Humanism of the Other (Urbana; Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003). While I am certainly influenced by the Levinasian 
claim that the encounter with the other is the primary and foundational component of 
human existence, I want to maintain, as I do throughout this project, that this encounter is 
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Genealogies of Responsibility  
 
Thus far, I have focused my attention on responsibility’s semantic terrain. 
However, to remain fixated on definition would be to maintain a faith in language 
that is not really there, moving us closer to responsibility as an object of desire 
and further away from responsibility as a political problem. In this regard, I am 
informed by Nietzsche’s critique of conceptual thinking. For Nietzsche, concepts, 
like responsibility, do not tell us anything objective about the world; they do not 
help us arrive at the essence or nature of that which they designate. All concepts 
have a history and the conceptual language we use is always tied to convention, 
context and, most importantly, power.32 
 To be sure, responsibility has had a distinctive genealogy in Western 
moral and political thought. The dominant approach has been to treat 
responsibility as a pre-discursive concept – something that inheres within an 
individual that is both discoverable and factual. As Marion Smiley argues, many 
contemporary moral and political thinkers treat responsibility “as a fact about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not simply an ethical one as if we could enact a hard boundary between the ethical and 
the political. Instead, my project emphasizes the ways in which the ethical and the 
political are implicated in one another in the sense that the question of the Other is always 
one that is politically bound and designated. As I demonstrate extensively in chapter three, 
the question of the Other, as it relates to responsibility, is an integral question for 
determining modes of political violence and political action.  
32 For more on Nietzsche’s critique of conceptual thinking, see for example, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer 
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997); Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and R. J. 
Hollingdale, Untimely Meditations, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Friedrich Wilhelm 
Nietzsche and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a 
Philosophy of the Future (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Friedrich Wilhelm 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, On the 
Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). 
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individuals.”33 Preoccupied with questions such as, under what conditions can 
someone be held responsible for their actions, to whom or to what are we 
responsible, and in what way ought we be responsible, Western conceptions of 
responsibility take as their starting point a number of metaphysical and 
ontological assumptions regarding the nature of the self and the world in which 
that self exists.34 Responsibility is positioned within a matrix of causality, agency, 
will and intention – subjects that author, subjects of self-mastery, and subjects that 
say “I.”  
 It is in this sense that Joel Feinberg claims that there is an absolute 
responsibility within the power of the agent and argues for a notion of “real 
responsibility” that is “distinct from a practical responsibility relative to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 It’s important to note that in this passage, Smiley is engaged in a specific critique of the 
deontological view of moral responsibility offered by John Casey in his 1971 article, 
“Actions and Consequences.” However, she extends her critique to include other 
prominent thinkers in the cannon of moral philosophy, including John Harris and Dennis 
Thompson, who all, despite their differences, rely heavily on the factual discovery of free 
will as a precursor to designating moral responsibility and blame to individual actors. 
Marion Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and 
Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992). 106, 146  
34 For examples of approaches to responsibility that take these questions and assumptions 
as their point of departure see, A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility; A Study in 
Greek Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960)., Gerald Dworkin, Determinism, Free 
Will, and Moral Responsibility, Central Issues in Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles 
for a New Political Debate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006)., Joel 
Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1970); Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic 
Problems of Philosophy, 7th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1989)., Peter A. 
French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984)., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975)., John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford,: Clarendon Press, 1972); Political Liberalism, The 
John Dewey Essays in Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); John 
Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with, the Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999)., Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and Its Critics, 
Readings in Social and Political Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1984); 
Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in 
Liberal Thought (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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principles and values of a particular community.”35 This suggests, no doubt 
problematically, that all that is needed are appropriate methods, standards and 
even the right judges to get us there – to get us to the Truth. Because 
contemporary thinking about, and uses of, responsibility continue to bear the 
traces of this genealogy, in this section I briefly map the development of the 
concept of responsibility through the intellectual traditions of Aristotle and Kant – 
the two key poles of the Western tradition vis-à-vis responsibility.36 As my 
analysis shows, their works are important not only for the conceptions of 
responsibility they offer but more so for the politics of responsibility they attempt 
to suppress.  
 In Book Three of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces questions 
that have long preoccupied moral and legal scholarship’s emphasis on 
responsibility as accountability and blameworthiness.37 How can we know who is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For example, in his discussion of the difference between legal and moral responsibility, 
Feinberg argues that when it comes to assigning blame, “even after legal responsibility 
has been decided there is still a problem – albeit not a legal problem – leftover: namely, is 
the defendant really responsible (as opposed to responsible in law) for the harm? This 
conception of a “real” theoretical responsibility as distinct from a practical responsibility 
“relative” to the purposes and values of a particular legal system is expressed very 
commonly in the terminology of “morality” – moral obligation, moral guilt, moral 
responsibility.” Feinberg, Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems 
of Philosophy. 30 
36 No doubt in my consideration of Aristotle and Kant there are many important aspects 
of the Western tradition that I am consciously omitting including an analysis of Judeo-
Christian traditions as well the British liberal tradition best exemplified by Locke’s work 
in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. However, because my project is a 
political analysis of how responsibility operates as rhetoric and not a history of 
responsibility, my emphasis on Aristotle and Kant is allows me to work broadly within 
the two most important traditions providing the foundation for contemporary uses and 
understandings of the concept.   
37 Of course, it’s important to note that, as Marion Smiley reminds us, the term moral 
responsibility has in fact only been in “use for two centuries.” She cites Alexander 
Hamilton’s 1789 Federalist Papers as well as Pascal’s 1656 Letters Provinciales as two of 
the first recorded uses of the term. In addition, Alasdair MacIntyre in, A Short History of 
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and who is not responsible? When is it appropriate to hold someone responsible 
for his or her actions? In response, Aristotle makes the dual issues of causality 
and voluntariness central to the concept of responsibility. Responsible actors in 
the Aristotelian sense are those who can be said to have caused or made 
something happen. But on what grounds can someone truly be said to have been 
the cause of something or, in Aristotle’s words, “the author” of his or her actions? 
For Aristotle, the answer to this question turns on making a crucial distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary action: “Since moral goodness is concerned 
with feelings and actions, and those that are voluntary receive praise and blame, 
whereas those that are involuntary receive pardon and sometimes pity too, 
students of moral goodness must presumably determine the limits of voluntary 
and involuntary.”38 
 Aristotle proceeds to a discussion of the voluntary by first considering 
what constitutes involuntary action. Specifically, there are two criteria for 
involuntary action: acts that happen by force, what Aristotle refers to as 
compulsion, and acts that happen by ignorance. In terms of force, “An act is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ethics, reminds readers that, “the concepts of duty and responsibility in the modern sense 
appear only in germ or marginally; those of goodness, prudence and virtue are central.” 
This of course begs the question as to how I can justifiably make use of Aristotle’s work 
in a section outlining a genealogy of responsibility if he never in fact used the term. 
However, despite the fact that Aristotle did not specifically deploy the concept of 
responsibility, he did write extensively on issues of causality and blame. Additionally, 
while Aristotle’s discussion of voluntariness differs from modern conceptions of free will, 
I demonstrate the ways in which demarcating voluntary from involuntary action provides 
a foundation for later conceptions of responsibility and in fact continues to play a role in 
understandings of contemporary issues around personal responsibility, blame, victimhood 
and dessert. For more on the difference between Classical and Modern ethics see, 
Alasdair C. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Fields of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan, 1966). 84, Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: 
Power and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View. 35    
38 Aristotle et al., The Nicomachean Ethics, Further rev. ed., Penguin Classics (London, 
Eng.; New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004). 50 
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compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind that the agent or patient 
contributes nothing to it; e.g. if a voyager were to be conveyed somewhere by the 
wind or by men who had him in their power.”39 In this regard, acts of compulsion 
are acts in which there is a complete absence of choice and the exercise of agency 
is impossible. In these cases, the individual cannot be said to have caused 
anything to happen. Importantly, given that constrained actions are connected to 
both the capacity to act and the possibilities to do so, here Aristotle opens the door 
for thinking about responsibility as contingent upon one’s ability to respond.      
 Aristotle also makes a number of important distinctions between 
involuntary and non-voluntary action as well as between actions done through 
ignorance and actions done in ignorance. To begin, Aristotle argues that, “Every 
act done through ignorance is non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when it 
causes the agent subsequent pain and repentance.”40 Aristotle introduces the 
category of non-voluntary as distinct from involuntary in this situation to 
distinguish individuals who, following a discovery of what they have done, would 
not have chosen otherwise.41 Here, Aristotle makes emotional dispositions, such 
as remorsefulness and regret, crucial components of how we ought to understand 
levels of culpability and blameworthiness. But what is most important is that this 
idea continues to impact debates about responsibility in the present. As I 
demonstrate in Chapter Two, where I discuss the image of the “responsible leader” 
who licenses the use of torture against potential terrorist suspects, Aristotle’s 
argument regarding the recognition of wrongdoing and the willingness to feel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. 50 
40 Ibid. 52 
41 Ibid. 52 
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pain associated with doing harm continues to play a central role in our 
understanding of what it means to be responsible.  
 When making the distinction between actions that are done “through 
ignorance” and actions that are done “in ignorance,” Aristotle invokes the famous 
example of an individual who acts while intoxicated. Being drunk, for Aristotle, 
does not exculpate an actor from being responsible for his actions. In these 
circumstances, Aristotle traces actions that occur while under the influence back 
to a moment of voluntary action. That is, the decision to drink in the first place, 
which is ultimately a question of virtue and character. As Alasdair MacIntyre 
argues, for Aristotle, “ignorance of what constitutes virtue and vice is not 
exculpatory, but is indeed what constitutes vice.”42 It is only ignorance of 
particular circumstances that excuse an individual’s actions as involuntary.43 
 In light of this discussion of all things involuntary, what exactly 
constitutes voluntary action? For Aristotle, “if an involuntary act is one performed 
under compulsion or as a result of ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be 
one of which the originating cause lies in the agent himself, who knows the 
particular circumstances of his action.”44 No doubt there is much in this short 
sentence to unpack. First, Aristotle places an emphasis on causality and the 
relationship between responsibility and the ability of an agent to cause or make 
something happen. Second, Aristotle raises the stakes by moving from a simple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics. 70 
43 Aristotle writes that what “makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in the choice (this 
is a cause of wickedness) nor ignorance of the universal (for this people are blamed), but 
particular ignorance, i.e. of the circumstances and objects of the action; for it is on these 
that pity and pardon depend, because a man who act in ignorance of any such detail is an 
involuntary agent.” Aristotle et al., The Nicomachean Ethics. 53  
44 Ibid. 54 
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discussion of causality to the question of knowledge. As opposed to the ignorance 
that surrounds involuntary action, the responsible agent is an agent who knows. 
The responsible decision hinges on an agent who acts voluntarily, and who is able 
to deliberate and make choices. 
 But a pressing question remains: How do we clearly demarcate the 
voluntary from the involuntary in order to arrive at an answer to the questions of 
causality, deliberation and choice that Aristotle places at the heart of 
responsibility? This question is even more crucial given that Aristotle himself 
continues to run into actions that blur the lines between the voluntary and the 
involuntary and thus cannot be so clearly categorized. 
For example, Aristotle contends with a number of potential borderline cases in 
which the line between absolute compulsion and individual choice is not so clear. 
In these cases, including situations in which choices are made under duress or the 
threat of violence, Aristotle is willing to allow that context and circumstances 
may in fact dictate whether or not we ought to see the action as voluntary or 
involuntary.45  
 And it is precisely at this juncture that the politics of responsibility 
suppressed by Aristotle’s attempt to formulate a normative ethics reveals itself. In 
advancing a deconstructive reading of Aristotle, Francois Raffoul suggests that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Aristotle gives the examples of acts done through fear or for what he describes as an 
“admirable purpose; e.g. if a tyrant who has a man’s parents and children in his power 
were to order him to do something dishonorable on the condition that if he did it their 
lives would be spared, and if he did not they would be put to death: in these cases it is 
debatable whether the actions are voluntary or involuntary. A similar difficulty occurs 
with regard to jettisoning cargo in bad weather. In general no one willingly throws away 
his property; but if it is to save the lives of himself and everyone else, any reasonable 
person will do it.” ibid. 50 
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the strict separation between the voluntary and the involuntary, the responsible 
and the irresponsible, cannot and does not hold. Rather, they imply one another, 
spilling over into and informing one another. Using Derrida as his guide, Raffoul 
argues that “being responsible could be traced back to irresponsible or a-
responsible foundations, and a certain undecidability between responsibility and 
irresponsibility may be discerned.”46 Otherwise, Raffoul asks, “why would 
Aristotle take such pains in trying to distinguish between them?”47 Indeed, in 
Book Three, Aristotle makes no less than the following four sets of distinctions 
when trying to define a sphere of human agency and responsibility: voluntary vs. 
involuntary, decision vs. wish, decision vs. opinion, and finally, the possible vs. 
the impossible.48 
 My analysis takes Raffoul’s argument a step further. Moments of 
undecidability require decision. Politics enters the conversation precisely at this 
moment of the undecidable. As the recent financial crisis of 2008 or explanations 
surrounding Hurricane Katrina demonstrate, determinations of causality are not 
objective descriptions, a subject I tackle in greater detail in Chapter Three. While 
Aristotle treats causality as a pathway to responsibility it is actually the case that 
attributions of responsibility work to produce the cause or origin of an action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Francois Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility, Studies in Continental Thought 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 41 
47 Ibid. 41 
48 Following his discussion of voluntary action, Aristotle proceeds throughout the rest of 
Book Three to continue making crucial distinctions between specific aspects of moral 
conduct in his attempt to demarcate a specific space of what constitutes responsible 
action. See, for example, Section Two of Book Three, titled, “Moral conduct implies 
choice, but what is choice? It must be distinguished from desire, temper, wish and 
opinion.” See also, Section Three of Book Three, titled, “If choice involves deliberation, 
what is the sphere of the later? And, “Deliberation is about means, not ends.” Aristotle et 
al., The Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Additionally, in making the determination of what is and what is not voluntary, 
Aristotle is invested in marking a sphere of responsibility and responsible action 
by demarcating its scope and limits.   
 In short, Aristotle is engaged not in ethical description but inscription. Or, 
as Raffoul puts it, “It is clear that Aristotle is not content with simply describing a 
phenomenon, but is actually establishing such a sphere by distinguishing it from 
those domains where we precisely have no agency.”49 Aristotle’s take on 
responsibility thus not only relies on metaphysical assumptions of causality and 
individual agency, but works to produce a conception of the responsible subject. 
The political implications of these assumptions could not be more serious. By 
demarcating that which is specifically up to “us” and within “our” control, 
Aristotle illuminates one of the principle ways in which subjects of responsibility 
are produced. In reading responsibility as a form of political rhetoric my project 
demonstrates how narratives of causality and control shape ways of seeing the 
political, and contribute to the production of specific subjects and behaviors 
deemed blameworthy, often inspiring suspicion, rebuke and even violence.50 As 
Raffoul notes, it is “not insignificant that Aristotle begins his treatise on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility. 49 
50 An excellent example of one of the ways in which this plays out in contemporary 
American politics is in regard to what Alyson Cole calls “True Victim” status. She argues 
that the most important virtue of True Victimhood is innocence, which is applied in two 
distinct ways: “First, with respect to his victimization, the victim’s innocence must be 
complete and incontrovertible. True victims have not contributed to their injury in any 
way. Second, the victim is morally upright; he must be pure. This totalizing conception of 
innocence encompasses every facet of the True Victim’s character.”  Alyson Manda Cole, 
The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 5 
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responsibility with the general problematic of blame-assigning and 
punishment.”51  
Notwithstanding Aristotle’s responsible subject of causality and self-
mastery, contemporary thinking about responsibility owes as much if not more to 
Enlightenment and early liberal thinking that elevates the rational, free and 
choosing subject to an uncontestable level. The notions of autonomy and choice 
central to Immanuel Kant’s work on metaphysics and moral philosophy serve as 
what Annika Thiem has called, “the bedrocks and fighting concepts of liberalism,” 
and continue to provide a starting point for debates about accountability and 
blame as well as political and social obligation. Like a ghost, Kant’s work 
continues to haunt contemporary thinking about responsibility, most famously 
(and hauntingly) embodied in A.W.H. Adkins’s claim that “we are all Kantians 
now.”52 
Similarly to Aristotle, Kant places both agency and causality at the heart 
of thinking about responsibility and in so doing attempts to designate a sphere of 
responsible action as that which is self caused, that which is beyond our control, 
and that which is caused by nature. However, unlike Aristotle, Kant’s subject 
operates with a more radical sense of freedom, what Kant called “transcendental 
freedom;” a subject with the capacity for spontaneous action, with “the power to 
begin a state on one’s own.”53  
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52 Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values. 2 
53 Immanuel Kant, Werner S. Pluhar, and Patricia Kitcher, Critique of Pure Reason, 
Unified ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1996). 535 
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Kant’s individual is a subject possessing a stable, dehistoricized capacity 
for reason. He is a choosing subject, endowed with a self-legislating, autonomous 
will that precedes acts and norms. As he argues in Part Two of The Critique of 
Pure Reason, “Freedom in the practical meaning of the term is the independence 
of our power of choice from coercion by impulses of sensibility…the human 
being has a power to determine himself on his own, independently of coercion by 
sensible impulses.”54 Aristotle’s gesture towards the social basis of responsibility 
and its relationship to capacity are effaced by Kant’s emphasis on the freedom of 
individual will and the possibility of spontaneous action. 
For Kant, it is this conception of freedom that “lies at the foundation of all 
moral laws and accountability to them.”55 Without this conception of freedom, 
responsibility for Kant would not be possible. As Theodor Adorno remarks, the 
problem of moral philosophy in Kant is “the problem of freedom,” and more 
specifically, the freedom of the will…[as] a form of behavior that is not ruled by 
the causality of nature…For if I simply act in conformity with causality, [instead 
of as a self-cause] I shall not actually be present as the agent that somehow has to 
make decisions about an action.”56 In this regard, Kant tethers the idea of free will 
directly to the concept of responsibility and the possibility for a subject to become 
a responsible self. Simply put, we have the freedom to choose and as a result we 
are responsible for the choices we make. Kant stresses this point in Religion 
Within the Limits of Reason Alone: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid. 536 
55 Immanuel Kant and Werner S. Pluhar, Critique of Practical Reason (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Pub. Co., 2002). 
56 Theodor W. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 1st. ed. (Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
University Press, 2001). 26, 27 
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Man must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral 
sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either condition 
must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be 
held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good 
nor evil. When it is said, man is created good, this can mean 
nothing more than: He is created for good and the original 
predisposition in man is good; not that he is already actually good, 
but rather that he brings it about that he becomes good or evil, 
according to whether he adopts or does not adopt into his maxim 
the incentives which this predisposition carriers with it (an act 
which must be left wholly to his own free choice).57 
 
For Kant, to be a person, to be human, is to be bound to the idea of self-
responsibility. In fact, it is the capacity for freedom and thus the capacity to be 
responsible for one’s self that distinguishes persons from objects and animals. It is 
the responsibility and the possibility of being responsible for one’s actions that 
divides the human from the non-human, the subject from the object, the person 
from the thing.58 
But what are the political implications of this ghostly inheritance 
bequeathed to us by Kant? As I show in Chapter Two, the twinning of 
responsibility and personhood points toward ways in which responsibility and 
designations of responsibility are often used in politics to mark the limits of 
human life. The category of humanness is not an objective category but rather 
dependent on that which it excludes – the non-human and the inhuman, which for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Harper Torchbooks the 
Cloister Library, (New York: Harper, 1960). 
58 For example, Francois Raffoul points out that Kant specifically states in The 
Metaphysics of Morals that while a person is “a subject whose actions can be imputed to 
him, a thing is that to which nothing can be imputed.” See, Raffoul, The Origins of 
Responsibility. 60 In addition, Kant makes the distinction between human freedom and 
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animals in his discussion of transcendental freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
stating that “The human power of choice, although an arbitrium sensitivum [sensory 
power of choice], is an arbitrium not brutum but liberum;” by which he means not animal, 
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Kant include the irrational and the irresponsible. Thus, to speak of the connection 
between personhood and self-responsibility already presupposes an answer to the 
question of who is capable of responding, and designates in advance those who 
possess the capacity for rational action and responsibility. 
To be sure, Kant treats these as metaphysical questions. My concern, 
however, is to trace the legacy of the responsible/irresponsible binary and its 
relationship to humanness in order to expose its important role in the construction 
of “knowable” others. A political approach to responsibility requires interrogating 
the ways in which this binary has played a crucial role in the construction of 
specific notions of community and has functioned as a foundational component of 
projects of expansion, colonization, domination and exploitation. The use of what 
Abdul JanMohamed has referred to as “metaphysical matter of facts” about 
individuals, groups and entire populations have long functioned to authorize 
violence and the governance of entire populations, allowing the perpetrators of 
such acts to disclaim responsibility in the name of responsibility.59 As a result, the 
question of who is capable of being responsible cannot be severed from the highly 
racialized and gendered development of the category of humanness itself.60 
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Feminist Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)., Judith Butler, Bodies 
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Additionally, the centrality of agency, free will and choice to Kant’s work 
continues to inform contemporary thinking about responsibility.61 Indeed, in 
debates over free will and social or scientific determinism, Kant’s ghost haunts 
and produces anxiety in those who remain wedded to maintaining the strength of 
strictly agent-centered accounts of responsibility. Lars Hertzberg provides a 
useful illustration of this concern in his article, “Blame and Causality,” where he 
writes, “Many of us, from time to time, have been haunted by the following 
thought, one day science will tell us about the causes of human behavior and 
when that day comes, we will no longer be able to hold people morally 
responsible for their actions.”62 Similarly, Isaiah Berlin has lamented the 
possibility that social determinism might lead to the collapse of responsibility 
altogether, and with it the death of attendant concepts – guilt and innocence.63 
The specters that haunt and produce anxiety in Hertzberg and Berlin reveal an 
allegiance to a moral imaginary that sees the social as undermining subjectivity, 
agency, independence and freedom rather than being one of its enabling 
conditions.  
This egocentric notion of responsibility emerges most vividly in Kant’s 
response to the question, “What is Enlightenment?” Enlightenment for Kant is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Demonology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987)., Edward W. Said, 
Orientalism, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1979)., Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
61 Accordingly, MacIntyre makes the claim that “for the majority of philosophical writers, 
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62 Lars Hertzberg, "Blame and Causality," Mind LXXXIV, no. 1 (1975). 
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first and foremost a call for individuals to be responsible for themselves by using 
their individual reason to break free from the dominance and reason of others: 
“Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another.”64 But 
most importantly, Kant makes responsibility a matter of maturity, positioning 
personal enlightenment against immaturity and irresponsibility. Failure to take 
responsibility for oneself is construed as a failure and abdication of will. As Kant 
argues, “Self incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but 
in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere 
Aude! Have courage to use your own reason – that is the motto of the 
Enlightenment.”65 Consequently, those who fail to take up the mantle of the 
Enlightenment due to lack of courage and resolution are depicted as failing to 
own up to their responsibility and thus a potential target of derision and blame: 
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of mankind, 
after nature has long since discharged them from external direction 
(naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless remains under life long tutelage, 
and why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It 
is so easy not to be of age.66     
 
Unworthy of our sympathy or responsiveness, those who fail to take up the 
position of self-enlightenment are met with moralizing judgment by Kant. The 
irresponsible are lazy; they are cowardly; they lack power; they are timid; they are 
weak willed. It is also of no small consequence that Kant genders his 
understanding of who possesses the will to assume responsibility for themselves 
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to break free of their self-imposed masters, arguing that while “the step to 
competence is held to be very dangerous by the far greater portion of mankind,” it 
is the “entire fair sex” that sees enlightenment as both difficult and dangerous.67  
 The political implications of responsibility/irresponsibility as a matter of 
choice are serious. As I demonstrate in Chapter Three, Kant’s conception of self-
responsibility intersects with the logic of the market in contemporary American 
political culture. There it finds its fullest expression in the neo-liberal discourse of 
personal responsibility, giving rise to what Wendy Brown calls the “moral subject 
as entrepreneurial subject.”68 An individual “who rationally deliberates about 
alternative courses of action, makes choices and bears responsibility for the 
consequences of these choices.”69 Again, as with Aristotle, we are faced with the 
question of what is, or should be “up to us.” How this question is answered, 
however, has a direct impact on everything from healthcare debates to social 
welfare policy, battles over reproductive rights and the politics of addiction.70 
Specifically in the ways in which responsibility becomes a method understanding 
who deserves or is worth of sympathy, social obligations and responsiveness and 
who deserves blame, suspicion and derision.  
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Destabilizing the Foundations of Responsibility  
 
To be sure, many thinkers have troubled this particular genealogy of 
responsibility. As previously mentioned, Nietzsche makes morality a problem by 
disturbing the typical approach to conceptual thinking taken by most in the 
Western philosophical tradition.71 Against philosophers claiming the mantle of 
belief or objectivity, Nietzsche criticizes thinkers like Kant, who profess faith in 
universal notions of morality, ethics and reason. In reference to many of his 
philosophical predecessors, Nietzsche argues that “Systematizers” like Kant, 
“practice a kind of play acting in as much as they want to fill out a system and 
round off its horizon, they have to try to present their weaker qualities in the same 
style as their stronger – they try to impersonate whole and uniformly strong 
natures.”72 On the contrary, for Nietzsche, responsibility (and morality more 
generally) cannot be easily systematized since morality is never divorced from 
history; morality is always interested, bound to and constituted through relations 
of power.73  
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In making morality an object of critical inquiry, Nietzsche launches a full-
scale assault on the metaphysical ground established by both the Aristotelian and 
Kantian traditions. For Nietzsche, the pillars of responsibility – causality, free will, 
rational agency, choice and voluntary action – are not givens upon which a 
coherent concept of responsibility can or should be built. On the contrary, they are 
fictional conventions that bear the imprint of human invention, long since 
forgotten.74 For example, in response to the Kantian notion of agency that rests 
upon an idea of transcendental freedom and spontaneous action, Nietzsche 
sarcastically asks, “What can be our doctrine alone? That nobody gives human 
beings their qualities, neither God, nor society, nor their parents and ancestors, 
nor they themselves (the nonsense of this last notion we are rejecting was taught 
by Kant as ‘intelligible freedom…’).”75  
Because our internal drives are not transparent to us, Nietzsche regards the 
idea that humans are free, that we consciously know want we want, and that as a 
result we are responsible for our actions, as a delusion. As he remarks in the 
opening to On the Genealogy of Morals, “We are unknown to ourselves, we men 
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of knowledge – and with good reason…we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, 
we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the 
law ‘Each is furthest from himself’ applies to all eternity – we are not ‘men of 
knowledge’ with respect to ourselves.”76 In stark contrast to the Kantian link 
between freedom and responsibility, for Nietzsche, the sovereign individual, who 
makes promises, keeps his word, exhibits self-control and can thus be said to be 
responsible, has a much less noble origin. The responsible subject is actually 
formed through the legal conventions of credit and debt. Specifically through 
discipline, subjection, the internalization of guilt, and the desire to punish:  
It was in this sphere then, the sphere of legal obligation, that the moral 
conceptual world of ‘guilt,’ ‘conscience,’ ‘duty,’ ‘sacredness of duty’ 
had its origin: its beginnings were, like the beginnings of everything 
great on earth, soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long time. And 
might one not add that, fundamentally, this world has never since lost 
a certain odor of blood and torture? (Not even good old Kant: the 
categorical imperative smells of cruelty…) To ask it again: to what 
extent can suffering balance debts or guilt? To the extent that to make 
suffer was in the highest degree pleasurable, to the extent that the 
injured party exchanged for the loss he sustained, including the 
displeasure caused by the loss, an extraordinary counterbalancing 
pleasure: that of making suffer…77 
 
In this regard, responsibility for one’s self functions as an internal disciplinary 
mechanism operating as what Nietzsche calls a “dominating instinct.”78 This 
argument challenges notions of free will and rational consciousness as 
foundational for responsibility, instead pointing toward the constructed nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Nietzsche, Nietzsche, and Kaufmann, On the Genealogy of Morals. 15 
77 Ibid. 65 
78 Nietzsche argues that the “privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare 
freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated to the 
profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct,” which according to 
Nietzsche is eventually named conscience. Ibid. 60 
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responsibility and the role that responsibility plays in the process of subject 
formation. 
  Similarly, Nietzsche also dispenses with causal relations and attributions 
of responsibility as narratives that are attached to events after they have already 
occurred in order to explain them and render them intelligible. As he remarks in 
one of the most famous passages from the Genealogy, “there is no ‘being’ behind 
doing, effecting, becoming; the doer is a fiction added to the deed.”79 For 
Nietzsche, cause and effect do not simply exist as objective facts about the world 
in which we live. Instead, “in truth we are confronted by a continuum out of 
which we isolate a couple of pieces.”80 What is most problematic, however, is 
that “once the cause had been introduced after the fact, it is then said to exist prior 
to the event, an event that has now been translated into necessity and meaning.”81 
In calling attention to this ex post facto attribution of causality, Nietzsche exposes 
responsibility’s reliance on forgetting as a condition of possibility. What is 
forgotten, specifically, is that the causal narrative is not the Truth or an objective 
description of a situation, but an inscription; an act that makes meaning.  
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that to refer to something as 
a fiction or construction is not to deny its real effects and consequences. On the 
contrary, it allows us to probe the material physical and psychic violence done by 
such constructions. Nietzsche invites us to become attentive to narratives of cause 
and effect and the ways in which responsibility, in its relationship to causality, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ibid. 45 
80 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, The Gay Science; with a 
Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 1st ed. (New York,: Vintage Books, 1974). 
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81 Nietzsche, Nietzsche, and Kaufmann, On the Genealogy of Morals. 45 
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operates as a convention, a conceptual tool that allows for the stabilization and 
interpretation of actions, moments and events.  
It is often assumed that the exposure of concepts as constructed or as 
fictitious ultimately leads to nihilism, a charge that has been leveled against 
Nietzsche himself.82 However, to speak of the constructed and contested nature of 
responsibility is not to render it inconsequential; a charge to which Nietzsche 
vehemently objects.83 The truth, in fact, is precisely the opposite: fictions are 
where the action is and most importantly, where the politics of responsibility 
becomes visible. By resisting the enclosures of dehistoricized and naturalized 
concepts, Nietzsche helps put responsibility back on the political map. In effect, 
by troubling the metaphysical ground upon which responsibility supposedly 
stands, Nietzsche foregrounds responsibility as a site of inquiry rather than one of 
passive obedience. 
 
Initiating a Politics of Responsibility  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 For examples see, Richard Schact, "Nietzsche and Nihilism," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 11, no. 1., and William Vollmann, "Friedrich Nietzche: The Constructive 
Nihilist," The New York Times, August 15, 2005. Ironically, of course, Nietzsche viewed 
an uncritical stance toward and acceptance of the given morality as the epitome of 
nihilism itself. For example, in Walter Kaufman’s biography of Nietzsche he 
demonstrates the way in which Nietzsche characterized much of the philosophical work 
of his age as nihilistic and “believed that, to overcome nihilism, we must first of all 
recognize it.” Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 
4th ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). 110 
83 As Raffoul notes, Nietzsche was insistent on the fact that making morality a problem 
and exposing it as the product of “error” was actually about “reengaging our tradition and 
its concepts, an attempt at reevaluating its values, that is, reevaluate the value of values…” 
Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility. 81 
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Writing prior to the 2010-midterm elections, David Brooks dedicated his column 
to an examination of what he called, “the responsibility deficit” in America.84 In 
the article, Brooks laments a loss of accountability and taps into public resentment 
over the severed “connection between action and consequences” in American life, 
arguing, “what the country is really looking for is a restoration of responsibility.85 
To be sure, Brooks draws his inspiration from lawyer and author Philip K. 
Howard who writes extensively on the ways in which the American political and 
legal systems continue to undermine the personal responsibility of ordinary 
citizens.86 Both Brooks and Howard, are part of a larger chorus who treat 
responsibility as an object of loss, something that must be recovered and 
something that we must get back to, calling for clear moral standards and 
increased personal accountability or objective conceptions of obligation, in order 
to redeem our cultures, our communities, and ourselves.87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 David Brooks, "The Responsibility Deficit," The New York Times, September 23, 2010. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See for example, Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is 
Suffocating America (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1994); Life without Lawyers: 
Liberating Americans from Too Much Law, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2009); The Lost Art of Drawing the Line: How Fairness Went Too Far, 1st ed. (New 
York: Random Hose, 2001); The Rule of Nobody: Saving America from Dead Laws and 
Broken Government, First edition. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014). 
87 Highlighting a loss or death of responsibility is in fact one of the key rhetorical moves 
used by political actors in disarming policy prescriptions. For example, recent debates 
around the passage and implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were flooded 
with commentary by opponents of the law that decried the Act as yet one more example 
of the erosion of personal responsibility in contemporary America. Some even went as far 
as sounding the death knell for responsibility in light of the laws passage. See for 
example, Vik Khanna to The Health Care Blog, July 14, 2013; Ed Rogers, "The Insiders: 
Obamacare Discourages Work," The Washington Post, February 5, 2014.  
	   36	  
 However, these “knights of responsibility” (as Derrida refers to them) fail 
to acknowledge responsibility’s deeply paradoxical nature.88 Derrida highlights 
the aporia that lies at responsibility’s core, namely that we are responsible and can 
act responsibly only while simultaneously acting irresponsibly. By acting 
responsibly, “I am sacrificing and betraying at every moment all my other 
obligations: my obligations to the others whom I don’t know.”89 How then are we 
to conceptualize what it means (or should mean) to be responsible to others? To 
ourselves? Or, to use the language of liberal political theory, how are we to 
distribute our obligations and responsibilities in the face of not just the other who 
stands directly in front of us, but everyone else? For Derrida, it is clear that there 
is no objective or simply just distribution; rather, “There is no front between 
responsibility and irresponsibility, but only between different appropriations of 
the same sacrifice, different orders of responsibility.”90 
What changes when we begin our analysis with the idea that responsibility 
is in fact impossible and paradoxical rather than wholly rational and knowable? I 
argue that beginning from this position actually opens up the possibility of 
thinking politically about responsibility and allows us to interrogate the ways in 
which the rhetoric of responsibility does important political work. Beginning from 
a space of impossibility reveals precisely why it is important to become attentive 
to the articulations and representations of responsibility that abound in political 
life. If it is the case that responsibility always fails in one sense and achieves or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Jacques Derrida and Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death; &, Literature in Secret, 2nd 
ed., Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 68 
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authorizes in another, then it is imperative to examine exactly how and why it 
fails and succeeds, but also, and more importantly, what types of responsibility 
succeed and why? When do they succeed? In relation to whom? In what contexts? 
The political and ethical injunction offered to us by Derrida is deceptively simple: 
pay attention when engaging in a language-game as familiar as responsibility in 
contemporary politics.  
 
The Political Work of Responsibility  
 
Political life is always in flux and cannot and should not be wholly fixed.91 
Responsibility rhetoric creates a narrative by which political moments and the 
political itself may be rendered fixed and intelligible. Attributions and definitions 
of responsibility attempt to stabilize that which cannot be stabilized. This 
stabilization is often done by conceiving of responsibility as that which is beyond 
the political, something from outside that can be brought in as a moral claim or 
Truth about the world.  
 In this regard, the rhetoric of responsibility appeals to a desire to escape 
groundlessness and instability. However, responsibility’s role in fulfilling this 
desire does not operate outside of political contexts. Not every narrative of 
responsibility, not every causal attribution, not every definition of obligation or 
impulse to blame will satisfy this desire for fixity and stability. Even Nietzsche 
points to the fact that successful narratives of stabilization are those that are most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 In one sense, Sheldon Wolin’s Politics and Vision can be read as an exploration of the 
ways in which different theorists in the Western cannon have dealt with the dynamic and 
often chaotic nature of political life, from Plato’s attempt to stabilize the disordered world 
of politics with the world of the forms to Hobbes’ imposition of the leviathan and 
Machiavelli’s recognition of contingency as a constitutive feature of political life. Wolin, 
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familiar to us.92 That sense of familiarity provides comfort but, of course, what is 
comfortable and what is familiar do not lie outside of the juridical and normative 
frameworks that are the stuff of political life. Throughout this project I 
demonstrate the ways in which politics and responsibility are mutually 
constitutive, entangled, not aligned serially. Responsibility is contested space. 
Accordingly, I offer an analysis that foregrounds the relationship between 
responsibility and discourses of power, ideology and normativity.  
 Responsibility does political work by operating as a knowledge claim 
about Others, ourselves and the world. It is, as Connolly has described it, Janus-
faced, “both indispensible to social practice and at the same time productive of 
injustice within it.”93 Rather than simply calling attention to those who should be 
held responsible, ascriptions of responsibility may actually serve to produce the 
subjects it marks. Similarly, conceptions of responsible action do not simply refer 
but instead function in a number of ways as both repressive and productive. For 
this reason, I envision three concrete principles of responsibility that I explore in 
greater detail throughout the following chapters. First, responsibility constructs 
and authorizes specific conceptions of political and communal life. Second, 
responsibility plays a key role in the process of subject formation, marking the 
boundaries of the normal and abnormal, the acceptable and pathological. Third, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 As Nietzsche argues in Twilight of the Idols, “Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the 
unknown – the first instinct is to eliminate these distressing states.” But, he argues, “only 
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I take up in greater detail in Chapter Three with an analysis of responsibility and the 
economic crisis of 2008. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with 
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responsibility mediates political reality by structuring the horizon of possible 
ways to perceive and respond to problems, which means that it plays an integral 
role in conditioning what we can see and hear as well as how we evaluate the 
political. 
 Such a move requires that responsibility be situated within specific 
historical, cultural and discursive contexts. As Connolly points out, responsibility 
is not a simple universal, but particular as well as contingent. Reflecting on 
current uses of responsibility, he suggests, “In other times and places it 
[responsibility] was not so agent-centered as it is today: the primary locus of 
responsibility was often the family or the clan rather than the individual…and 
sometimes the gods absorbed a portion of the guilt; if not the responsibility, 
moderns distribute among themselves.”94 Connolly illustrates responsibility’s 
ontological instability, characterized by shaky ground and constant movement. A 
floating signifier, responsibility attaches itself to a diverse array of ever-shifting 
entities. Accordingly, “The history of Western thought is full of attempts to 
relocate the locus of responsibility: from humanity to the gods, from god to 
humanity, from collectivity to the individual, from the past to the present, and 
again, from the individual to a new vision of collectivity.”95 
 This suggests that it is possible and even necessary to speak of different 
objects of responsibility, subjects of responsibility, sites of responsibility and 
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practices of responsibility that conjure and rely upon different conceptions of self, 
time, place and community. In examining responsibility as a political problem, I 
read for these movements and attend to the discursive regimes and ideological 
strategies associated with these shifts. Emphasizing responsibility as a form of 
rhetoric, with a focus on meaning-making and language use, allows for political 
analysis because it provides the tools with which to probe specific conceptions of 
responsibility being offered at particular moments and in response to specific sets 
of circumstances. In so doing, my analysis interrogates what is done in 
responsibility’s name and under its authority.  
 
Structure of Argument 
Recently, a great deal of scholarly work has attempted to rethink responsibility in 
an attempt to move it away from the paradigms of accountability and obligation in 
order to sever responsibility from its linkages to the autonomous liberal subject.96 
While this diverse body of work provides an important touchstone for my project 
and informs my thinking about responsibility, I depart from these concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 A great deal of this work has been influenced by Levinas’ work on responsibility as 
first philosophy. Under the broad heading of what’s come to be known as the ethical turn, 
many contemporary thinkers have emphasized the response aspect of responsibility and 
specifically the relationship with the Other as the fundamental relation constitutive of 
responsibility. No doubt, this is a great simplification, and these works vary a great deal, 
however, examples of this approach include, Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 
1st ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Peter Baker, Deconstruction and 
the Ethical Turn (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995); Simon Critchley, 
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York: Fordham University Press, 2008); Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice, 
Oxford Political Philosophy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
	   41	  
because mine is ultimately not a project that seeks to formulate a normative ethics 
or conceptualize new grounds for responsibility. Rather, by placing responsibility 
in discrete political contexts, I propose to create what Michel Foucault called, “an 
ontology of the present,” by which he meant, an understanding of the range of 
values, experiences and possibilities that comprise our present political moment.97 
 With this task in mind, I examine three specific political contexts in which 
responsibility has played a crucial role in shaping public perception and 
engagement. In Chapter Two, Tragic Heroes and Torturable Bodies: Terror and 
the Politics of Responsibility, I argue that torture discourse in the United States 
following 9/11 has been dependant upon a problematic politics of responsibility 
that is inextricably bound to an Orientalist notion of irresponsibility. Torture 
discourse helps to produce an image of the responsible leader that mirrors the 
liberal subject of choice, autonomy and accountability. Far from possessing a 
purely rational basis, more specifically, the image of the responsible leader 
emphasizes a set of emotional performances that include remorse, guilt, and regret. 
This stands in contrast to the image of the irrational Islamic subject cast as a 
product of a “culture of death” that forecloses the possibility of agency and 
responsibility. As opposed to the responsible leader, these emotions are not 
evidence of morality and remorse, but an irrational and irresponsible subject ruled 
by rage, anger and resentment. 
 I read these two discourses as parallel to one another to see how they 
continually reinscribe a mind/body split that distinguishes the reasonable from the 
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irrational and the responsible from the pathological. Most importantly, American 
torture discourse uses responsibility to humanize and make visible the leader as an 
individual while the terror discourse renders the Islamic subject irresponsible and 
thus non-human. I therefore address the ways in which responsibility operates 
discursively to humanize and constitute visible, legible subjects. This framework 
places responsibility at the center of thinking about who has access to the 
category of the human and how exclusion from that category works to produce 
torturable bodies that are subject to cruelty and violence.  
 In Chapter Three, Rogue Traders, Suspect Citizens and the Invisible 
Hand: Crisis in the Theater of Responsibility, I examine the relationship between 
responsibility and the economic crisis of 2008 in order to demonstrate the role 
responsibility discourse plays in framing ways of understanding and responding to 
political problems. Specifically, I argue that within the context of that crisis, there 
was a marked shift from an anthropomorphizing “market-talk” that displaces 
human agency to an active naming and production of blameworthy subjects. This, 
I suggest serves a political and ideological function by focusing attention on 
individuals and groups and away from a confrontation with the normative and 
systemic violence of capitalism itself. By attending to the multiple corollary 
discourses of responsibility through which that economic crisis was and is framed, 
I catalog the ways in which responsibility renders political moments intelligible 
through ascriptions of blame and accountability. I suggest that in order to respond 
effectively to normative problems, systemic violence, and structural injustice it is 
important to first deconstruct the economic discourse that shuttles between a 
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market-centered model of responsibility and an agent-centered blame model of 
responsibility, both of which serve to sustain the sanctity of the market. 
 In Chapter Four, Whose Future? Environmentalism and the Queering of 
Intergenerational Responsibility, I explore the role responsibility plays in 
constructing and authorizing specific conceptions of communal life. I do so by 
exploring the idea of responsibility to future generations, and argue that an 
environmental politics organized around an ethics of intergenerational 
responsibility is bound to a heteronormative conception of the future. To rework 
these norms I ask the following: what categories underpin, define and delimit our 
imagination of the future? I argue that notions of environmental responsibility are 
already prefigured by and built out of assumptions regarding what is and what is 
not worth sustaining for the future. Drawing upon and in dialogue with 
scholarship from queer theory, I advance a conception of responsibility that 
operates in what Judith Halberstam refers to as queer time and place – a set of 
practices that operate against the logic of a future tied to reproducing the 
heteronormative family and heterosexual desire. I argue that this framework both 
challenges the idea of intergenerational responsibility and allows for a rethinking 
of the temporalities and subjectivities theorists bring to bear in their engagements 
with environmental politics. 
 Finally, in Chapter Five, Rhetoric and the Violence of Responsibility, I 
reemphasize the core argument of this project – that is, that responsibility as 
rhetoric does significant political work. But I also offer some pointed takeaways 
regarding the intimate relationship between responsibility and violence. In 
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recasting responsibility in light of its relationship to violence, I conclude by 
reflecting on the ways in which responsibility is used to mark the very limits of 
human life and offer a framework for approaching the question of whose lives 
count as livable?  
 Ultimately, this project is about more than just a simple act of unmasking 
the unspoken truth of responsibility in the face of so many operations that work to 
conceal its political force. Rather, it is my intention to demonstrate the 
significance of responsibility’s political uses not only because we often miss them 
but also because we are often implicated in them. In this regard, if my project 
disturbs the familiarity of responsibility for the reader, allowing that reader to 
confront responsibility as a rhetorical inscription and not an objective description 
of people and/or events then I will have succeeded. In working to recast our 
orientation towards the use of moral language in politics it is my hope that 
ultimately we begin taking responsibility for the rhetoric of responsibility itself, 
and all of its attendant concepts, especially when they are used in our name and in 
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Chapter Two: Tragic Heroes and Torturable Bodies: Terror and the Politics 
of Responsibility 
 
But what is especially intriguing is the ingenuity of liberal discourse in rendering 
inhumane acts humane. This is certainly something that savage discourse cannot 
achieve.  
 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing  
 
 
On November 5th 2001, with the smell of ash and smoke still engulfing lower 
Manhattan, Newsweek published a bluntly titled article, “Time to think about 
Torture.”98 The article foreshadowed many of the tropes now associated with 9/11. 
In particular, it previewed the dominant discourses of trauma and victimization 
that would emerge to shape September 11th as an event replete with its own 
signifiers, symbols and meanings. Most importantly, the article played with a now 
familiar theme that the America of September 10th no longer existed. This 
argument was meant to imply that the world had fundamentally changed, ushering 
in a new and more dangerous epoch of international politics, violence and warfare. 
Indeed, in a direct challenge to Francis Fukuyama’s claim that “we had entered 
the end of history back in 1992,99 September 12 marked a new – and worse – 
beginning for history. Accordingly, the article suggested the it was time to “take 
the gloves off,” and proclaimed, “In this autumn of anger, even a liberal can find 
his thoughts turning to torture.”100 
 It is within this highly tense and emotionally charged context that a public 
discussion regarding the necessity of torture as a component of the tactical and 
strategic apparatus to deal with the threat of terrorism began to take shape. 
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Twelve years later, in the wake of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and the publication 
of what have now come to be known as the “torture memos,” much debate has 
focused on whether or not those involved in the U.S. torture program should be 
held morally and legally accountable for their actions. There is no doubt that a 
number of important ethical and legal questions have been raised regarding the 
torture of detainees held in U.S. custody, the rendition of terror suspects to 
international black sites for torture by allied regimes, indefinite detention and the 
denial of due process to those categorized as enemy combatants. However, I want 
to begin with Paul Kahn’s assertion that “theory’s role must be to explain torture 
as a political phenomenon, not to simply identify it as a legal violation,” which 
“can only be achieved by examining the manner in which violence creates and 
sustains political meaning.”101 With this in mind I ask, how is torture being talked 
and thought about in the United States. How is it being talked about in relation to 
terror? What assumptions and extant discursive and ideological systems prefigure 
these responses? 
 In this chapter I argue that torture discourse in the United States is 
dependent upon a problematic politics of responsibility that is inextricably bound 
to an Orientalist notion of irresponsibility. Torture discourse helps to produce an 
image of the responsible leader that mirrors the liberal subject of choice, 
autonomy and accountability. Far from possessing a purely rational basis, more 
specifically, the image of the responsible leader emphasizes a set of emotional 
performances sublimated to reason that include remorse, guilt, and regret. This, in 
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turn, stands in contrast to an image of the irrational Islamic subject cast as a 
product of a “culture of death” that forecloses the possibility of agency and 
responsibility. As opposed to the responsible leader, the emotions emphasized 
here are not evidence of morality and remorse, but an irrational and irresponsible 
subject ruled by his emotions – rage, anger, and resentment.  
Accordingly, I read these two discourses as interdependent, highlighting 
the ways in which they continually reinscribe a mind/body split that distinguishes 
the reasonable from the irrational and the responsible from the pathological. Most 
importantly, American torture discourse uses responsibility to humanize and make 
visible the leader as an individual while the terror discourse renders the Islamic 
subject irresponsible and thus non-human. I therefore address the ways in which 
responsibility operates discursively to humanize and make subjects visible. This 
framework begs the question of who has access to the category of the human and 
how exclusion from that category works to produce torturable bodies that are 
subject to cruelty and violence.  
 
Dirty Hands 
The question of torture and the problems it poses for liberalism predate post-
September 11th discussions and the War on Terror.102 Most famously, within the 
Western philosophical canon, the torture problem has been represented within the 
framework of the problem of dirty hands. For this reason I turn to this literature to 
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understand how the problem of torture produces and relies upon a specific type of 
responsible subject in the image of the responsible leader. In particular, I seek to 
examine how this image is made legible and visible through its juxtaposition 
against a parallel discourse about terrorism that takes shape through the 
construction of an irresponsible Other.  
 In the now famous essay, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” 
Michael Walzer defines the problem of dirty hands as a paradox in which:  
“…a particular act of government (in a political party or state) may be 
exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man 
who does it guilty of a moral wrong. The innocent man, afterwards, is 
no longer innocent. If on the other hand he remains innocent…he not 
only fails to do the right thing (in utilitarian terms) he may also fail to 
measure up to the duties of his office.”103  
 
Simply put, Walzer here attempts to engage the paradoxical situation that arises 
frequently in political life where, as the colloquialism goes, one might have to “do 
bad in order to do good.” Crucially, the problem of dirty hands, according to 
Walzer, is not anomalous or exceptional but rather a constitutive feature of 
political life. 
The dilemma of dirty hands rests upon certain assumptions and implicit 
arguments about the nature of political life and the conditions that give way to 
extraordinary action. Most importantly, it assumes the existence of a moral sphere 
that can be identified and known and that lies external to not only the political 
world but also the material world in general. This assumes the existence of a 
space external to politics in which certain universal standards of conduct bind 
moral agents and insists that one is able to know what constitutes moral and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 2, no. 2 (1973). 3 
	   49	  
responsible action in a purportedly non-political sphere. It is this moral sphere 
that constantly runs up against and gives way in the face of the political 
challenges of contingency, exigency and necessity.  
For instance, Max Weber asks pointedly in “Politics as a Vocation,” “what 
relations do ethics and politics actually have?”104 The question already assumes 
the potential for conflict between what Weber classifies as an “ethic of ultimate 
ends” where one acts in accordance with prefigured ends and principles regardless 
of the costs, and an “ethic of responsibility,” where one must account for the 
consequences of their actions.105 Weber argues that the potential for conflict 
between different codes of ethical conduct is ever-present in politics, where “No 
ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the attainment of 
‘good’ ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using 
morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones.”106 
Weber ultimately assumes that any man built for politics and political life 
must accede to the harsh reality that he will have no choice but to violate accepted 
moral norms and be tragically altered as a result. The only suitable disposition for 
Weber’s responsible leader is that of living in the tense and paradoxical space 
between the “ethic of ultimate ends” and the ethic of responsibility.”107 Similarly, 
Walzer’s formulation builds upon a tension between conflicting responsibilities 
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that arise as a result of the office or position that an individual inhabits. The 
problem of dirty hands posits that to engage in political life is to be confronted 
with situations in which the unthinkable becomes not only thinkable, but also 
necessary and thus doable. John Parrish emphasizes this idea in his definition of 
dirty hands, arguing that, “it has long been a truism that significant moral 
dilemmas arise more frequently within the political arena than they do anywhere 
else. Power seems to invite its practitioners to do what would be unthinkable to 
them in ordinary life.”108 This idea that different spheres of life will require 
individuals to assume and perform differing responsibilities that may conflict with 
one another harkens back to Kant’s essay, “What is Enlightenment?” which posits 
that while one might be responsible – as a cosmopolitan scholar and citizen of the 
world – for thinking for one’s self, speaking out, and criticizing freely, the 
individual in his official capacity as a soldier or state official is bound to fulfill 
those obligations that arise as a result of his position.109 
This public-private split is basic to Western configurations of 
responsibility. It is also essential to the way in which torture is situated in the 
framework of the dirty hands narrative at the center of liberal discourse; while the 
political leader may abhor the violence of dirty hands as a man, in taking on the 
responsibility of his office, he understands that this is what must be done. In this 
regard, the dirty hands literature constructs an image of the tragic hero who is 
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forced to sacrifice his sense of morality for the sake of others in a moment of 
emergency. 
However, most importantly, for Walzer and others working in the dirty 
hands tradition, the paradox between action that might be politically necessary but 
also morally wrong is never entirely resolvable.110 Indeed, recognition that the act 
in question will violate moral norms lies at the heart of seeing dirty hands as a 
moral dilemma in the first place. While the utilitarian position would dismiss this 
moral dilemma by insisting that the only tenable moral and ethical position is that 
which maximizes the greatest good and minimizes the greatest harm for the 
greatest number, the dirty hands position sees an irreconcilable conflict wherein 
the action remains simultaneously right and wrong.111 As Stephen De Wijze 
contends, “The primary insight arising from dirty hands scenarios is that it is 
possible for an action to be justified, even morally obligatory, yet nevertheless 
somehow also wrong.”112 The persistence of the conflict, ironically, fortifies both 
the actor’s sense of responsibility and recognition of his humanity.  
 Up until this point I have focused on some general aspects of the problem 
of dirty hands. However, a crucial question remains. Exactly what type of action 
constitutes dirty hands? Is it any action violates the assumed backdrop of moral 
norms? Is it only the most extreme types of actions that fall within the realm of 
physical violence and harm? Indeed, the question of which actions fall within this 
category have been the subject of philosophical debate, in part because Walzer 
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presents his readers with two very different and extreme examples of dirty hands 
in his article – the politician who lies and makes backroom deals to win an 
election and the politician who licenses the torture of a suspected rebel in 
captivity.113 It is not my intention here to rehash these debates or to iron out the 
ambiguities of how one defines actions that constitute dirty hands. Instead, since 
my focus is the question of responsibility, I turn to the dirty hands literature to 
examine how it positions torture within this paradoxical space of doing the 
unthinkable or doing wrong in order to do right.  
 
Ticking Time Bombs and Liberal Hearts 
Walzer situates torture within the now in/famous framework of the “ticking time 
bomb scenario,” in which a political leader “is asked to authorize the torture of a 
captured rebel leader who knows or probably knows the location of a number of 
bombs hidden in apartment buildings around the city, set to go off within the next 
twenty-four hours.” He orders the man tortured, convinced that he must do so for 
the sake of the people who might otherwise die in the explosions – even though 
he believes that torturing is wrong, indeed abominable, not just sometimes, but 
always.”114  
That the ticking time bomb scenario used in Walzer’s article has become 
famous is no trivial matter. In other chapters throughout this project, I devote a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." See also, David P. 
Shugarman and Paul Rynard, Cruelty and Deception: The Controversy over Dirty Hands 
in Politics (Peterborough, Ont. and Australia: Broadview Press: Pluto Press, 2000); Stuart 
Hampshire, Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978). 
114 Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." 9 
	   53	  
great deal of space to analyzing the specific rhetoric of political actors. In this 
chapter, I engage with the philosophical underpinnings of the dirty hands 
argument precisely because of the way in which it became ubiquitous following 
9/11. The question of dirty hands, the ticking time bomb, and its use as a 
justification for torture found its way into just about every discussion regarding 
how to rationalize the practice of torture against suspected terrorists during 
interrogation. Given the rarity with which philosophical arguments become part 
of popular discourse, my intention here is to spend time with not only the original 
texts themselves but the most recent uses of this line of thinking to rationalize 
torture with what Michael Rogin refers to as the “liberal self-image.” In my use of 
the dirty hands framework, I therefore do not claim that this is how President 
Bush or any of his cabinet members and senior advisers saw themselves during 
the course of their actions.	  	  I	  restrict	  my	  analysis	  to	  the	  phenomena	  itself.	  
Following September 11th the hypothetical example began to proliferate 
beyond philosophical debate and into popular discussions about torture in 
television and print media.115 It became a familiar dramatic set up in widely 
popular television shows like 24 and films like Batman: The Dark Knight and 
Unbreakable. Indeed, even the then director of the CIA Leon Panetta got in on the 
act when he assured Congress that “If we had a ticking bomb situation, and 
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obviously, whatever was being used I felt was not sufficient, I would not hesitate 
to go to the president of the United States and request whatever additional 
authority I would need.”116 These examples all point toward the fact that though 
Walzer’s argument dates back to the 1970’s it has indeed become the hegemonic 
lens through which the problem of torture is represented in contemporary 
America and thus worthy of interrogation (no pun intended). 
From the outset then, contemporary discussions about torture in the West 
arise in response to the dynamics of a terrorist threat. Moreover, in these 
discussions, torture is pitched at the register of a moral dilemma, something that 
makes us uncomfortable and uneasy. This plays on the cultural assumption that 
liberal societies are uncomfortable with violence and the notion that not only do 
certain types of violence not come easy to “us,” but in addition, run counter to a 
coherent set of values and moral norms. As Parrish suggests, conflicts about dirty 
hands persist “because they are motivated by a fundamental incommensurability 
among our most deeply felt human demands, and by a moral schizophrenia that 
seems to increasingly characterize our late modern condition.”117 
 The notion that liberalism is indeed uncomfortable with violence and 
inimical to torture has no shortage of supporters. For instance, Michael Ignatieff 
in his argument for the permissibility of torture in specific instances writes, 
“There is not much doubt that liberal democracy’s very history and identity is tied 
up in an absolute prohibition of torture…Liberal democracy stands up against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Mark Mazzetti, "Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some C.I.A. Interrogation," The 
New York Times (2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/us/politics/06cia.html?_r=1. 
117 Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics: From Dirty Hands to the Invisible Hand. 12 
	   55	  
torture because it stands against any unlimited use of public authority against 
human beings and torture is the most unlimited form of power that one person can 
exercise over another.”118 Similarly, David Luban argues that liberalism stands in 
opposition to torture not out of compassion but rather because of torture’s 
intimate relationship to cruelty and tyranny. For Luban, the history of torture “has 
always been bound up with military conquest, regal punishment, dictatorial terror, 
forced confessions and the repression of dissident belief – a veritable catalogue of 
the evils of absolutist government that liberalism abhors.”119  
 In response, I want to suggest that positioning torture as a dilemma within 
the dirty hands framework helps humanize violence, which in turn allows the 
liberal heart to overcome its supposed dis-ease with torture. The question of 
torture within the dirty hands framework rests upon the dual criteria of urgency 
and necessity. In terms of urgency, the ticking time bomb scenario is one in which 
there is little to no time. Every second counts and every second that goes by is a 
second closer to detonation. As a result of the urgency and exceptionality of the 
situation torture becomes a tragically necessary departure from moral norms, 
producing what Oren Gross refers to as a “tension of tragic dimensions.”120 It is 
in this context that Ignatieff argues for what he calls a “lesser evil morality,” in 
which it might be necessary to torture even if it represents a departure from a 
liberal sense of morality or commitment to democratic values such as respect for 
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human rights and dignity. The argument depends on his supposition that 
“democratic evil is the evil of good intentions, necessary because of evil 
people.”121  
But in what context does it become necessary to torture? Luban suggests 
that liberalism’s dilemma with torture may be reconciled through arguments that 
cast torture as an instrument employed to extract the information necessary to 
save lives.122 This is of course a moment where the moral arguments about torture 
are fused to pragmatic aims. Walzer’s responsible leader is one who tortures not 
out of a desire to enact cruelty or participate in brutality, but rather for 
instrumental reasons – to achieve the most desired and most incontestable ends – 
the saving of innocent lives.123 Notwithstanding the work of those who have 
criticized the use of torture as a method of extracting reliable information, arguing 
that individuals under conditions of extreme stress and subject to brutal conditions 
of physical and psychic violence will not produce reliable information there are 
those, such as Fritz Allhoff, who have argued that the only context in which 
liberal societies should opt for torture is in the context of producing 
information.124  
Finally, the dilemma of dirty hands and the supposed conflict between the 
practice of torture and liberalism has given way to debates about the possibility of 
making torture a more “responsible” practice in terms of both procedure and 
tactics. In this vein, Alan Dershowitz has made arguments in favor of what he 
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calls “torture warrants” that would require a political official to obtain a warrant 
from a judge prior to licensing torture as a way to regulate the practice and force 
public justifications of such dire actions.125 With regard to tactics “Much of the 
legal discussion about torture revolves around the decision as to what precisely 
constitutes torture.”126 Both domestic and international law attempts to parse the 
differences between torture, and cruel and inhumane treatment. Similarly, the 
torture memos were attempts at construing the precise nature of what does or does 
not constitute torture in order to establish the acceptable threshold for conduct by 
officials and interrogators. In these debates, the liberal problematic becomes a 
matter of “identifying the justifying exceptions and defining what forms of duress 
stop short of absolute degradation of an interrogation subject.”127  However, what 
escapes legal categorization is the bodily dimension of torture that constitutes 
more than calibrated levels of pain or force to include the total domination and 
humiliation of the victim, coupled with the ascription of responsibility for that 
pain to the victim himself.128 
 
Torture and the Making Human of Responsibility  
While most philosophical and legal scholarship on the question of torture explores 
the problem of responsibility from the perspective of a conflict between politics 
and ethics, what has gone unexplored is the way in which this work is itself a part 
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of a larger discursive apparatus that produces a liberal political imaginary 
regarding the relationship between ethics, politics and violence. As Talal Asad 
argues, “The interrogation center is not merely a source of information and a 
place where abuse may happen. It is a site where a particular kind of identity is 
typified and dealt with.”129 In the following sections I examine how torture and 
terror discourses function in tandem to contribute to an epistemology of 
responsibility that produces torturable bodies, responsible subjects and 
irresponsible cultures. Attending to this epistemology of responsibility is crucial 
for thinking about how certain individuals and cultures are produced as 
“responsible” and how others function as “irresponsible” constitutive exclusions. 
Such distinctions draw on a host of asymmetrical oppositions familiar to colonial 
discourse such as: individual/culture, secular/religious, mind/body. For instance, 
as Abdel Jan Mohammad writes in the “Economy of the Manichean Allegory,” 
“The dominant model of power and interest relations in all colonial	  societies is the 
Manichean opposition between the superiority of the European and the supposed 
inferiority of the native. This axis in turn provides the central feature of the 
colonialist cognitive framework and colonialist representation – the Manichean 
Allegory – a field of diverse yet interchangeable oppositions between white and 
black, good and evil, superiority and inferiority, civilization and savagery, 
intelligence and emotions, rationality and sensuality, self and other, subject and 
object.”130 
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 Within this framework I highlight the binary opposition between 
responsibility and irresponsibility. In fact, the historical development of liberal 
responsibility that relies upon a matrix of causality, agency, will, and intention 
arises out of the imagined opposition between individualism, reason and 
autonomy on one side and culture, unreason and religion on the other.131 However, 
what is most interesting is the way in which this opposition has functioned 
politically to distinguish between groups and populations, advancing logics of 
ruling and doing violence to others while reconciling the use of violence with 
what Michael Rogin refers to as “the liberal self-image.”132  
Though despite the fact that it is this very opposition between 
responsibility and irresponsibility that licenses the torture of specific groups of 
people, it is precisely the inability of liberalism to be reflective about its 
relationship to violence that leads Paul Kahn to argue that, “In truth, liberalism 
has nothing interesting to say about torture.”133 However, in his dismissal Kahn 
misses the dynamic relationship that exists between current debates about torture 
and their reliance on a conception of liberal subjectivity and personhood. The 
very idea of who may be tortured and what violence is justifiable relies upon the 
way in which liberal thought and practice makes use of the concept of 
responsibility to render certain individuals visible within the category of the 
human and certain individuals outside the framework of dignity, rights and 
recognition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See e.g. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 
Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
132 Michael Paul Rogin, Ronald Reagan the Movie and Other Episodes in Political 
Demonology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
133 Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty. 5 
	   60	  
 For instance, Kahn goes on to argue that, “The modern liberal state was to 
be a state in which individuals could flourish in the pursuit of life plans that they 
chose for themselves. This state was willing to abandon torture and instead try to 
respect an ideal of Kantian morality – to treat everyone with the dignity due to an 
autonomous rational agent…This vision of security, respect and mutual well 
being has been at the heart of the project of the liberal nation state.”134 Yet, Kahn 
fails to engage the way in which the liberal project and the production of liberal 
subjectivity has always relied upon and been produced in relation to its “Other.” 
This is no minor or trivial point given that the Kantian ethics that Kahn invokes 
are in fact based not on difference but similitude. Responsibility to others is 
constituted by the proper recognition of another ego, another rational and willing 
agent, who is both autonomous and self-legislating.  
For Kant, to be a person, to be human, is bound to the idea of self-
responsibility. The capacity for freedom and thus the capacity to be responsible 
for one’s self distinguishes persons from objects—responsibility and the 
possibility of being responsible divides the human from the non-human, the 
subject from the object, the person from the thing.135 Similarly, for Locke, the 
idea of personhood is directly linked to the concept of responsibility. Writing in 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke distinguishes the categories 
of man and person, identifying man with the body and personhood with 
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consciousness and rationality.136 The idea of self-reflection and the ability for a 
person to reflect on his past and future actions is a crucial feature of moral agency. 
To be a person in the Lockean sense is to be capable of receiving praise, blame 
and possessing the capacity to obey the law. It is this conception of responsibility 
and subjectivity that has become the bedrock of modern liberal thought and 
practice.  
But to return to a question I posed in the introduction to this project, what 
are the political implications of this ghostly inheritance bequeathed to us by both 
Locke and Kant? The twinning of responsibility and personhood points toward 
the ways in which responsibility and designations of responsibility are often used 
in politics to mark the very limits of human life. The category of humanness is not 
an objective category but rather dependent on that which it excludes – the non-
human, the inhuman, which include the irrational and the irresponsible. Thus to 
speak of the connection between personhood and self-responsibility already 
presupposes a designation based upon who is seen as possessing the capacity for 
rational action and responsibility.  
 My intention, however, is to trace the legacy of the 
responsible/irresponsible binary and its relationship to humanness in order to 
foreground its important role in the construction of knowable others – specifically, 
others that can be tortured. A political approach to responsibility requires 
interrogating the ways in which this binary has played a crucial role in the 
construction of distinct notions of community and has functioned as a 
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foundational component of projects of expansion, colonization, domination and 
exploitation. The use of “metaphysical matter of facts” about individuals, groups 
and entire populations have long since functioned to authorize violence and the 
governance of others, allowing for disclaiming responsibility in the name of 
responsibility. Thus, the question of who is capable of being responsible cannot 
be severed from the highly racialized and gendered development of the category 
of humanness itself.  
Those positioned outside the framework of personhood constituted by a 
specific conception of autonomy, rationality and most importantly, responsibility 
that is both highly gendered and racialized have continuously become the licensed 
targets of violence. It has been a constitutive part of the liberal project to secure 
its boundaries and police its borders through this regulation and production of 
identity and difference. This in turn has allowed for the practice of liberal 
violence in the name of responsibility against irresponsible “Others.”   
 
Imaging/Imagining the Responsible Leader – Torture, Reason, Emotion 
Weber and Walzer focus exclusively on the individual political actor, politician or 
leader, and not broader institutional or bureaucratic structures of decision-making. 
This is important to remember because the discourse of torture runs through the 
individual – and specifically, an individual that is the product of a host of cultural 
and metaphysical assumptions about the self. But what is implied by this focus on 
the individual rather than collective publics? What conception of responsibility 
does it produce? How does it frame the question of torture? In this section I argue 
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that in addition to providing a specific framework for conceptualizing the 
question of torture, the dirty hands literature also works to construct an image of 
the responsible leader. This image produces an epistemology of responsibility that 
relies upon a reinscription of the metaphysical tropes and assumptions of liberal 
subjectivity as well as a typology of moral emotions that casts the responsible 
leader as a sympathetic and tragic hero, while occluding cultural and institutional 
elements from consideration. 
 To focus on the responsible leader is first and foremost to individuate the 
question of torture, reducing it to specific instances and moments of decision. The 
question of torture becomes a matter of contingency and not a question of 
culture—a moment, a decision, a choice, but not a structural, social or cultural 
problem. The focus is on the individual and the traits of the individual that allow 
him to act autonomously, to make this decision through rational calculation and 
deliberation. Weber, for example, writes that the crucial characteristic of the 
political leader is “his ability to let realities work on him with inner concentration 
and calmness.”137 Responsibility in this picture is dispositional, a state of maturity 
in which reason plays a crucial role. The psychic state of the responsible leader is 
important since the responsible leader is able to resist being overtaken by his 
passions and keeps them controlled and in check. In short, when it comes to the 
problem of torture in the West – individuals matter. This will be important to 
revisit to when considering how the discourse of terror in the West functions 
within a framework of cultural discourse that collectivizes responsibility, 
punishment and suspicion.  
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 Parrish notes that the “standard model of the dirty hands 
problem…confronts a lone heroic political actor, who faces an inescapable moral 
dilemma in which he is asked to sacrifice his own moral purity on behalf of the 
public good.”138 Parrish’s remark here is especially telling because it 
demonstrates how dirty hands casts the responsible leader as a tragic hero, like 
Oedipus who can’t help but to seal his own fate. This leader is depicted as a 
victim of the circumstances in which he finds himself – an inescapable moral 
dilemma where even the “right” choice will be “flawed” or “wrong” in some way. 
However, in the face of the necessity that renders the political actor incapable of 
escaping the moment of decision, he still makes a choice; he still exercises reason 
and acts – sacrificing his own moral purity for others.  
Walzer similarly casts his political actor in a sympathetic light, as an 
individual with the best of intentions, a good man faced with the inescapable 
corruption, violence and dirty deeds endemic to the realm of politics. Walzer 
plays on this notion of sacrifice in arguing that “Knowing all this or most of it 
(that political life requires this dirtying of hands) good and decent people still 
enter political life, aiming at some specific reform or seeking general reformation. 
They are then required to learn the lesson Machiavelli first set out to teach: ‘how 
not to be good.’”139 While the responsible leader may abhor violence and torture 
as a man, his position as a political leader forces him to concede to the necessity 
of these tactics.    
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The political actor of dirty hands takes responsibility for his actions. But 
what exactly does it mean to “take responsibility” in this situation? As I stated 
earlier, the problem of dirty hands relates to actions that are paradoxically and 
simultaneously both right and wrong. In this scenario, the responsible leader acts 
out of a deep sense of obligation and commitment, but also understands the 
weight of his actions and can be held accountable for what he has done. For 
instance, Weber argues that the specific “honor of the political leader, of the 
leading statesman, lies precisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what 
he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not regret or transfer. It is the nature 
of officials of high moral standards to be poor politicians and above all, in the 
political sense of the word to be irresponsible politicians.”140 The responsible 
leader does not apply the famous Machiavellian maxim “se guarda al fine” as he 
is not cast as an instrumentalist. Instead, this responsible leader does not let 
himself off the hook, regardless of necessity and in spite of outcomes. Instead, he 
uses the moment of necessity to which he reacts to frame his very willingness to 
take responsibility. “Even though they were moved by moral considerations or 
obligations to commit moral violations, the result is dirty hands, the loss of moral 
innocence and the knowledge that they have been a willing and active causal link 
in the furthering of evil projects.”141 At the same time, the context within which 
he operates comforts the responsible leader and justifies his actions.  
Within this context, knowledge plays a crucial role in the production of 
the responsible leader. The responsible leader knows what he is doing, knows 
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what choice he is making, knows the gravity of the choice but, most importantly, 
responsibility requires an acknowledgement that one has engaged in morally 
dubious actions. In this sense, the image of the responsible leader produced by the 
problem of dirty hands bears a strong relation to the Lockean subject of 
responsibility – an individual who has knowledge of his actions and owns up to 
them.142 This mode of responsibility, in fact, requires ownership and an 
acknowledgement that simultaneously allows the public to “know” him as 
responsible. 
It is at this juncture of “knowing responsibility” that the emotional 
dimension of dirty hands becomes transparent. The dirty hands literature builds a 
link between responsibility and a certain identifiable emotional disposition. 
Specifically, it evokes the idea that emotional responses and the visibility of these 
responses render intelligible a sense of being responsible. The responsible leader 
not only acts with his head but with his heart, his soul; he feels the gravity of his 
actions. The responsible leader does not decide to get his hands dirty lightly; he 
feels the impact of his action beyond the immediate consequences in relation to 
some sense of a higher morality. Either way, the responsible leader must feel. 
More importantly, he must feel in a certain way. I want to suggest that these 
theorists establish a category of what I refer to as “responsible emotions.” 
Emotions that these theorists see as comporting with reason, emotions that bear a 
certain relation to a sense of conscience and the mind – anguish, guilt and remorse. 
For example, Walzer argues that “We know he is doing right when he 
makes the deal because he knows he is doing wrong. I don’t mean merely that he 
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will feel badly or even very badly after he makes the deal. If he is the good man I 
am imagining him to be, he will feel guilty, that is, he will believe himself to be 
guilty. That is what it means to have dirty hands.”143 Interestingly, Walzer fuses 
feeling and being together when he insists that feeling guilty means to believe that 
one is no longer morally innocent. In so doing, he gives feeling and emotion an 
ontological valence that makes the responsible leader an emotional figure: “It is 
by his feelings that we know him.”144 These feelings of guilt function not only as 
internal state for the responsible leader but also as public evidence for his capacity 
to be a responsible leader. Walzer’s responsible leader does not simply suffer. He 
suffers publically. “His willingness to acknowledge and bear (and perhaps repent 
and do penance for) his guilt is evidence, and it is the only evidence he can offer 
us, both that he is not too good for politics and that he is good enough.”145 The 
outward display of emotion humanizes and is a part of the making-visible of 
responsibility. This outward movement serves as evidence that in spite of the 
reprehensible actions engaged in or authorized by this individual, he has retained 
his humanity.  
To be sure, Walzer is not the only theorist to foreground emotions in this 
way. Stephen De Wijze, identifies the emotional disposition of the political actor 
as a key component of the problem of dirty hands. Wijze advances the idea of 
tragic-remorse, which he defines as “a sentiment that acknowledges the difficulty 
that moral agents sometimes encounter when seeking to do the best they can in 
circumstances where the immoral projects of others leaves choices only between 
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bad or evil.”146 In this regard, the projection of immorality onto the Other is 
distinct from the loss of moral innocence experienced by the responsible leader. 
Wijze then differentiates tragic-remorse from simple remorse arguing that; 
“unlike remorse it does not involve any wish that the wrongful act should not 
have been performed, since it was also the right thing to do.”147 For Wijze, tragic-
remorse accompanies the moral pollution and shame one feels for having acted 
wrongly even in the face of necessity. Once again, this sentiment operates as an 
indicator of the acknowledgement that one has violated moral norms and engaged 
in reprehensible ways. In this regard, similarly to Walzer, Wijze imagines the 
responsible leader as a sympathetic and tragically heroic figure who is a victim of 
circumstances beyond his control, and yet acts for the greater good of others, 
sacrificing his own moral sensibilities in the process.   
Critically, Walzer and Wijze rely upon and make use of certain emotions 
as markers of the responsible leader. Furthermore, these theories suggest that the 
emotions bear a more base and primordial – and as a result trustworthy and 
verifiable – truth of the subject, as though feelings reveal truth in a way that 
language cannot, subject as it is to potential manipulation. Used in this way, 
emotions play a significant role in constructing an epistemology of responsibility. 
The message here is clear: without these emotional signifiers we will not be able 
to recognize our leaders as responsible, and most importantly, as still retaining 
their humanity when they act abhorrently.  
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In addition, this strategy emphasizes specific types of emotions – guilt, 
remorse, and regret. In so doing, this emphasis constructs a typology of 
moral/responsible emotions that focus heavily on cognition and seem to 
compliment and comport with rather than subvert reason. Walzer and Wijze’s 
responsible leader feels through thinking about and acknowledging what he has 
done. Yet, there is something rationalistic about this treatment of the emotions 
that emphasizes reason, knowledge, cognition and reflection as opposed to the 
visceral, the instinctual and the bodily. These emotions do not overtake reason, 
but rather work in relation to it. The responsible leader in these images does not 
become a slave to his passions but lives in dialogue between reason and emotion.  
It is important to note that for both Walzer and Wijze emotions are not 
decisive factors in decision-making. Both emphasize emotions that come into the 
picture retrospectively after the decision to torture has been made and highlight 
how engaging in actions that are morally wrong makes one feel. For Walzer and 
Wijze, torture brings on a working through of suffering for the torturer. However, 
they do not consider how emotions might play a role in the decision making 
process itself, eliding the possibility that torture policy and decision-making 
might itself be affective. Instead, their view suggests that the responsible leader 
employs reason to make his decision and then feels retrospectively. In this sense 
Walzer and Wijze split reason from emotion as if to cue the reader to think about 
tough decisions as those that are made in the most responsible fashion – where 
one exercises autonomy, judgment, reason and choice unclouded or contaminated 
by emotional contagion. 
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To be sure, in the wake of the Obama administration’s move to investigate 
the abuse of prisoners by the CIA during interrogation, remarks made by Bush 
and Cheney have been cited as evidence that they are anything but remorseful for 
their actions. However, in their defense of torture tactics, or what they continue to 
refer to as “enhanced interrogation,” both Bush and Cheney, discuss the decision 
to torture within the larger framework of liberal rationalism and responsible 
decision making. Though there are no expressions of outright remorse or guilt, 
their rhetoric gestures towards the difficulty of the decisions they made and the 
urgency and necessity that guided their reasoning. Most important are the ways in 
which the defense of torture makes use of the binary between reason and emotion 
in the act of decision making itself, a point he emphasizes as critical for how 
America as a nation approaches the question of violence. For example, Cheney, in 
response to Eric Holder’s investigation, remarked that Americans “know the 
difference between justice and vengeance”; he insisted, moreover, “along the way 
there were some hard calls. No decision of national security was ever made lightly, 
and certainly never made in haste…for all that we’ve lost in this conflict, the 
United States has never lost its moral bearings.”148  
 
Doubly Bound – Irresponsible Subjects, Torturable Bodies 
To this point I have explored the ways in which torture discourse in the United 
States is structured by the problem of dirty hands. This it does, moreover, by 
individuating the question of torture through a focus on the singular political actor, 
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in turn producing an image of the responsible leader. However, this imaging of 
the responsible leader is constituted as much by that which it leaves invisible – the 
question of who exactly is in the torture chair? How does one become, what Talal 
Asad refers to as, a “torturable body?”149 Who, in fact are these bodies? In a way, 
the abstract discussions about torture induce a disembodied forgetting of the 
materiality of torture. In part, I argue, this is the case because those bodies that are 
subjected to torture have already been produced as tourturable prior to the 
moment of torture itself.  In this section I attend to the ways in which some bodies 
become torturable and the targets of specific types of violence.  
 Shortly after September 11th, then Vice President Dick Cheney remarked, 
“We are dealing here with evil people who dwell in the shadows planning to 
commit international violence and destruction.” Combating the enemy in this 
context, Cheney suggested, requires that we “meet the enemy where he 
dwells.”150 When read in conversation with the problem of dirty hands, Cheney’s 
comment underscores the extent to which the ticking time bomb scenario always 
ticks against a larger backdrop of other potentially ticking bombs and a 
contextualized and “known” enemy who deploys the tactics of hidden explosives, 
operating willingly and comfortably in Cheney’s shadows. In this sense, one 
never simply licenses the torture of an abstract individual, but instead, an 
imagined, and collective enemy. While the question of torture is individuated by 
the image of the responsible leader, the enemy is pluralized, depicted as an 
undifferentiated, homogenous and violent collective.    
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 But how does one imagine the enemy? As we’ll see, imagining the enemy 
is in many respects what Foucault referred to as an operation of power/knowledge. 
Indeed, Cheney’s remarks underscore the idea that “we” know our enemies on 
more than just a superficial level. Instead, we know who the enemy is at their core. 
However, Cheney’s purported knowledge in fact serves to produce the enemy in a 
way that recalls Edward Said’s argument in Orientalism that “knowledge of the 
Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient.”151 In this 
regard, a crucial step in producing a torturable body is the transformation of the 
Islamic subject into an epistemological object to be captured.  
While the question of torture is considered through the image of the 
paradigmatic liberal subject, the discourse on terrorism speaks not in terms of 
individuals but instead, in terms of collectives, peoples and most importantly, 
cultures. As Richard Jackson argues, “A ubiquitous feature of contemporary 
terrorism discourse, observable in a great many political, academic and cultural 
texts, is a deeply problematic notion of ‘Islamic Terrorism,’ a term that comes 
laden with its own set of unacknowledged assumptions and embedded political-
cultural narratives.”152 Jackson highlights that this discourse draws upon a long-
standing tradition of colonial imaginings. While I want to build on Jackson’s 
point and engage this historical framework, I also suggest that the collective 
Islamic subject produced in this discourse bears a certain relationship to 
responsibility that is governed not by a sense of individual personhood and 
autonomy, but by his location in a larger cultural and religious framework. 
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Ultimately it is the transformation of religious and cultural difference into “moral 
and metaphysical difference” that has the most significant consequences for 
imagining the enemy and producing a torturable body.153  
 For example, Mahmood Mamdani argues that “culture-talk” became the 
distinctive explanatory framework employed to render intelligible the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. Mamdani defines “culture-talk” as a mode of discourse, which 
“assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it and then 
explains politics as a consequence of that essence. Culture-talk, for example, 
qualified and explained the practice of ‘terrorism’ as ‘Islamic.’ ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
is thus offered as both description and explanation of the events of 9/11.”154 In 
this regard, culture-talk functions to construct a certain space of meaning around 
events by attributing causality to a specific type of subjectivity that it calls into 
existence through its very attribution.  
 Mamdani situates his conception of culture-talk in a broader framework 
that draws upon the usual suspects of Orientalist discourse like Samuel 
Huntington and Bernard Lewis, both proponents of the now in/famous “clash of 
civilizations” thesis that construes post-Cold War conflict as emanating not from 
political or ideological differences, but rather from cultural ones.155 As 
Huntington writes, “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating 
source of conflict will be cultural…the principle conflicts of global politics will 
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations…The fault lines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 JanMohamed, "The Economy of the Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial 
Difference in Colonialist Literature." 
154 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the 
Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2004). 17 
155 Ibid. 20 
	   74	  
between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”156 Of course, 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis rests upon a politicization of culture and 
begs the question as to what exactly is meant by culture or a cultural explanation.  
Indeed, what is at stake in Huntington’s politicization of culture is a 
specific relationship to culture. It is in this sense that the culture-talk that 
Mamdani highlights functions as an argument about responsibility. While torture 
discourse relies upon a liberal framework that construes responsibility on an 
individual basis and in relation to a process of rational and autonomous 
deliberation, the discourse of the War on Terror produces an image not of the 
responsible subject but of a culture of irresponsibility. Islamic culture in this 
discourse is inscribed not as a function of choice but rather as dominant, 
demanding capitulation and obedience from its adherents. This is juxtaposed 
against a secular, liberal conception of culture that imagines the individual’s 
relationship to culture as something one does rather than something one is. 
Wendy Brown points to this juxtaposition in her critique of how liberal tolerance 
functions as a disciplinary and governing apparatus - “We” have culture,” she 
writes, “while culture has “them,” or “we” have culture while “they” are a culture. 
This asymmetry turns on an imagined opposition between culture and liberal 
moral autonomy, in which the former vanquishes the latter unless culture itself is 
subordinated by liberalism.”157 The presumed dominance and imagined absence 
of choice and autonomy in Islam function to produce the image of an 
irresponsible culture whose members and adherents lack the capacity for 
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subjectivity, ownership and moral decision-making. The absence of these bedrock 
elements so crucial to the Western concept of personhood works to transform the 
Muslim body into an object, outside the category of the human. 
Historically, this imagined opposition has served to license violence 
against those seen as lacking the capacity for moral autonomy. For example, 
Mamdani, citing the work of Slovenian historian Tomaz Mastnak, notes that “the 
point of the Crusades was not to convert Muslims but to exterminate them” 
specifically because as Mastnak argues, Muslims were seen as lacking the 
capacity to choose conversion.158 As he argues: “The Muslims, the infidels, did 
not have freedom of choice, they could not choose between conversion and death 
because they were seen as inconvertible.”159 Indeed, it is this same depiction of 
Islamic culture in opposition to a secular-liberal, and as a result responsible, 
Western subject that continues to traffic in the discourse on terrorism, serving to 
produce torturable bodies that lie beyond the boundaries of personhood. In this 
regard, secular-liberal societies become representations of “responsible cultures” 
while Islamic culture is cast as “irresponsible.” In certain respects this 
juxtaposition draws on very familiar and well-trodden colonial binaries. As Said 
remarked on the operations of colonial power, “On the one hand there are 
Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are rational, 
peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural 
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suspicion; the latter are none of those things.”160 Whereas the responsible leader 
is depicted as capable of separating his obligations and sentiments into their 
appropriate spheres of action through the liberal distinction between public and 
private or the secular separation of church and state, the Islamic subject is 
rendered incapable of negotiating these types of boundaries. In fact, the Islamic 
subject through the combined absence of liberalism and secularism is imagined to 
lack any separation at all.  
This opposition is perhaps no better exemplified than it is by the 
sexualization of torture in the post-9/11 context and the ways in which sexuality 
and gender have been used as a key tactic in the interrogation of suspected 
terrorists.161 In addition to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, in which smiling female 
soldiers posed with detainees on leashes who were both naked and hooded, 
sexualized tactics, including “the feminzation and homophobization of the male 
enemy’s body – through raping prisoners or forcing them to sodomize or urinate 
on one another or crawl naked like dogs or wear hoods that resemble burqas,”162 
were central to U.S. interrogation of prisoners.163  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Said, Orientalism. 49 
161 See e.g. Zillah R. Eisenstein, Sexual Decoys : Gender, Race and War in Imperial 
Democracy (North Melbourne, Vic.: Spinifex, 2007)., Cynthia H. Enloe, Bananas, 
Beaches and Bases : Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, Updated ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Rosalind Petchesky Sonia Correa, 
Richard Parker, "At the Outer Limits of Human Rights: Voids in the Liberal Paradigm " 
in Sexuality, Health and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2008); Kelly Oliver, 
Women as Weapons of War : Iraq, Sex, and the Media (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007). 
162 Sonia Correa, "At the Outer Limits of Human Rights: Voids in the Liberal Paradigm ". 
163 For example, in her book, Women as Weapons of War: Iraq, Sex and the Media, Kelly 
Oliver details “a midnight session in which a female army interrogator unbuttoned her 
uniform ‘almost like a stripper,’ rubbed ‘her breasts against,’ the prisoner’s back, and 
then later ‘placed her hands in her pants,’ and wiped fake menstrual blood on the 
prisoners face.” To be sure, this is but one of the many examples Oliver cites to highlight 
	   77	  
Reliance on these tactics, however, plays directly into cultural 
assumptions regarding Muslim and Arab sexuality and grow out of a long-
standing Orientalist depiction of the male Arab subject as both sexually repressed 
and sexually perverse. Echoing Said’s conception of the relationship between 
knowledge production, violence and colonial conquest, Seymour Hersh, 
demonstrates that the 1973 book by Raphael Patai on Arab culture and 
psychology, entitled, The Arab Mind, which contains a 25-page chapter detailing 
the rules and restrictions that govern sexual relationships between men and 
women, as well as the publicly humiliating nature of homosexuality for Muslim 
men, received considerable attention from military and diplomatic officials with 
significant influence on post-9/11 military and detention operations.164 Puar 
argues that it is “exactly this unsophisticated notion of Arab/Muslim/Islamic 
cultural difference – in the singular – that military intelligence capitalized on to 
create what it believed to be a culturally specific and thus ‘effective’ matrix of 
torture techniques.”165 The assumption made at the highest levels of the U.S. 
military industrial complex was clear: “Muslim men will be particularly 
susceptible to sexualized degradation.”166 This assumption, which directly 
impacted the choice of interrogation techniques is yet another example of how the 
torturable body is produced. As opposed to the calculating and rational Western-
leader who makes decisions regarding the use of torture in a responsible manner, 
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the enemy is constructed as a knowable group – undifferentiated, unified and 
homogenous, with a limited capacity for agency beyond the dictates of their 
cultural affiliations.  
The opposition between responsible and irresponsible subjects is also 
exemplified by the juxtaposition between Western-liberal orientations towards 
emotion and the emotional disposition of Arabs and Muslims. Just as the 
emotions come to play a central role in the torture debate’s construction of an 
epistemology of responsibility, so too do they play a role in producing their Other 
– an epistemology of irresponsibility around the Muslim subject. Just as in the 
dirty hands literature we come to know our leaders as responsible through their 
emotional performances, the emotions displayed by the Islamic subject become 
evidence of his irrationality, his immaturity and irresponsibility. For instance, 
Lewis in The Roots of Muslim Rage writes that  
In moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are 
stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an 
explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the 
government of an ancient and civilized country – even the spokesman 
of a great ethical religion – to espouse kidnapping and assassination, 
and try to find, in the life of their Prophet, approval and indeed 
precedent for such actions.167  
 
What is interesting here is the way in which Lewis uses emotional categories – of 
rage, resentment, and anger – as the markers of truth and knowledge about 
Islamic subjects. Here, Lewis creates a category of “irresponsible emotions,” or, 
emotions that are indicative of irresponsibility – of a subject who lacks the 
maturity to respond and react to situations deliberatively or reasonably. In this 
instance, the Islamic subject becomes disrupted in a moment of urgency and 
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contingency and becomes a slave to his passions rather than in control of them. 
As opposed to the image of the responsible leader in the dirty hands literature who 
deliberates rationally and coolly even when faced with the challenges of urgency 
and necessity and then feels retrospectively, emotions here are a part of the 
decision making process itself. These emotions according to Lewis, overtake the 
Islamic subject who succumbs to its passions. Who in turn displays precisely the 
“wrong” relationship between thought and emotionality.  
While this emotional disposition has long been wielded as a marker of 
racial and sexual difference, Puar has recently noted the ways in which Orientalist 
associations of sexual perversity and depravity serve to construct the “Muslim 
body as pathologically sexually deviant and as potentially homosexual, ” 
solidifying the notion that “Underneath the veils of repression sizzles an 
indecency waiting to be unleashed.”168 The association of the Muslim subject 
with deviance, pathology and perversion, join together to reinforce the image of 
the Muslim body as a dangerous, uncontrollable and irresponsible body in need of 
discipline and punishment in the name of our security. 
 It is crucial to note, however, that while contemporary culture-talk 
borrows significantly from the Orientalist discourse of the colonial past, it does 
not simply rehash it. For example, Mamdani demonstrates the ways in which 
culture talk vis-à-vis Muslims functions along two lines – the pre-modern and the 
anti-modern:  
One thinks of pre-modern peoples as those who are not yet modern, 
who are either lagging behind or have yet to embark on the road to 
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modernity. The other depicts the pre-modern as also the anti-modern. 
Whereas the former conception encourages relations based on 
philanthropy, the latter notion is productive of fear and preemptive 
police or military action.169  
 
What is interesting here is the way in which this places the Islamic subject in a 
double bind. He is at once pre-modern and anti-modern. However, this double 
bind is very much an argument about responsibility. A specific type of 
responsible subject is rendered visible by this cultural discourse. On the one hand, 
pre-modern culture-talk casts the Islamic subject as incapable of catching up to 
the West, on the other hand, however, the anti-modern Islamic subject is depicted 
as unwilling. Thus the Islamic subject is at once both unable and unwilling, “not 
only incapable of but also resistant to modernity.”170 In exchange this double bind 
helps construct distinct conceptions of responsibility on the part of the West.  
To be sure, this double bind is itself constitutive of a post-colonial 
moment. Whereas colonial discourse, from Rousseau to Hegel to Conrad, focused 
largely on a language of inability in order to license domination in the name of the 
civilizing discourse of benevolence that is most famously encapsulated by 
Kipling’s “white man’s burden,” a post-colonial discourse emphasizes the 
abdication of responsibility as a matter of will on the part of former colonial 
subjects, which in turn renders them as potentially threatening as well as non-
compliant and thus torturable.  
This reminds us that the concept of violence always functions within 
concrete cultural contexts. Violence in the torture discourse is depicted as a tactic, 
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a regrettable one, but a tactic nonetheless that is simultaneously a response to a set 
of conditions, if not always principles. Torture is portrayed as something that 
liberals do unwillingly and only in moments of great urgency and necessity. 
However, representations of the enemy make use of a different relationship to 
violence. While violence is something that liberals do, violent is not something 
that “they” are. Violence for liberals is a choice, whereas violence for “them” is 
ontological. For example, Emran Quershi and Michael Sells note that both 
Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis claim “violence is inherent to Islam 
because of its essential distinction between the ‘House of Islam’ and the ‘House 
of War.’”171 This position, they state, leads Huntington to argue that faced with an 
enemy that is both comfortable with violence and inherently hostile means that 
“we should adopt a posture that treats Islam as the enemy it is.”172  
 Similarly, Ignatieff justifies his “lesser evil morality” by noting that “we 
are faced with evil people and stopping them may require us to reply in kind.”173 
The implications here are clear. For Ignatieff, liberal democracies are inherently 
good, but are sometimes forced to engage in violence for the sake of protection, 
security and defense. In this framework, violence, including the violence of 
torture is portrayed as a tactic, a strategy, an action but not ontology. Liberal 
democratic peoples might engage in evil when a situation calls for the adoption of 
such tactics, where as, on the other hand, the enemy is evil. Evil is what “we” 
might do, but evil is who “they” are, a part of their very being. Interestingly, even 
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Ignatieff admits that a major problem with the U.S. strategy was that it failed to 
target individuals and instead punished and targeted collectively. And yet, he does 
not pause to consider how or why something like this could happen. Nor does he 
reflect upon how his own argument about “evil people,” operates within the very 
same logic that licenses this type of collectivizing of an imagined enemy. Is this a 
coincidence or something more fundamental to liberalism itself? 
 
Conclusion 
Reflecting on the torture and detention regimes implemented by the U.S. 
government following 9/11, Talal Asad finds it most remarkable that amidst all of 
the debates concerning the legality of torture as a practice or the efficacy of 
torture as a tactic, there remains a lack of overwhelming public outrage in the face 
of this violence.174 To conclude this chapter, I want to take a moment to pause 
and consider Asad’s point. How are we to understand the absence of outrage on 
the part of citizens living in the West? The answers, I suggest, lie in the two 
interrelated discourses of torture and terror I’ve examined in this chapter, and 
specifically in the crucial role the concept of responsibility plays in both.  
 On one hand, Asad’s remark seems to be a bit tongue in cheek. He follows 
up his surprise by identifying one of the key ways in which liberal subjects 
tolerate the violence of torture. Specifically, he notes that when it comes to 
violence against others, “the liberal sensibility is more discriminating in this 
matter than one might have thought.” For even the most well intentioned liberals, 
it seems clear that, according to Asad, “in a war against barbarians, the use of 
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cruelty has always been more acceptable than it has been against civilized enemy 
populations.”175 As we’ve seen, the terror discourse helps render the Muslim 
body as something other than human by, in part, positioning that body within the 
framework of a larger culture of irresponsibility – lacking the capacity and will 
for the exercise of reason, choice and moral autonomy.  
In this regard, the concept of responsibility plays a fundamental role in 
maintaining and policing the exclusionary boundaries around the category of 
personhood – who we see as worthy of our compassion, our empathy and 
understanding and those we see as dangerous, unstable, threatening and in need of 
discipline, punishment and regulation. As a result, the responsibility for torture 
can be disclaimed in the name of responsibility for the nation. 
However, there is another way in which we might think through the lack 
of public outrage. This, I suggest, has to do with the absence of collective 
responsibility that is all too integral to the way in which the paradigmatic dirty 
hands scenario functions. The image of the responsible leader produced in the 
dirty hands literature relies on the quintessential liberal framework that privileges 
individual reason, deliberation and decision making, devoid of any larger context 
or social structures. Most importantly, the dirty hands framework allows for 
transference of responsibility from the larger citizenry to a specific political actor 
by emphasizing the important role that guilt plays in the public recognition of him 
as a responsible individual. Ultimately, it is this type of thinking that exculpates 
wider democratic publics from truly grappling with what Hannah Arendt referred 
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to as a distinctly political form of responsibility.176 That is, the responsibility not 
for what one has done but for what has been done in one’s name.  
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Chapter Three: Rogue Traders, Suspect Citizens and the Invisible Hand: 
Crisis in the Theater of Responsibility177  
 
The government is promoting bad behavior. Because we certainly don't want to 
put stimulus forth and give people a whopping $8 or $10 in their check, and think 
that they ought to save it, and in terms of modifications…I'll tell you what. I have 
an idea. 
 
You know, the new administration's big on computers and technology-- How 
about this, President and new administration? Why don't you put up a website to 
have people vote on the Internet as a referendum to see if we really want to 
subsidize the losers' mortgages; or would we like to at least buy cars and buy 
houses in foreclosure and give them to people that might have a chance to 
actually prosper down the road, and reward people that could carry the water 
instead of drink the water? 
- Rick Santelli, CNBC 
 
 
Beginning in 2008, the language of economic crisis came to dominate American 
political discourse. This language raises a series of difficult questions such as, 
how did we get here, what is to be done, and who exactly is the “we” that is in 
crisis. Parsing the language of crisis is no simple task. Amid the numerous 
accounts of what caused the crisis, as well as the abundance of solutions proposed 
to bring the crisis to a swift conclusion, one thing is certain: crises disorient rather 
than clarify. Indeed, the economic crisis of 2008 raises larger questions about the 
nature of crisis itself. How do we make sense of crisis? More importantly, how 
are moments of crisis narrated and explained?   
In this chapter, I argue that the rhetoric of responsibility plays a central 
role in stabilizing moments of crisis through narratives of causality, blame and 
accountability. 
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Specifically, I analyze the multiple corollary discourses of responsibility that 
emerged around the 2008 economic crisis and argue that the language of 
responsibility that lies at the heart of American political self-identification serves 
to deflect attention away from powerfully organized social interests and the 
violence of economic institutions. By attending to the multiple discourses of 
responsibility through which that economic crisis was framed, I suggest that, 
particularly through ascriptions of blame and accountability, the rhetoric of 
responsibility helps mediate crises and establishes a boundary between what is 
and what is not considered a moment of crisis. This renders political moments 
intelligible, structuring public perception of economic crisis and delimiting 
possible responses to it.  
 
Natural Forces and Invisible Hands: Market Talk in (sort of) Ordinary 
Times 
 
At 9:30 A.M. EST the opening bell rings at the New York Stock Exchange and 
trading commences. Even before this ritual begins, commentators and pundits, 
economists and casual investors alike have been talking for hours—about what 
we can expect from the market, assessing and anticipating its movements and 
flows. Surrounded by line charts and graphs that gauge the market’s “pulse,” a 
roundtable of financial experts banter about the relationship between the “health” 
of the market and that of the nation. Others talk about the need for an “adrenaline 
shot” in the form of stimulus spending. The scene here is like the early shift in a 
hospital emergency room, preparing for unknown patients certain to be coming 
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through the double doors. From the language of health and sickness, to metaphors 
of the body, the market sounds, feels and begins to look real.178 
 And yet, there is nothing exceptional in what these commentators say or 
how they say it. The anthropomorphic language recalls David Brooks’ 
observation that in “normal times, the free market works well,” which 
underscores the way crises operate as markers that divide the normal from the 
exceptional.179 But if a crisis is understood as a break with normalcy, then the 
question remains; what differentiates a moment of crisis from a normal state of 
affairs? In this section I examine how discussions of the economic system in 
“ordinary times,” to use Brooks’ characterization, are dominated by a 
depoliticizing discourse that attributes responsibility to other worldly and 
incontestable forces.  
 To be sure, political and economic commentators “often frame discussions 
of inequality in a curiously passive, technical and distinctly apolitical way.”180 As 
an example, Larry Bartels cites an article in The Economist that notes that, “After 
2000 something changed. The pace and productivity gains have been steered 
towards the highest earners, and towards companies whose profits have reached 
record levels of GDP.”181 Examples of this depoliticizing rhetoric abound, as 
when Bush administration Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson noted that, “as our 
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179 David Brooks, "The Bailout Artists," The New York Times, March 18, 2008. 
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economy grows, market forces work to provide the greatest rewards to those with 
the needed skills in the growth areas…this trend is simply an economic reality 
and it is neither fair nor useful to blame any political party.”182 
 Similarly, in her ethnography of Wall Street, Karen Ho found that traders 
often blame mechanisms of market causality for their own job insecurity. In her 
interview with Raina Bennett, an analyst laid off by Lehman Brothers in early 
1999, Ho observes a tendency to “[portray] markets as capricious forces of nature, 
unpredictable, unstoppable storms,” against which individuals are helpless. 
Bennett blames the market for her loss, which “could not justify a group of this 
magnitude….”183 Importantly, Ho makes the explicit link between Bennett’s job 
loss and a particular notion of responsibility at work in her characterization of 
downsizing: “By naturalizing the agency of downsizing in markets and market 
cycles, she [Bennett] dispersed responsibility from particular investment banking 
actions. What is missing is an analysis of how the values and practices of 
investment banks helped to construct both ‘the market’…and their approach to 
employment and the workplace.”184 Indeed, her attribution of downsizing, 
unemployment and instability to autonomous market forces is not anomalous to, 
but quite representative of, how investors and financial professionals talk about 
the world they inhabit.185 
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185 Ho’s book is littered with examples of Wall Street professionals who operate with a 
notion of market-based causality as a primary explanatory framework for economic 
indicators like downsizing and unemployment. The “tautological answer of market 
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 What is especially telling in this discourse is the use of terms like 
‘something,’ ‘it seems,’ ‘market forces,’ and ‘economic reality,’ each of which 
conjures an air of distance from and lends objectivity to economic phenomenon, 
producing a productive ambiguity that leaves the inner workings of the economy 
shrouded in mystery. The discourse at work presents such shifts as both normal 
and inevitable, hence presenting no cause for alarm. Moreover, these seemingly 
objective attributions of causality also depoliticize questions of economic 
importance by positioning responsibility for the market and the larger economy as 
something outside of human decision-making and control. However, this way of 
speaking allows us to miss the fact that economics is a discursive practice despite 
its doctrinal adherence to positivist methods. In fact, it is this very denial of 
rhetoric that contributes to its force.186 As Deirdre McCloskey argues, “The 
scientific study of finance…claims to reach beyond anecdote and parable to the 
dignity of science. The rhetoric of science since the seventeenth century has been 
that science is outside of rhetoric.”187  
 Far from anomalous, these discursive frames are part of a tradition within 
both classical liberal economics and neoliberalism to naturalize and 
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anthropomorphize the market.188 This tradition, in turn, presents market forces as 
a product of nature, a rhetorical move that severs the economy from political life. 
Accordingly, in the Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault identifies a shift that 
occurs in the middle of the eighteenth century wherein markets become sites of 
truth, as objects “that obeyed and had to obey ‘natural,’ that is to say spontaneous 
mechanisms.”189 As Foucault explains, the market functions as a site of what he 
calls “veridiction,” a kind of litmus test of what is and what is not true.190 But 
what truth does it advance? Foucault argues that the market illuminates not only 
what is true in terms of economic practice but also what is natural and true in 
terms of governmental practice: “inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance 
with the natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth 
which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which 
are erroneous.”191 Consequently, the truth of the market becomes a force that 
governments must obey since it is on this basis, and only on this basis, that the 
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distinction between good and bad governmental practice can be made. That the 
market is natural, good and true becomes both familiar and self-evident.192  
 Yet, the discourse of the market is seldom grasped as discourse, in part 
because it is precisely the purpose of neoliberal economic language to place its 
behaviors “beyond good and evil.” In this way, market rhetoric plays an important 
role in the advancement of neoliberal projects, which if they were observed as 
neoliberal, rather than natural, projects, would expose the political dimensions of 
supposedly natural behaviors.193 In other words, it would make clear that the 
“invisible hand” of Adam Smith is always governed by real – often dirty – hands; 
exposing the man behind the supposedly unguided capitalist curtain. 
 David Harvey notes that the advancement of neoliberalism was “masked 
by the rhetoric of “individual freedom, liberty personal responsibility and the 
virtues of privatization, the free market and free trade,” all of which served to 
“[legitimize] draconian policies designed to restore and consolidate class 
power.”194 However, in his passing reference to the rhetoric of neoliberalism, 
Harvey suggests that this is all “just rhetoric,” simply providing cover for capital 
rather than telling us something important about capital itself. In so doing, Harvey 
engages in the well-known Marxist tendency, illustrated clearly in The German 
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Ideology, to discount the rhetorical structures of capitalism as so much 
“theoretical bubble blowing.”195 
 In taking the rhetoric as my object of inquiry, I do not want to simply 
swap the materiality of capitalism for the immateriality of language. Quite the 
opposite. I aim to interrogate the rhetoric of capitalism to examine precisely how 
it captures and organizes a material base. Here I take my cue from Foucault’s 
assertion that “the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the 
workings of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent, ” 
exposing them “so that we can fight them.”196 This requires a critical encounter 
with the concepts, rhetoric and discursive patterns that over time become the 
naturalized truth so that, as Nietzsche reminds us, we may remember that 
concepts have histories, and as I stressed in the introduction to this project, 
languages do not simply refer to things in the world.197 In this view, the language 
game of capitalism does not simply provide cover for the systemic violence of 
capitalism but is itself a key vehicle through which that violence is wielded. In 
fact, the reason why the conditions of capitalism and its systemic violence are 
rendered invisible is precisely because its rhetoric and discursive regime 
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constantly escapes critical reflection. What would happen if we, to invoke the 
language of James Carrier, make the discourse of the market “strange” rather than 
ordinary?198 Might it alter our ability to respond to capital? 
 
Rhetorical Strategies of Neoliberal Economics 
Naturalized and anthropomorphic rhetoric dominate “normal” neoliberal 
economic analysis, performing several functions. To talk about the market as 
natural is to attribute responsibility to forces beyond human control. At its 
simplest level, to anthropomorphize is to give human characteristics to that which 
is not human – to an object, an animal or abstraction. These strategies construct 
the market as no mere human agent, but something more powerful, even 
otherworldly. When markets are treated as mystical fountains of authority, 
circumstances and events appear inevitable and natural. Above all, market 
discourse constitutes a brand of responsibility made possible by the erasure of 
human agency.  
 Hence Iris Marion Young identifies markets as a critical means by which 
actors can avoid taking responsibility.199 Markets operate as arguments about 
causal relations that appease liberal sensibilities by emphasizing a discourse that, 
as Young explains, centers on “actors treating products of human action in 
particular social relations as though they are things or natural forces.” – as the 
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rhetorical justification for reification and its psychoanalytic cousin, market 
fetishism.200 
 Young’s piece sharpens our understanding of neoliberal market discourse. 
Yet, to speak of market discourse, as a means of avoiding responsibility through 
the reification of market concepts is to miss that capitalism, read rhetorically, both 
blames and exculpates, disclaiming responsibility in the name of responsibility. 
By invoking the language of reification, Young speaks in a register that opposes 
ideology to Truth, even as abstract concepts such as the market do not reduce, 
simply, to ideological reifications. They are, as Ho suggests, “important 
formulations through which finance speaks,” and as a result, “even in their 
opaqueness, are culturally significant and needed to be taken seriously, 
interrogated, unpacked.”201 I want to underscore the importance of seeing 
economic models in their fully rhetorical light so that we may see – in pursuit of a 
clearer understanding of responsibility – that the truth of neoliberal economics is 
to a large extent “a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and 
anthropomorphisms”202 designed to navigate and explain through a carefully 
delineated politics of responsibility. 
 This representation of the economy “empties capitalism of its social and 
political content” because it casts the laws and forces of the market as natural and 
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immutable entities.203 The logic of the invisible hand and the naturalness of the 
market are painted as both separate from and outside the control of politics. 
Consequently, these strategies are indicative of the ways in which the rhetoric of 
responsibility is often used as a rhetoric depoliticization, transforming political 
questions of class power, exploitation, and domination into technical questions of 
neoliberal economic calculation devoid of culpability or redress. Rising economic 
inequality, the ever widening gap between the rich and the middle class and the 
almost complete erasure of the poor from public discourse in America are not 
considered to be exceptional, and as a consequence do not warrant the urgent 
responses associated with crisis. Indeed, they are rendered non-response-able. 
At the same time, to criticize market discourse as a form of responsibility 
rhetoric that erases human agency is not to simply call for a reaffirmation of a 
fictional “I” or a liberal subject. Instead, by revealing that which remains 
concealed in the discourse of the market we can see that these realities are not the 
outcome of natural and disembodied forces but rather the direct result of complex 
social relations, class power dynamics and partisan politics. In this clearing, 
Brooks’s observation takes on new meaning: “In normal times the market works 
well.”204 In normal times indeed. 
 
Crisis in the Theater of Responsibility  
To this point, I have suggested that the language of crisis contests presumptions of 
normalcy. To call something a crisis is to signify that a situation is exceptional, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical 
Materialism (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 19 
204 Brooks, "The Bailout Artists." 
	   96	  
abnormal and even pathological. Crises thus serve as markers to distinguish 
normality from deviance. Crisis, understood as an event, ruptures the everyday, 
transcends the status quo and represents a radical break from what was taking 
place before its onset. As such, it counsels an urgent departure from usual 
procedures of response. 
 Thought of in this way, the invocation of crisis should provoke critique. 
How exactly do we understand moments of crisis? How do we respond to them? 
By shaping their representation, the frameworks through which a crisis is 
mediated helps determine our comprehension of crises – their causes, effects and 
implications. Such frames are therefore simultaneously productive and repressive, 
working to define and delimit the field of intelligibility, including the Truth of 
crisis itself. As Derrida suggests, “The representation of crisis and the rhetoric it 
organizes always have at least this purpose: to determine, so as to limit it, a more 
serious and more formless threat, one which is, in fact, faceless and 
nameless…By determining it as a crisis, one tames it, domesticates it, neutralizes 
it – in short, one economizes it.”205 But how does one economize an economic 
crisis? 
From the beginning of the 2008 crisis, commentators asked, “Who is 
responsible?” The implication is clear: if the economy is in crisis, it is broken, and 
if it is broken, there must be responsible agents who did the breaking. Is it the 
banking industry? Bear Stearns? AIG? Deregulating politicians, past and present? 
Irresponsible loan recipients who should not have accepted sub-prime mortgages? 
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Alan Greenspan? Bernard Madoff? Business schools? Wall Street culture? 
American culture? For this reason, the narrative of crisis is largely transmitted 
through and mediated by a language of responsibility that shifts the discourse 
from the natural and the necessary to an active naming of responsible parties in an 
attempt to provide adequate and satisfying responses to the question of causality. 
These attributions then link causality to a notion of moral responsibility that ties 
active naming to guilt, blame, retribution and punishment.  
 
Subjects of (Ir)responsibility – Rogue Traders, Suspect Citizens 
In the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2008, Time magazine identified 
“25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis.”206 The article amounted to a virtual 
“perp walk” using a slide show format in which each slide contained a picture of 
the suspect in question standing in front of a mock mug shot backdrop. From 
individual actors like Countrywide’s co-founder Angelo Mozilo, to former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, to the less specific and broader group 
of “American consumers,” the article provides an explanatory framework for the 
economic crisis that operates through the isolation of specific individuals and 
groups as irresponsible, blameworthy and guilty. The article’s format is telling 
because the slide show itself isolates and removes a sense of interconnectivity 
between the parties involved. The viewer’s experience is structured by isolated 
and individual slides and the absence of any representation of social connectivity. 
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 The article is representative of the general tendency within public 
discourse to explain crisis through narratives of blame and responsibility.207 For 
example, in response to the events in 2008, Thomas Friedman wrote that it was a 
“near total breakdown of responsibility at every link in our financial chain, and 
now we bail out the people who brought us here or risk a total systemic 
breakdown. These are the wages of our sins.”208 These two sentences illustrate 
multiple uses of responsibility operating through the register of accountability and 
blame. Friedman points to a pervasive failure of responsibility, yet also singles 
out an unspecified group of people who are responsible for having brought us to 
the brink. And yet, the logic of necessity that Friedman invokes to justify the bank 
bailout rests upon the notion of communal failure wherein responsibility becomes 
the burden of the entire community; in both a retributive and redemptive way, 
“we” will pay for “our” sins. 
 Others, such as John Steele Gordon, were more precise in their 
assessments. Writing in The New York Times, Gordon argues, “There is no doubt 
how we got into this mess. To be sure there is plenty of blame to go around; greed, 
as it periodically does when traders and bankers forget the lessons of the past 
clouded judgments.”209 At the same time, some singled out “the guilty men of 
Wall Street,” arguing about who the world’s worst and most villainous banker 
was, brooding over whether Dick Fuld, former president of Lehman Brothers, was 
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a more detestable specimen than the rest of his peers.210 Still others directed 
responsibility toward the “shocking failure of government regulation,”211 while 
foreign commentators did their part to nationalize and localize the blame, as when 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
both remarked pointedly “that the crisis has come from America.”212 In addition, 
documentary films like Michael Moore’s, Capitalism: A Love Story, and Charles 
Ferguson’s Oscar winning film, Inside Job, sought to explain the economic crisis 
by identifying guilty parties.213 Indeed, Ferguson paused at the beginning of his 
Oscar acceptance speech to reflect on the fact that “not a single financial 
executive has gone to jail and that’s wrong.”214 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some commentators point to the 
failings of suspect citizens and the loss of morality, decrying the “culture of debt” 
that led to the economic crisis and the moral hazard that deregulation did not 
cause, but enabled. In a now-famous outburst, CNBC commentator Rick Santelli 
opined from the floor of the Chicago Exchange, “This is America! How many of 
you people want to pay your neighbor’s mortgage that has an extra bathroom and 
can’t pay their bills? Are you listening Mr. President? The government is 
promoting bad behavior…Reward people that can carry the water rather than 
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drink the water.”215 Brooks widens the net, asking, “Who’s not to blame? The 
mortgage brokers were out of control. Regulators were asleep. Home buyers 
thought they were entitled to Corian counters and a two story great room…This 
was an episode of mass idiocy.”216 As a result, he asks, “Why should the 
government do anything? Shouldn’t people be held responsible for their stupidity 
and greed? Our economic system is based on the idea that people take 
responsibility for their own decisions.”217 It is important to note that arguments 
such as Santelli’s and Brooks’ not only link personal responsibility to an 
assessment of what caused the crisis, but bear the familiar marks of retribution 
and punishment.  
To be sure, arguments for the restoration of a sense of personal 
responsibility fit into a larger discursive framework that has been identified with 
the rise of neoliberal ideology.218 However, to simply dismiss these arguments as 
ideology obscures the subtle ways in which the targets of personal responsibility 
discourse are often racialized. While some commentators pitch their criticism at 
the level of the nation as a whole, various conservative commentators define 
suspect citizens through categories of racial identity. For example, Neil Cavuto 
commented that financial institutions should be held responsible for “lending to 
minorities and other risky folks,”219 and Michele Malkin emphasized the fact that 
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“half of the mortgages to Hispanics are subprime.”220 Both suggest that a loss of 
personal responsibility in America is coupled with an overall decline of American 
values of personal responsibility and self-sufficiency, and a loss of American 
(read: white, Christian) culture.  
The idea that individuals abdicated their personal responsibility raises the 
question: who exactly are these suspect citizens, and how are they also constituted 
through the discourse of responsibility? Brooks’ meditation on why people should 
be held responsible for their actions buries the fact that while certain individuals 
will be required to demonstrate that they are taking responsibility, others will 
escape this burden. Brooks’ comment provides a prototypical approach to 
responsibility that takes the concept as a pre-discursive and objective description 
of facts in the world rather than a product of a political culture.  
 
From Invisible to Visible Hands 
In the last section I showed that crisis interacts seamlessly with a broader 
discourse that hails the market as an otherworldly agent of truth and necessity. 
Moments of crisis demand not only a response but also an answer to the question 
of how the crisis came about in the first place. For instance, conceptualizing 
financial crisis as an event, as something that transcends the ordinary, suggests 
that a specific conception of responsibility will emerge to represent the crisis. But 
how do we make sense of this framing of events as manifestations of individual 
responsibility, accountability, fault, and blame? What does it mean to be held 
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responsible or to assume a greater share of responsibility? Even a cursory analysis 
makes clear that the language of responsibility is neither benign nor neutral. Thus, 
to make sense of this framing requires returning to one of the three concrete 
principles of responsibility that I outlined in this project’s introduction. 
Specifically, how responsibility is often used to mediate reality, conditioning what 
we can see and hear as well as how we evaluate the political.  
The search for beginnings and origins is inextricably linked to a 
conception of responsibility as accountability and blame that runs through the 
Western tradition. For instance, as Francois Raffoul argues in his recent work, 
The Origins of Responsibility, Western conceptions of responsibility as 
accountability operate with a host of assumptions about the self and the world in 
which that self exists. Responsibility is positioned within a matrix of causality, 
agency, will and intention. Aristotle, in his discussion of moral responsibility in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, makes the question of causality central to the concept of 
responsibility. Simply put, for Aristotle, responsible actors are those who can be 
said to have voluntarily caused or made something happen in the world. For Kant, 
it is his argument regarding the nature of human freedom and the subject as self-
cause in the Critique of Pure Reason that allows for what Kant refers to as the 
imputability of actions to human subjects. Yet, this tradition has rarely noted that 
to plot origins is itself a political act.  
 Rather than simply calling attention to those who should be held 
responsible, an ascription of responsibility produces the subjects it marks. In a 
similar vein, Judith Butler argues, “to be addressed is not merely to be recognized 
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for what one already is, but to have the very term conferred by which the 
recognition of existence becomes possible.”221 Subjects of responsibility become 
recognized and recognizable not prior to discursive regimes but insofar as they are 
constituted by them. In this sense, responsibility operates not as a simple 
description, but a moral inscription that simultaneously isolates, binds, produces 
and disciplines. In so doing, responsibility narratives structure ways of perceiving 
and responding to social problems, making visible a certain knowledge of the 
world while rendering invisible that which falls outside its boundaries of truth.  
 Ascriptions of responsibility within the liberal tradition that cast a gaze on 
individual agents as blameworthy focus public attention by, as Chad Lavin 
observes, “establishing the limits of possible and appropriate targets for political 
attention.”222 From greedy bankers to greedy unions, discourses of responsibility 
bring characters to life in relation to a larger narrative about the economy. This 
reminds us that responsibility is representational, a frame through which we tell 
stories about ourselves, but also a mechanism for ordering reality to make sense 
of a world that often appears, and is, very much out of order. But why these 
particular stories?  
 The question of causality and its relationship to responsibility is fraught 
with difficulty. For Nietzsche, the search for a causal agent is reflective of a 
psychological desire for certainty, a need to stabilize and allay feelings of fear and 
anxiety that emerge in relation to the unknown and perhaps the unknowable. To 
pose and answer the question of causality helps render a disorienting and 
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destabilizing moment intelligible and knowable. As he argues in The Twilight of 
the Idols, “Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown - the first instinct is to 
eliminate these distressing states. First principle: any explanation is better than 
none.”223 Responsibility operates as an object of desire that ossifies in the face of 
a crisis that produces anxiety and fear. Nietzsche’s contention is that the causal 
explanations that work are those we find comforting and familiar, which suggests 
that not just any explanation will serve as a satisfying response to the question of 
causality. Indeed it is only “our most habitual explanations” that will “abolish the 
feeling of the strange.”224 Responsibility serves to stabilize the unstable, to make 
the strange ordinary.  
 But how do we make sense of precisely which explanations will produce 
that feeling of comfort? Answering this question requires moving beyond the 
language of desire and psychology to a more sustained political critique that 
examines how desire, familiarity and comfort emerge and exist discursively 
within institutions of power. With this in mind I turn to Foucault’s work in order 
to build a bridge between Nietzsche’s critique of causality and the current 
narratives of responsibility circulating as explanatory frameworks for the financial 
crisis.  
 Foucault opens The Order of Discourse by reflecting on the anxiety that 
having to begin or locate a point of origin produces. He argues that one does not 
begin ex nihilo but rather within a space already prefigured by the discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer. 62 
224 Ibid. 62 
	   105	  
regimes of systems and institutions.225 Foucault’s suggestion illustrates that as 
disorienting as a moment of crisis might be, ideological and discursive systems 
have already constructed spaces from which explanatory narratives about crisis 
can emerge. Most importantly, he shows that discursive systems have built-in 
capacities to deal with and thus respond to crises. He argues that “in every society 
the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and 
redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role it is to avert 
its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events.”226 Foucault here affords a 
way of understanding the shift from market-talk that displaces human agency and 
renders invisible the everyday violence of capital to the active blaming of 
individuals and groups. This approach highlights the way in which liberal 
capitalism calls upon its built-in mechanisms to contextualize responsibility so as 
to exculpate itself, or disclaim responsibility in the name of responsibility.  
 Within the context of the economic crisis, the shift from market-talk to an 
active naming and production of blameworthy subjects serves a political and 
ideological function by focusing attention on specific individuals and groups and 
away from a confrontation with the normative and systemic violence of capitalism 
itself. In a moment of economic crisis one cannot merely say, “This is simply the 
natural force of the market at work,” since such a statement would certainly raise 
questions as to the soundness of the broader system. The restaging of 
responsibility to the active “discovery” of guilty parties helps maintain the 
integrity of capital and sustain the mythology that the market is rational, objective, 
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and natural, but had been undermined and polluted by a few bad apples. The 
discovery of guilty parties preserves the notion that the system would work fine 
were it not for the negligent and deviant conduct of certain rogue individuals. In 
the name of restoring the market to its pre-crisis state of normalcy, the multiple 
corollary discourses of responsibility thus stage crisis by isolating those who have 
committed crimes against “nature.” These ascriptions of responsibility produce a 
unified, autonomous and rational subject that wills and acts prior to history, 
beyond power relations, outside of accepted norms and disconnected from 
inherited social institutions. Although this may be helpful in speaking to specific 
instances of personal injury, as Lavin argues, “it all but proscribes that possibility 
that political phenomenon do not result from the acts of individual agents or that 
politics depends upon unwilled and superbly complicated institutional 
arrangements embodied in bureaucracies, markets and traditions.”227 Exemplary 
of this way of thinking are the personal responsibility narratives that chide 
segments of the American citizenry for racking up debt and taking on mortgages 
that they “knowingly” could not pay back. These ascriptions erase a historical 
context in which the ideal of home ownership and the ownership of property exist 
as normative values at the core of American culture. This erasure and forgetting 
both operate as not only modes of stabilization but also as modes of 
depoliticization. In addition, they conceal the way in which easy access to credit 
and debt spending become core components of post-Fordist economies in the 
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wake of wage stagnation and the decline in labor power and unions vis-à-vis 
employers.228 
 The localization of responsibility around specific targets of blame ensures 
that these larger systemic issues remain unseen, unexplained and altogether free 
from interrogation. The isolation of responsible parties frees us from the burden 
of probing deeper into the normative and systemic violence of capitalism. As 
Young argues, the blame and fault model of responsibility, “[pins] responsibility 
on one agent in order to absolve others.”229 I want to push this point further to 
argue that the blame model of responsibility at work here not only conceals 
capitalism’s systemic violence, but is itself a part of the that very systemic 
apparatus. It exculpates the system of capitalism through the isolation of 
individual agents.  
 There is something else at work in the blame model of responsibility, 
namely that those personal responsibility narratives intended to explain how and 
why financial crisis occurs suggest that crises of capitalism are also crises of 
liberalism.230 In this regard the movement from the abstract agency of the market 
to the active naming of responsible subjects not only conceals the structural 
violence of capitalism but also aims to fill in cracks and fissures in the 
metaphysical edifice that a financial crisis produces. In other words, it is precisely 
when the world seems completely unstable and beyond individual control that the 
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move is made to shore up the concepts of individual freedom, choice and 
responsibility rather than confronting the messy reality of situated actions. Is it 
any surprise then that the discourse of personal responsibility proliferates rapidly 
within the context of neoliberal financialization, increased globalization, 
corporate mergers and the centralization of finance capital? The economic crisis 
thus culminates in a kind of legitimacy crisis, not just for capitalism as a system, 
but also for liberalism itself.  
 
Conclusion - From the Non-Response-Able to Response-Ability 	  
But what then does this mean for political action, perhaps within the context of 
progressive political projects? Do we need a subject of blame or responsibility in 
order to respond in politically efficacious ways? To interrogate responsibility is 
not to disable it as a concept or induce political paralysis. Political response must 
first take shape through a careful consideration of the process of production 
through and by which one becomes a subject of responsibility in the first place in 
order to contest those very designations. Exposing the workings of power is a 
necessary exercise of any progressive politics because the possibility of 
responding requires making visible precisely that which is concealed through 
those attributions of responsibility that currently dominate neoliberal and market 
discourse. This, moreover, we must do to both grasp and reject the too-simple, 
too-seductive binaries on which capitalist discourse thrives, forcing us to attend to 
the ordinary, every-day violence of capitalism itself. 	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 With all the talk of responsibility what really suffers is the potential for a 
certain type of response-ability—an ability to respond effectively to normative 
problems, systemic violence and structural injustice. My analysis suggests that 
responsiveness is limited because of the mystifications generated by economic 
discourse that shuttles between a market-centered responsibility and an agent 
centered blame model of responsibility, both of which serve to sustain the 
supposed sanctity of the market.  
The language that anthropomorphizes and naturalizes the market disclaims 
responsibility and suppresses modes of political redress by casting the market 
system as external to political life. Within this framework, inequality, joblessness, 
homelessness and environmental degradation are not considered exceptional, but 
evidence that the natural forces of the market are working accordingly. On the 
other hand, the narrative that seeks to identify particular agents as responsible for 
the economic crisis elides the possibility that the crisis might be the result of 
systemic aspects that are constitutive of, rather than aberrant to, neoliberalism. 
Hence, “the very idea that this might be the fundamental core of what 
neoliberalization has been about all along appears unthinkable.”231 Mediated 
through discourses of responsibility as accountability and blame, the crisis is 
painted as the unfortunate byproduct of mismanagement, propagated by greedy 
bankers and suspect citizens who lost their moral compasses of personal and 
fiduciary responsibility. In both instances, however, the market is always doing its 
job, functioning according to nature, breaking down only as a result of individual 
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irresponsibility and personal failing. This rendering of responsibility, in other 
words, serves to reinforce the idea that the system itself remains in tact.	  
In Precarious Life, Butler attempts to reformulate the concept of 
responsibility by asking the reader to engage the difficult task of thinking about 
the conditions within which subjects emerge and act.232 This requires careful 
consideration of how people live and operate as embedded subjects in the world 
where the conditions of action are made possible by those structures and 
institutions that call them into being. To be clear, my approach to these questions 
(like Butler’s) does not absolve individuals or institutions in a zero-sum game of 
responsibility. Nor does it seek to produce yet another abstraction – the market as 
guilty, or capitalism as a blameworthy agent. Rather, it confronts the ways, in 
which the isolation of responsible parties exculpates wider publics and institutions 
–including capitalism itself – from the burden of probing the normative and 
systemic violence of neoliberalism, while disciplining specific segments of the 
population. 	  
Unfortunately, attempts to explain are often taken as calls to exonerate.233 
However, as Butler notes, to think in terms of conditions or possibilities of human 
action in no way forecloses the possibility of action: “Conditions do not act in the 
way that individual agents do, but no agent acts without them. They are 
presupposed in what we do, but it would be a mistake to personify them as if they 
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acted in the place of us.”234 This allows us to acknowledge that Bernard Madoff 
needs to be in jail while, at the same time, we might take seriously his claim that 
many of those around him, including deregulating politicians and the financial 
services institutions with which he did his business are also, at least to some 
degree, culpable. It is too simple, and naïve, to believe that parties “did not know.” 
Such admissions clarify the most problematic and seductive aspects of liberal 
responsibility and raise critical questions. Crucially, however, this questioning 
must be part of contemporary engagements with crisis, even as redress is sought 
in the more limited contexts that liberalism offers. The pay-off, however, is that 
such clarity allows us to respond to economic injustice above the rancor of blame 
and indictments, courtrooms and prisons, while also remembering that the justice 
we seek is always, to some extent, to come.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Ibid. 11 
	   112	  
Chapter Four: Whose Future? Environmentalism and the Queering of 
Intergenerational Responsibility  
 
Human beings are created through the conjugation of one man and one woman. 
The percentage of human beings conceived through non-traditional methods is 
minuscule and adoption, the form of child-rearing in which same-sex couples may 
typically participate together, is not an alternative means of creating children, but 
rather a social backstop for when traditional biological families fail. The 
perpetuation of the human race depends upon traditional procreation between 
men and women.  




In his 2006 film, An Inconvenient Truth, former Vice President Al Gore addresses 
the reality of climate change and its implications for people around the globe.235 
But in highlighting the inherent danger of continuing to deny the on-going erosion 
of the Earth’s atmosphere, Gore’s message is not merely scientific. Instead, 
Gore’s appeal is both moral and political. In the film, Gore plays the role of 
partisan politician turned impassioned academic, pressing his audience to focus 
not only on the structural causes of climate change but on behavioral changes they 
may adopt in their everyday lives to collectively reverse its negative effects.  
 I begin this chapter with Gore’s film, however, not because of its moral 
message but because of the way in which he presents that message to the audience. 
Gore’s narrative is deeply personal. After providing his audience with a quick 
primer on the science of climate change, he quickly shifts into a different register. 
Departing from discussions of atmospheric pressure and carbon emissions, he 
tells the story of almost losing his son at the age of six. Narrating over screen 
shots of his children and images of himself beside his son’s hospital bed, Gore 
conveys passionately to his audience that as a result of this event, “his way of 
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being in the world changed.”236 In fact, it is this event, Gore tells us, that lead him 
to “dig in on climate change.”237 
 Gore’s message is clear: the near loss of his child serves as a watershed 
moment. In almost losing a child, his thinking about the environment is 
transformed, as he contemplates the fragile and tenuous nature of the future for 
the first time. Building on this realization, Gore moves from contemplating the 
fragility of his child’s life to the fragility of the Earth’s existence, shifting from a 
possible future in which his child no longer exists to the possibility of the world, 
as we know it, no longer existing for his child. Harnessing the affective power of 
this image, Gore levels a challenge to his audience at the end of the film regarding 
the need to take action on the issue of climate change. Future generations, he 
suggests, “will ask themselves, what were our parents thinking? We have to hear 
that question from them now.”238 This emotional narrative is leveraged 
continuously throughout the film as the camera shifts between Gore at the lectern 
and images of Gore’s family, his childhood, and scenic shots of his rural 
upbringing.  
 Gore’s role as a parent serves as his point of entry into the problem of 
climate change, in general, and is formidable in shaping his thinking about 
environmental responsibility in particular. The ethical imperative of 
environmentalism is tethered to his responsibility as a father. As a result, the 
underlying “inconvenient truth” of Gore’s film is the need for a strong father to 
save Mother Earth. More broadly, however, is Gore’s message that to abdicate 
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our responsibility to the environment is to abdicate our responsibility to the future, 
represented symbolically in the image of the child. This narrative, I suggest, is 
instructive of a larger trend that is ubiquitous in environmental discourse, 
stretching from political rhetoric and public policy all the way to popular culture 
and the halls of academe.  
 While in Chapter Two, I focused on the ways in which responsibility 
rhetoric is often used in the face of a crisis to create a narrative of past events that 
attempt to explain the present, in this chapter; I take the relationship between 
responsibility and the future in environmental discourse as my primary focus. 
Taking this relationship as my point of departure, I ask how we make sense of the 
future’s centrality to present day arguments about environmental responsibility? 
What categories underpin, define and delimit our imagination of the future? In 
response, I argue that rhetorical deployments of responsibility to the future are 
already prefigured by and built out of assumptions regarding what is and what is 
not worth sustaining for the future. As a result, interrogating the discursive uses of 
responsibility to the future provide insight into who and what we see as vital to 
our political community in the present.   
 Given the long-standing association of homosexuality with death and 
toxicity, I argue that environmental responsibility, framed as an investment in 
future generations, is bound to a heteronormative conception of the future – a 
future contingent on the regulation of sexual desire and the normative 
reproduction of white, heterosexual families.239 Through its emphasis on children, 
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environmental futurity actually forecloses the possibility of collective 
responsibility by directing our attention toward the privatized space of the family. 
Using the oppositional images of the irresponsible queer and the blameless, 
innocent child, I open up space for rethinking the temporalities and subjectivities 
brought to bear in engagements with environmental politics and probe the larger 
role that conceptions of responsibility play in constructing and authorizing 
communal life.240   
 
Planetary Redemption Song – The Future, the Child and Environmental 
Responsibility 
 
Environmentalism raises the specter of responsibility in a number of ways.241 
However, the future plays a crucial role in structuring conceptions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship, Series Q (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997); Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits 
of "Sex"; Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Series Q 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Deborah B. Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion 
and Act Up's Fight against Aids (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009); 
Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives, 
Sexual Cultures (New York: New York University Press, 2005). 
240 In calling into question what I identify as the heteronormativity implicit in the 
discourse of futurity central to environmental responsibility, I take my queue from the 
instructive work currently being done in the field of queer ecology that specifically seeks 
to “probe the intersections of sex and nature with an eye to developing an environmental 
politics that demonstrates an understanding of the ways in which sexual relations 
organize and influence both the material world of nature and our perceptions, experiences 
and constitutions of the world.” Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, 
Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 2010). 5   
241 From a consideration of the appropriate moral relationship of individuals to their 
natural world to debates concerning the proper distribution of burdens and benefits in 
environmental policy, as well as questions of global environmental justice, there are no 
doubt a number of ways in which responsibility is central to environmental issues that are 
well beyond the purview of this chapter. For examples see, Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: 
A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Ted Benton, 
Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights, and Social Justice (London; New York: 
Verso, 1993); Murray Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society (Montréal; Buffalo: 
Black Rose Books, 1980); John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental 
Discourses, 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Roderick Nash, 
	   116	  
environmental responsibility and helps to define an understanding of whom we 
are responsible to as well as how far our commitments ought to extend. From 
political and philosophical debates around intergenerational justice to the plotlines 
of major Hollywood blockbusters, the concept of futurity and responsibility to the 
future casts a large and looming shadow over the present. This suggests the need 
for a closer examination of the idea of responsibility to the future and the role it 
plays in constructing our moral and political imaginaries. The question, as has 
been the case throughout this dissertation, is not what does responsibility to the 
future mean, but rather how does this idea of responsibility to the future operate in 
political discourse around environmentalism? To what end and with what effects?  
 In his most recent book, Eaarth, environmental activist Bill McKibben 
notes that futurity is often central to political rhetoric and policy debates around 
environmental issues.242 Indeed, recourse to arguments about the safety and 
security of future generations is so popular that it cuts across party lines in 
American politics.243 Citing the 2008 presidential election, McKibben argues that 
both candidates spoke about global warming and climate change mostly in the 
future tense, invoking the necessity of preventing ecological crisis in order to 
safeguard future generations.244 Most importantly, however, is the way in which 
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responsibility to future generations commonly took shape as the responsibility to 
save “our” children and grandchildren. For both President Obama and Senator 
John McCain, the image of the child was integral to the ethical and moral 
imperative of environmentalism. 
 McCain, for example, emphatically argued in a speech on foreign policy 
to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council that now is the time “to get serious 
about substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the coming year or we 
will hand off a much-diminished world to our grandchildren.”245 Similarly, 
children and grandchildren also played a central role in the Obama campaign’s 
messaging on environmental issues. Asked at the Democratic Candidates 
Compassion Forum in 2008 to convey a sense of how he related his religious faith 
to his science policy, Obama replied, “Part of what my religious faith teaches me 
is to take an intergenerational view, to recognize that we are borrowing this planet 
from our children and our grandchildren. And this is where religious faith and the 
science of global warming converge.”246 Notably, from the campaign trail to his 
second term, Obama’s symbolic use of children continues to be a feature of his 
administration’s environmental policy discourse. In his second inaugural address, 
Obama provided the answer to Gore’s rhetorical question, declaring, “The debate 
is settled. Climate change is a fact. And when our children look us in the eye and 
ask if we did all we could to leave them a safer, more stable world, with new 
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sources of energy, I want us to be able to say yes, we did.”247 To underscore this 
point a bit further, in President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, released in June 
2013, the word children is used four times in the first page and a half while the 
term future generations comes up four times in the first two as well. In addition, 
future generations and children or future children are often used interchangeably, 
in tandem or concurrently. For example, the policy brief begins by stating that, 
“we have a moral obligation to future generations to leave them a planet that is 
not polluted and damaged. Through steady, responsible action to cut carbon 
pollution, we can protect our children’s health and begin to slow the effects of 
climate change so that we leave behind a cleaner, more stable environment.”248  
 Writing about the ubiquity of future oriented rhetoric in discussion about 
environmental policy, McKibben urges his readers to Google “global warming 
and grandchildren.”249 In addition to yielding over half a million results, the 
comments, which range from Barbara Boxer to Arnold Schwarzenegger, make 
clear that the image of the child and responsibility to future generations is a 
rhetorical form that appeals to all sides of the political spectrum. However, 
McKibben, concerned primarily with calling his readers to immediate action, 
quickly dispenses with his interrogation of futurity to force his readers to look at 
environmental catastrophe in the present tense. For McKibben, ecological disaster 
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is not on the distantly approaching horizon, it’s already here.250 While 
McKibben’s effort is indeed an important and laudable one, I’m not comfortable 
with moving on from the rhetoric of environmental responsibility and planetary 
redemption in the name of our future children just yet. While McKibben rightly 
criticizes this emphasis on futurity, he does not pause to reflect on the 
consequences of this discourse for environmental responsibility itself, let alone 
the ways in which these appeals are central to the ways in which responsibility, as 
I’ve argued throughout this project, is used rhetorically to create specific ways of 
seeing and responding to political problems or the ways in which responsibility is 
used to authorize specific conceptions of communal life. 
  
Just-us: The Environmental Ethics of Saving the Future 
 
To this point, I have demonstrated the ways in which future generations and the 
image of the child factor into mainstream discourse around environmental politics. 
In the following section, I ask what role responsibility to future generations plays 
in shaping questions of environmental policy and ethics. Specifically, futurity is 
germane to arguments around the principles of intergenerational justice and equity, 
defined in its broadest sense as fairness between generations.251 The problem of 
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intergenerational justice, however, is not simply a matter of academic debate but 
rather a central component of contemporary debates taking place around global 
climate policy.252 Highlighting the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) commitment to protecting the “planet’s climate 
system for the benefit of future generations of humankind, Steven Vanderheiden 
notes that “contemporary debates about environmental issues such as climate 
change, in which present policy choices predictably affect those conditions under 
which future persons will live, usually take at least some obligation toward future 
persons as a bedrock assumption.”253 
 However, while Vanderheiden establishes the centrality of the future to 
debates around environmental justice, his focus, like much of the literature on 
intergenerational justice, is concerned less with interrogating the assumptions that 
travel under the sign of the future and instead is focused on locating a ground for 
ethical and political commitments to future generations.254 This is because while 
Vanderheiden sees the claim that we have a responsibility to future generations as 
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intuitive, he argues that the principle lacks any a priori justification as to why “we 
might be obligated to assume potentially high costs for the benefit of persons 
whom we will never meet and about which we know very little.”255 Of course, 
Vanderheiden, writing in the tradition of liberal political theory, writes about 
future persons in the abstract. Similarly to the Rawlsian “original position”, 
Vanderheiden’s consideration of responsibility is disembodied, eliding the 
powerful impact that race, class, gender, sexuality and geography have on 
determinations of moral obligation and political commitment.256 
 For Vanderheiden, the questions are clear: on what basis can we justify the 
claims of future generations on the present one and how exactly can we, or do we, 
determine what is owed to future generations? Finally, how much of a sacrifice 
should we assume in the present in order to preserve the planet for future 
generations. As a result, for Vanderheiden, the question of intergenerational 
justice, the linchpin of environmental responsibility, is transformed into a 
question about debt: how can we justify “costly commitments to maintaining 
climatic stability”257 for future generations? How much and what exactly is 
owed?  
 No doubt, Vanderheiden’s project is an important one, especially 
considering that many of his interlocutors see absolutely no defensible reason to 
alter present behavior in light of responsibility to future generations. Probably the 
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most famous of detractions comes in the form of Derek Parfits’s “non-identity 
problem,” which reduces to the following: any policy or individual choice we 
make in the present will have a direct impact on producing the future world that 
will emerge as a result of these choices.258 Therefore, “we cannot say that our 
choice harms any particular individuals, since “if we had chosen Conservation 
[over depletion], this would not have benefited these people, since they would 
have never existed.”259 No future person whose existence depends on our present 
choice of depletion could regret our having made that choice, and as a result, 
cannot claim to be harmed by it. Echoing Doc Brown’s warning in the popular 
science fiction film Back to the Future, had we chosen otherwise, they never 
would have existed.  
 In addition to the non-identity problem, Vanderheiden also has to contend 
with those who argue that grounding present environmental commitments with an 
eye towards the future are tied to the question of whether or not future generations 
will in fact have a basis upon which to hold past generations accountable.260 
However, even Vanderheiden’s laudable attempt to provide a secure foundation 
for responsibility to future generations ultimately leads down a familiar path. That 
is, a reading of responsibility that fails to consider the assumptions that underlie 
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the concept of the future he is working with. As a result, to a consideration of the 
future and its underlying assumptions is where I turn next. 
 
Responsible Sex Acts and the Heteronormative Future of Environmental 
Discourse 
 
The previous examples make clear that discussions of the future and 
environmentalism are heavily filtered through the image of the child. 
Consequently, when it comes to the rhetoric of responsibility to future generations, 
sex and sexuality are always in the background, if not an explicit part of the 
conversation. An investment in the future is positioned as an investment in the 
health and security of “our” children; responsibility for the environment depicted 
as responsibility to future generations (“our” children and “our” children’s 
children) and conversely, a failure to act with an eye towards the future is both 
morally reprehensible and a failure to meet obligations to “our” children. Whether 
we choose to acknowledge it or not, what the rhetoric of responsibility to future 
generations makes clear is that “familial and sexual arrangements are clearly 
important to environmental issues.”261 
Even Vanderheiden, guided by concern for identifying philosophical 
grounds for responsibility to future generations cannot avoid the specter of sex. 
This becomes evident in his discussion of whether or not future generations 
possess valid rights claims we should take seriously in the present: 
Can rights be held by persons who do not yet exist and so are not 
actual people? - Suppose that they did. Counting all the possible 
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sperm-egg pairings in one of my political theory courses, there are a 
great many possible persons whose right to exist stands to be violated 
by the failure of various combinations of students to bring them about. 
Can we say that some possible person has been wronged, in this case? 
Were this a legal as well as a moral right, should the state redress it by 
forcing some particular pairing? Since it would be physically 
impossible for all possible persons from my class to be brought into 
existence, do my students have some obligation to bring as many 
possible persons into existence as they can.262 
 
Without wading into the details of where Vanderheiden takes this argument, the 
reproductive schema at work in his thought experiment makes clear that even in 
the discourse of distributive justice, sex, and specifically, reproductive, 
heterosexual sex, does important work.  
In Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality, Sarah 
Ahmed argues that, “There is no body as such that is given in the world: bodies 
materialize in a complex set of temporal and spatial relations to other bodies, 
including those bodies that are recognized as familiar and friendly, and those that 
are considered strange.”263 Ahmed’s observation generates important questions 
for understanding the rhetoric of responsibility to future generations in 
environmental discourse. Who are the friendly bodies in the imagined future 
community? Who are the strangers? Given the continual twinning of 
environmental responsibility and the image of the child, is intergenerational 
justice is implicitly heterosexual? Is the future in question, always already 
heteronormative.  
Undoubtedly, considerations of human survival and the future of the 
planet have long been tied to specific conceptions of sexuality and the idea that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. 128 
263 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality, 
Transformations (London; New York: Routledge, 2000). 40 
	   125	  
specific sexual practices are indicative of responsible sexual behavior. As 
Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson argue in their work on queer 
ecology, heterosexuality, as an adaptive capacity, remains central to ecological 
thought.264 They note, “In this model, heterosexual reproduction is the only form 
of sexual activity leading directly to the continuation of a species from one 
generation to the next…If the ability of a species to survive in its environment is 
tied to reproductive fitness, then ‘healthy’ environments are those in which such 
heterosexual activity is seen to be flourishing.”265 The associations of nature, 
health and sustainability with reproductive sexual behavior have helped establish 
a foundation for thinking about evolutionary advantage and disadvantage as 
linked directly to specific sexual orientations and types of sexual behavior. 
The perceived dependence of biological reproduction on heterosexuality, 
along with the conception of reproductive heterosexual activity as healthy, places 
it squarely in the register of responsible sexual behavior. In the context of 
environmentalism, reproductive heterosexuality gains its normative force as the 
responsible form of sex through the assumption, highlighted by Noel Sturgeon, 
“that heterosexuality is the only form of sexuality that is biologically 
reproductive.”266 By establishing a link between heterosexuality, reproduction, 
nature and sustainability, the normative power of heterosexuality is continuously 
reinforced by an environmental discourse that places the image of future 
generations and the responsibility to children at its center. This, despite the fact 
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that biological reproduction does not require compulsory heterosexuality and, in 
some cases, may in fact be harmful to the reproductive process.267    
But perhaps some of the strongest expressions of heteronormative force in 
environmentalism can be found in films that feature ecological disaster as their 
central premise. Consider, for example, Roland Emmerich’s film, The Day After 
Tomorrow. In the film, years of unregulated climate change have led to a global 
temperature shift in which ongoing ice and snowstorms featuring unprecedented 
frigid temperatures make major parts of the Northern Hemisphere uninhabitable. 
The film’s central character, Sam Hall, played by Jake Gyllenhall, is the son of a 
known paleoclimatologist, Professor Jack Hall, played by Dennis Quaid, whose 
warnings about climate change and atmospheric shifts have gone unheeded by the 
United States government and the agencies for which he works. As the storm 
grows in intensity, Sam, who was in New York City to participate in an academic 
decathlon, takes shelter with a group of his friends along with a number of other 
people struggling to survive inside the main branch of the New York Public 
Library. 
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Though separated from his parents, Sam is hunkered down with his female 
love interest, Laura, played by Emmy Rossum, who also happens to be one of his 
decathlon teammates. As the two exchange stories and personal experiences while 
attempting to ride out the storm, Laura, reflecting on their prospects for survival, 
exclaims regretfully that she’s spent so much of her time preparing for a future 
that most likely no longer exists; a future that looks to be impossible in the face of 
ecological disaster and almost certain death. In response, Sam reveals why he 
joined the decathlon team in the first place - to be closer to her. After a slight 
pause, they share their first kiss.  
 The kiss is meaningful in terms of the relationship between futurity in the 
discourse of environmental responsibility and normative heterosexuality. 
Following her expression of regret about a lost future, the kiss hints at the sexual 
conduct that may in fact save the future; that may allow the future to have a future. 
However, the diminished future does not become a justification for “deviant” 
sexuality. Instead, in the following scene, as Laura becomes gravely ill due to an 
infection, Sam risks his life to procure antibiotics from an abandoned cargo ship 
marooned in the ice outside of the library. By risking life and limb to save her, he 
works to save their potential future relationship, and as a result, the idea of the 
future itself.  
At the same time that Sam puts himself at risk in the name of love, his 
father is also engaged in risking his life to save both his son and, ultimately, his 
wife. By the film’s conclusion, Sam’s father survives the impossible journey, 
travelling into the eye of the storm from Washington D.C. to New York City on 
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foot while the rest of the country’s inhabitants flee south, to reunite with his son, 
Laura and the other remaining survivors. Sam’s mother, Lucy, also manages to 
survive the impossible and eventually reunites with her husband and son, which 
allows for the restoration of the traditional family structure amid the chaos of 
environmental catastrophe. In this regard, the film accomplishes what Noel 
Sturgeon argues in her critique of environmentalism in popular culture, namely 
that the film equates “the restoration of natural harmony with the restoration of 
the two-parent suburban family.”268 
To be sure, The Day After Tomorrow concludes with a “queered” future as 
inhabitants of the Global North immigrate to and are welcomed by Global South 
nations. In a reversal of contemporary immigration patterns, Americans enter 
Mexico in droves. This conclusion is pure fantasy fulfillment with both the 
despair of ecological disaster giving way to the promise of global unity – a theme 
made popular by the movie Independence Day, another Emmerich film.269 In 
addition, the quid pro quo of debt forgiveness in exchange for opening the borders 
also allows for a complete erasure of colonial legacies and post-colonial 
aggression. But even in this newly queered future, the promise of “normalcy” and 
the abatement of social anxiety hinges on the complete and orderly restoration of 
the heterosexual family structure. At the end of the film, the Hall family, which 
had been separated by geographical distance and the uneven distribution of 
ecological disaster, is made whole again south of the border. This final act of 
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familial restoration drives home the integral relationship between responsibility, 
heterosexuality and futurity in mainstream environmental discourse.    
 
Irresponsible Queers and Deviant Mothers: Fear of a Gay Black Chinese 
Planet  
Responsibility, as I’ve argued in previous chapters, always works to produce, and 
in fact relies upon, its irresponsible other. But who or what exactly is the 
irresponsible other of reproductive heterosexuality? Juxtaposed against the image 
of the healthy, responsible and adaptive heterosexual stands the queer, the 
homoerotic and sexually deviant, associated with danger, sickness, pollution and 
toxicity. Against the future made possible by responsible heterosexual behavior, 
the queer endangers the very possibility of the future itself. As Lee Edelman 
argues, “The stigmatized other in general can endanger our idea of the future, 
conjuring the intolerable image of its spoliation or pollution, the specter of its 
being appropriated for unendurable ends; but one in particular is stigmatized as 
threatening an end to the future itself.”270 Given the fact that futurity is always 
already positioned against queerness, any invocation of the future in 
environmental discourse demands an interrogation of the assumptions that 
underpin that imaginary future. 
 Speaking specifically about the discrimination against sexual minorities 
for most of the twentieth century, Ladelle McWhorter places these associations of 
queerness with pollution and toxicity in the historical context of the race hygiene 
and race betterment movements of the early part of the 20th century. As she argues, 
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“queer people – like dark-skinned people, disabled people, chronically ill people, 
and so on – were degenerates who might contaminate the bodies and bloodlines of 
the evolutionary avant-garde and thus derail Homo sapiens’ biological advance. 
These people were held to be, literally, biological enemies of the human 
species.”271 Paranoia surrounding the potential for contamination also extends to 
the supposed purity of the national body, which has deep roots in American 
political life and can be traced back bio-legal norms like the “one drop rule,” 
which classified any individual with just 1/32 of black blood as black, and as a 
result, ineligible for the rights and protections of full American citizenship.272 
 As opposed to the language of health, nature and responsibility tied to 
reproductive heterosexuality, ecological metaphors of disease, pollution, toxicity 
and contamination have long been called upon to describe homosexual desire and 
sexual expression. These metaphors found their sharpest expression in the 
homophobic characterizations of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The twinning of homosexual desire and illness open the door for gay sex acts to 
be construed as more than merely unnatural but instead as acts that bring disease – 
as acts of death.273 This idea is exemplified by Senior Editor John Langone’s now 
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(in)famous Discover Magazine article, in which he concluded that “AIDS isn’t a 
threat to the vast majority of heterosexuals,” but rather “the fatal price one can 
pay for anal intercourse.”274 
Most notably, however, is the way in which representations of the AIDS 
epidemic were tinged with the moralizing language of guilt, blame and dessert as 
victim status was often denied to dying individuals on account of what was seen 
as their own irresponsible behavior. As Susan Sontag notes in her analysis of 
AIDS and Its Metaphors, “The unsafe behavior that produces AIDS is judged to 
be more than just weakness. It is indulgence, delinquency – addictions to 
chemical that are illegal and to sex regarded as deviant. The sexual transmission 
of this illness, considered by most people as a calamity one brings on oneself, is 
judged more harshly than other means – especially since AIDS is understood as a 
disease not only of sexual excess but of perversity.”275 To take Sontag’s analysis 
a step further, I want to suggest that the associations of AIDS with homosexuality 
and irresponsibility gesture toward the ways in which the rhetoric of 
responsibility plays an essential role in policing the national body. In the context 
of the AIDS epidemic, responsibility and blame do the work of distinguishing 
between those to whom our sympathies and obligations should extend and those 
who threaten our health, safety and longevity because of their own deviance. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 The article also makes the claim that AIDS “may have come to the United States by 
way of Haiti, a popular vacation spot for homosexuals.” John Langone, "AIDS: The 
Latest Sceintific Facts," Discover (1985). For additional analysis on the Langone article, 
see Paula A. Treichler, How to Have Theory in an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of Aids 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 
275 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor; and, AIDS and Its Metaphors, 1st Anchor Books 
ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1990). 113, 114 
	   132	  
irresponsible homosexual other is thus firmly identified as the carrier of disease 
with the potential to contaminate and endanger the nation’s future.276  
But the historical context that McWhorter provides – linking queer 
toxicity to issues of race and culture – is instructive for thinking about queerness 
more expansively to include not only homosexual behavior but also any sexual 
practices portrayed as irresponsible. By now it should be clear: the question of the 
future in environmentalism concerns itself with sex. That is, who is having sex 
with whom? Who should and shouldn’t be having sex? As a result, the regulation 
of specific types of sexual conduct and desire through the moral rhetoric of 
irresponsible sexual behavior extends beyond homosexual activity to the 
reproductive activities of non-white populations both inside and outside of the 
United States. It is at this juncture that homophobia, xenophobia and racism, 
converge around the rhetoric of responsibility in an effort to ensure the safety and 
security of the national body in both the present and the future tense.  
For example, working within the Malthusian tradition, Paul Ehrlich made 
the question of overpopulation and population control a core environmental issue. 
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The central conceit of Ehrlich’s original argument was a prediction that 
overpopulation would ultimately result in global famine as consumption needs 
outpaced the availability of resources worldwide.277 However, at the heart of 
discussions regarding overpopulation is a racially motivated concern over the 
uncontrolled reproduction of poorer, non-white populations around the globe. As 
Andil Gosine argues, central to the discourse of overpopulation has been the idea 
that global ecological disaster is the fault of “child-bearing (or potentially child-
bearing) women from Asia, Africa and South and Central America, as well as 
First Nations and non-white women in North America,” who have “overpopulated 
the earth,” and placed “too much pressure on its natural resources.”278 Gosine’s 
argument gestures towards the fact that a consideration of what sex acts are 
considered responsible along with the question of who should and should not be 
reproducing are crucial to arguments around environmentalism and the future.  
 Despite the dated and largely discredited nature of Ehrlich’s theories, they 
remain a staple of much contemporary mainstream environmentalist discourse.279 
For instance as Gosine notes, in An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore remains 
committed to the Malthusian rhetoric he adapts from Ehrlich’s book, citing the 
disaster of uncontrolled population growth on numerous occasions. But most 
tellingly, are the ways in which these references in Gore’s film are coupled with 
on screen images of people of color, from Hurricane Katrina to the Global South. 
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The abundance of non-white faces in the context of unbridled population growth 
not only works to induce anxiety about the future but also helps to construct a 
visual narrative of responsibility. The underlying message suggests that the 
reproduction of specific populations possesses dangerous consequences for the 
Earth’s future. Irresponsible sex acts are those that involve the unregulated and 
rampant reproduction of non-white and non-Western populations.  
In contrast to the implicit racial undertones of Gore’s message, there is no 
shortage of evidence that makes explicit the relationship between overpopulation 
and race. For example, in a Foreign Affairs article from 2010 titled, “The New 
Population Bomb,” author Jack Goldstone notes that while Ehrlich’s worst fears 
regarding global famine and overpopulation have not come to pass, there is still 
much to be weary of.280 Specifically, Goldstone argues that international security 
in the twenty-first-century “will depend less on how many people inhabit the 
world than on how the global population is composed and distributed: where 
populations are declining and where they are growing, which countries are 
relatively older and which are more youthful, and how demographics will 
influence population movements across regions.”281 Citing a decline in the 
population growth of developed nations, Goldstone emphasizes the “alarming 
challenges” that will accompany the fact that “most of the world’s expected 
population growth will increasingly be concentrated in today’s poorest, youngest 
and most heavily Muslim countries” as well as urban centers in the “world’s 
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poorest countries, where policing, sanitation, and health care are often scarce.”282 
Goldstone’s warning then gives way to a larger description of demographic shifts 
from Europe in the beginning of the 18th century to the present that have 
accompanied “the West’s relative decline.”283 The message here is - the wrong 
people are having sex, leaving the future in question.  
Another stark example of this is evident in environmental journalist, Alan 
Weisman’s latest book, Countdown. He sets out to explore the environmental 
dangers associated with “the exploding human population,” asking, perhaps 
rhetorically, in his subtitle whether or not tackling the population issue is indeed 
“our last, best hope for a future on earth?”284 Though Weisman does admit that, 
“any discussion of population that doesn’t include the USA would be pointless, 
let alone racist,” he quickly pivots to a language of equivalency, arguing, “Fair or 
not, in today’s global ecosystem everyone’s presence matters.”285 By 
collectivizing responsibility, however, Weisman effectively negates the uneven 
development of climate change in which the carbon emissions and pollution of the 
world’s richest nations, including the United States, have contributed far more to 
global warming, as well as environmental crisis and degradation, than nations in 
the Global South.286 In addition, his language of equivocation and the idea that 
“we’re all in this together,” erases what Rob Nixon refers to as “slow violence” 
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against the world’s poor. That is, the long lasting and often invisible violence that 
accompanies the impact of war, militarism and toxic waste disposal on the 
environment, which disproportionately impact the world’s most vulnerable 
citizens.287 
Ultimately, while the future remains uncertain, one thing seems clear: 
environmental responsibility to future generations possesses these subtleties that 
depict homosexuality as well as non-white reproductive heterosexuals as a threat 
to a sustainable future. Their significance as the irresponsible other of 
environmental discourse derives “from their manifestations as oppositional 
subjects, as the Others through whom the white subject can make sense of himself, 
and upon whom anxieties can be focused.”288 
 
The Future is Queer Stuff 
 
Lee Edelman opens his most recent book, No Future: Queer Theory and the 
Death Drive, with a section entitled, “The Future is Kid Stuff.” It is no accident, 
then, that I’ve titled the concluding section of this chapter, “The Future is Queer 
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Stuff.” In my less than subtle nod to Edelman, I want to begin by not only 
thinking with him but against him as well.  
 To review, Edelman’s argument, which has been instrumental in my 
critique of environmental discourse centered on a responsibility to future 
generations, goes something like this: the image of the child has become a 
ubiquitous feature of our national political discourse. To invoke the child is to 
create an argument that is as compelling as it is irresistible in what Edelman refers 
to as its “self-evidence” and one-sidedness as an unquestionable value.289 After 
all, who does not want to be seen as being on the side of the children, and 
consequently, the side of true innocence, the side of hope and the side of the 
future? This emphasis on “reproductive futurism,” however, comes at a cost. That 
is, according to Edelman, it  “imposes an ideological limit on political discourse 
as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by 
rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a 
queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations.”290 By 
identifying the extra-political force of arguments made in the name of children, 
Edelman gestures towards the way in which environmentalism cast as a 
responsibility to future children works to stabilize political debate and solidify 
communal boundaries.  
 In the face of reproductive futurism’s hegemony, Edelman makes the 
following wager: “what would it signify,” he asks, “to not be ‘fighting for the 
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children?’”291 Acknowledging that queerness is in fact the side not fighting for 
the children, his ultimate response is to embrace the pessimism, hopelessness and 
anti-futurity leveled at queer identity rather than resist it. Instead of affirming any 
positive social value, Edelman finds the ethico-political imperative of queerness 
in its outright rejection of any claim to a hopeful future, concluding his first 
chapter with an emphatic cry: “fuck the future.”292 
 It is important to consider that Edelman’s rejection is not a detour into 
nihilism. Rather, Edelman is forcing his reader to consider what, if any, future 
might exist for those who have been repeatedly excluded from the present, for 
those whose very existence has been associated with threatening the very 
possibility of the future? The answer is, under the continuation of the current 
social order, none at all; “There can be no queers in that future as there can be no 
future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no 
future at all.”293 
 I want to steer Edelman’s important insight back to the central argument 
of this chapter. There is no doubt that the idea of the future is problematic. As I’ve 
demonstrated, an environmental politics centered on responsibility to the future 
and to future generations serves to reinforce and reproduce the normative power 
of reproductive heterosexuality as natural and responsible. This it does, moreover, 
through the othering of homosexual desire and non-white reproductive sex as 
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toxic and irresponsible. These arguments about responsible and irresponsible 
sexual identity and relationships inscribe the future with an exclusionary 
component. In effect, the rhetoric of responsibility tied to sexual practice, 
reproduces an image of the future that unfortunately looks much like the present, 
riddled with homophobia, racism and xenophobia in spite of overwhelming lip 
service to the practice of liberal tolerance.  
  To be sure, the use of children in the context of political argument 
extends to a number of issues beyond environmentalism. For example, Lauren 
Berlant, argues that from the Regan era to the present, a “familial politics of the 
national future came to define the urgencies of the present,” and notes a 
significant transformation whereby “a nation made for adult citizens has been 
replaced by one imagined for fetuses and children.”294 Indeed, in contemporary 
American politics, in debates on everything from national debt to entitlement 
reform, where there are issues that conjure future repercussions, recourse to 
arguments invoking responsibility to “our” children are never far behind.295    
 The embodiment of pure innocence, the child represents not only 
vulnerability but blamelessness as well. As such, they don’t simply deserve our 
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care; they require it. In this regard, the child stands in as a future victim in need of 
rescue, which requires that adults take responsibility for their irresponsible actions 
in the present. This innocence and blamelessness associated with children allows 
an ethic of responsibility to them and future generations to stand in as the 
quintessential figures in whose name the planet should be redeemed since they 
will, as the argument goes, inherit a planet beset by environmental catastrophe by 
no fault of their own. 
 What makes the image of the child so compelling is the fact that it 
operates within the context of what Edelman calls a “social consensus that such 
an appeal is impossible to refuse,” precisely because it appears as both a natural 
and self-evident truth.296 In its self-evidence, responsibility to children and 
responsibility in the name of children command acquiescence, operating as non-
negotiable and beyond argument. As a result, rhetorical deployments of 
responsibility to children can fly below the radar of political argument. 
Undetected and infallible, to fight for children and their futures is to ascend to a 
moral high ground that stands not only outside of but also above partisan rancor. 
 But notwithstanding its apolitical appearance, throughout this chapter I 
have demonstrated that responsibility to children and future generations does 
important political work. Specifically, environmental discourse that emphasizes 
responsibility to children actually serves to foreclose the possibility of collective 
action by directing public attention toward the privatized sphere of the family. In 
so doing, this rhetoric serves to instantiate what Berlant calls the, “intimate public 
sphere,” rendering “citizenship as a condition of social membership produced by 
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personal acts and values, especially acts originating in or directed toward the 
family sphere.”297 This, of course, raises a number of serious questions about who 
can lay claim to membership in the American political community as well as who 
an environmental discourse that relies upon responsibility to the future speaks to 
and for.  
 By directing attention toward the private sphere of the family, 
environmental responsibility framed in this way removes the vulnerability of 
collective action as well as thinking through the difficult question of who actually 
comprises the collective body. To invoke the terminology of “our” children begs 
the question as to which children are being spoken about? Which parents? What 
about those without children? Those outside of hetero-reproductive relationships? 
These are no doubt incredibly messy and difficult questions that require serious 
thinking and debate precisely because they impact not only a sense of future 
obligations but also present commitments. As a result, confronting these questions 
may actually serve to increase vulnerability rather than security in the face of 
issues that are inherently marked with uncertainty such as global warming and 
environmental crisis. It is in this regard that responsibility operates rhetorically to 
perform a stabilizing function by directing our attention to the privatized family. 
This is a space in which there are no strangers or others who require a response, a 
space that allows for a disclaiming of responsibility in the name of responsibility 
by absolving the public of the need to take responsibility for contemplating these 
difficult ethico-political questions about community and collectivity.   
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But if, as Ahmed argues, “a queer politics which refuses to organize its 
hope for happiness around the figure of the child or other tropes for reproductivity 
and survival is already alienated from the present,” what hope might there be for 
the future?298 Is Edelman right? Is it time to abandon all hope? In one sense, 
Edelman’s rejection is valuable. Most notably, because it helps shine a light 
directly on what Gosine calls, the “sexual blind spot in environmentalism,” in 
which the “paradigm of natural heterosexuality overrides the obvious existence of 
plenty of non-reproductive sexual options that might be more ecologically 
appropriate.”299 But beyond unmasking the normative heterosexuality embedded 
in environmental discourse’s commitment to the future, how might we use this 
rejection to rethink responsibility?300 To do so, requires reading Edelman’s 
rejection of reproductive futurity in concert with Judith Halberstam’s argument 
for thinking in “queer time.”301 
 For Halberstam, “queer time” develops “in opposition to the institutions of 
family, heterosexuality, and reproduction.”302 However, while queer time 
develops out of the experience of gay communities battling with the AIDS 
epidemic at the close of the twentieth century, Halberstam, similar to my more 
expansive reading of queerness throughout this chapter, understands queer time as 
a way of rethinking temporality beyond sexual identity. Rather than being 
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restricted to the idea of a diminishing future, Halberstam’s queer time concerns 
the production of what she calls, “alternative temporalities” that lies outside of 
those paradigmatic markers of experience – namely, birth, marriage, reproduction 
and death.”303 It is this emphasis on alternative that provides an entry point into 
seizing Edelman’s critique and investing it with potential for rethinking the uses 
of responsibility and the future in environmental discourse.  
 Placing responsibility in queer time, I argue, would serve to disjoint our 
temporal investment in an environmental discourse tethered to producing a future 
in the image of a politically troubled present. To think responsibility in queer time 
would emphasize resistance to the closure of political imagination in the name of 
planetary responsibility and redemption committed to sustaining a future that 
refuses to question the social and political exclusions already prefigured as a 
constitutive part of that future. Instead, responsibility in queer time would allow 
for a future that is not fate, that is yet to be written and its inhabitants and ways of 
life yet to be determined. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Ibid. 2 
	   144	  
Chapter Five: Conclusion: Rhetoric and the Violence of Responsibility   
 
We need norms in order to live, and to live well, and to know in what direction to 
transform our social world, we are also constrained by norms in ways that 
sometimes do violence to us and which, for reasons of social justice we must 
oppose. 
- Judith Butler, Undoing Gender 
 
 
Asked toward the latter part of his life how he came to define his interests in a 
series of diverse subjects, from the penitentiary system to powerful discourses of 
medicalization and public health, Foucault explained that he was motivated by a 
very basic and fundamental question. That is, the desire to comprehend what is 
happening around us; to inquire, “What is our present?”304 Inspired by Foucault’s 
commitment to critical inquiry as a form of political work, I began this project 
with similar intentions. I set out to make sense of our present through an 
examination of the responsibility rhetoric that abounds in 21st century American 
politics. To be sure, my project has remained largely grounded in critique, intent 
on pulling apart the rhetorical constructions of responsibility that inform and 
shape political life. However, the sheer ubiquity and continued proliferation of 
“responsibility-talk” begs the question – why responsibility? Why now?  
 
Responsibility, Rhetoric and an Ontology of the Present 
Throughout this project I have sought to demonstrate how responsibility functions 
as an inscriptive rather than descriptive political concept. By making 
responsibility a specifically political problem, I have emphasized that 
responsibility does not simply reduce to a question of uncovering levels of blame 
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or accountability. In studying responsibility through the lens of rhetorical analysis, 
I have shown how a diverse range of political actors use responsibility to secure 
political positions as well as construct compelling narratives and representations 
of political events. I have also demonstrated that uses of responsibility are 
themselves embedded in and often constitutive of the problems of inequality, neo-
colonialism, racism, gender bias and sexual discrimination that pervade American 
political life. To do so has allowed me to illustrate the contested nature of 
responsibility as well as emphasize the repressive and productive political work 
responsibility rhetoric does.   
 To this point, my objective has been to uncover the ways in which 
responsibility mediates and shapes political life. From the economic crisis of 2008 
to the debates regarding the uses of torture following 9/11 and the ongoing 
discussions regarding political and ethical commitments to environmental policy 
and activism, responsibility produces specific ways of seeing, thinking and feeling 
political moments. For example, in my analysis of the financial crisis of 2008, I 
demonstrated the constitutive role responsibility rhetoric played in masking the 
normative violence of capitalism by analyzing a shift in economic discourse from 
an anthropomorphic representation of the market to the active naming of 
blameworthy subjects who could be identified as responsible. In this regard, 
responsibility rhetoric was central to stabilizing the crisis by providing a familiar 
framework of accountability and blame through which it could be understood and 
internalized.  
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In my discussion of torture discourse following 9/11, I demonstrated how 
the rhetoric of responsibility served to humanize and justify acts of violence by 
constructing an image of the responsible leader who reluctantly overcomes his 
disease with violence in the name of protecting the nation. At the same time, 
responsibility rhetoric played a crucial role in rendering the targets and victims of 
that violence irresponsible, non-human Others against whom torture and detention 
was not only legitimate but acceptable as well. This chapter placed responsibility 
at the center of thinking about who has access to the category of the human and 
how exclusion from that category works to produce torturable bodies that are 
subject to cruelty and violence. 
Finally, in my chapter on mainstream environmentalism’s discourse of 
heteronormative futurity, I explored the role that responsibility plays in 
authorizing specific conceptions of communal life. Rather than take for granted 
uses of responsibility to future generations in debates around environmental 
policy and ethics, my analysis made visible the ways in which responsibility 
rhetoric is used in the present to delineate between what is and what is not worth 
sustaining for the future. In similar fashion to examples from earlier chapters, I 
once again made clear that the normative force of responsibility is, at least in part, 
derived from the continual production of irresponsible, and in this case, 
homosexual and non-white, others. 
 In each one of these examples, responsibility rhetoric also worked to 
condition and limit the range of appropriate responses to political problems while 
precluding certain questions altogether. Responsibility accomplishes this by 
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constructing a conception of who belongs inside the political community and who 
needs to be kept outside its borders. This, I suggest, is directly related to the ways 
in which responsibility arguments invoke specific conceptions of community and 
belonging by not only providing a distinct vision of “being-in-common”305 but 
also by acting as liminal markers that structure the boundaries of community, 
notions of correct action and normal behavior. Responsibility rhetoric produces a 
field of political intelligibility around specific events, bringing actors into being, 
inscribing and proscribing particular modes of subjectivity. It does this by always 
calling forth its irresponsible other: the suspect citizen whose greed caused the 
economic crisis, the irrationally dangerous Islamic terrorist ruled by rage and 
resentment, the toxic homosexual endangering the health of the community and 
the poor, non-white mother putting a sustainable future at risk by draining vital 
and scarce resources. It is for this reason that responsibility carries with it an 
intense set of political stakes. The rhetoric of responsibility strikes at the heart of 
Judith Butler’s question as to “who counts as human? Whose lives count as 
lives?”306 
 
The Violence of Responsibility 
In the history of political and moral thought, responsibility has often been 
associated with attendant political concepts like justice, freedom, obligation and 
duty.307 However, one of the crucial insights of my project is the close 
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relationship responsibility actually bears to the political concept that many 
thinkers, save Machiavelli, Hobbes and Fanon, prefer to exclude when cataloging 
the pantheon of core political concepts. That is, the specific relationship 
responsibility has to violence.308 
 At its core, the violence of responsibility inheres within what Heidegger 
referred to as the “metaphysics of presence” and what Derrida would later go on 
to explicitly call the “violence of metaphysics.”309 This is specifically evident in 
the ways in which the rhetoric of responsibility focuses public attention by 
creating explanatory frameworks that appear as Truth. The appearance of 
responsibility as Truth, however, exists only at the expense of actually being able 
to clearly identify the structures of power that condition its very appearance. This 
is precisely why I have stressed that utterances of responsibility rhetoric cannot be 
taken for granted, and demand our critical attention despite their familiarity. 
Rhetorical deployments of responsibility are directly involved in the production of 
reality. As such, I have stressed that any time responsibility is invoked, whether it 
is in the context of economic crisis, debates over the use of torture, or 
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environmental discourse, we pause to reflect on how it is being used, by whom 
and to what ends.  
But my project makes clear that what is at stake in this reflection is not 
merely an assessment of proper language use (as if such a thing actually existed). 
Instead, as my chapter on torture discourse in post-9/11 America reveals, from the 
theoretical problem of dirty hands to the physical reality of Abu Ghraib, the stakes 
are nothing less than the bodies and communities that responsibility rhetoric 
leaves marked in its wake. While my examination of responsibility rhetoric in the 
2008 economic crisis called attention to the ways in which shifts in neo-liberal 
economic discourse mask the systemic violence of capital itself, subsequent 
chapters on torture and environmental politics highlighted that responsibility and 
violence go hand in hand not only at the systemic level but also at the level of the 
individual, by producing a category of subjects that are acceptable targets of 
violence and/or political exclusion. In short, my project has continuously 
demonstrated that designations of responsibility are used politically to mark the 
very limits of human life. 
By calling forth its irresponsible other, responsibility rhetoric is often used 
by political actors to render specific subjects altogether excluded from the 
normative category of humanness. But in their exclusion, the irresponsible and 
blameworthy are far from invisible. Rather, they are highly visible and vulnerable 
– constantly watched, criticized and questioned. At best, they are disregarded and 
discarded as unworthy of our communal obligations and empathy. At worst, they 
are literally marked for death; made the legitimate targets of torture, indefinite 
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detention and other horrific acts of violence. In this way, responsibility exposes 
certain bodies to physical harm while at the same time humanizing the use of 
violence by others. 
The idea that the irresponsible deserve what they get and get what they 
deserve – whether it is queers dying of AIDS or people losing their homes during 
the foreclosure crisis or addicts that wind up on the street – has tremendous 
currency in an American political culture that places such a strong emphasis on 
the individual and the individual’s power to make him or herself regardless of 
social circumstances or historical context. As Judith Halberstam argues in the 
Queer Art of Failure, “Believing that success depends upon one’s attitude is far 
preferable to Americans than recognizing that their success is the outcome of the 
tilted scales of race, class and gender.”310 However, the cost of this type of 
thinking, Halberstam notes, is an emphasis on personal responsibility, “meaning 
that while capitalism produces some people’s success though other people’s 
failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only upon 
working hard and failure is always of your own doing.”311 The notion that the 
irresponsible and blameworthy get what they deserve also places a limit on our 
sense of communal obligations to extend care and concern the way we would to 
seemingly responsible, and thus deserving, citizens while at the same time 
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bolstering an affective and psychological dimension to being a responsible and 
“morally worthy” member of the community.312 
 
Rethinking Responsibility  
Though my project has centered on subjecting responsibility to critical analysis, 
this does not equate to arguing that we should do away with responsibility 
altogether. In critiquing responsibility I am not denying its necessity as a political 
and moral concept. All too often, critical projects and projects of reclamation are 
cast as mutually exclusive. My aim has been to demonstrate that the foundation or 
ground for any future project that attempts to reclaim responsibility for 
progressive or liberatory political aims requires rhetorical and deconstructive 
analysis precisely because it is a useful tool for reminding us that political 
language must not only be the starting point of political analysis, “but the place 
where paradoxes and suppressions of power relations can be charted.”313 As such, 
the rhetorical analysis of responsibility provides an entry point for future projects 
of reclamation because it brings us face to face with the politics of responsibility 
rather than a fictive space in which responsibility as a concept can be severed 
from power relations, social context and cultural norms. Though a full normative 
project is beyond the scope of this current work, what follows is a brief 
description of some considerations that can serve as the basis for further study and 
analysis.  
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What makes responsibility so vexing is precisely the fact that in spite of its 
problematic nature and intimate relationship to violence, it is, as Connolly 
reminds us, “necessary for political life;” necessary because we live, not as 
isolated individuals, but as deeply relational beings.314 As Annika Thiem argues: 
None of us live as fully self-sufficient, autonomous beings; we are 
implicated in the lives of others not only at the beginning and end of 
our lives, but all throughout them. We live with others, proximate to 
others whom we encounter personally, whom we might encounter, or 
whom we might wish that we would need not encounter, and with 
others whom we might never meet directly, but whose lives and 
plights are nonetheless enmeshed with ours, and not always for the 
better.315 
 
I want to conclude by asking how, given Thiem’s insistence on relationality, 
interconnectivity and interdependence, might we reconsider the uses of 
responsibility for the future of political life?  
One of the things I have found throughout this project is that while 
interconnectivity is an inescapable fact of political life, responsibility is often used 
to deny that reality as well as the vulnerability and instability that it creates. A 
prime example of this is the rant from CNBC commentator Rick Santilli that I 
discussed in Chapter Three. At the height of the financial crisis in 2009, with 
countless numbers of Americans facing foreclosure, eviction and, in many cases, 
homelessness, Santelli, broadcasting from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, put the crisis in stark binary terms. On one side stood the winners, 
responsible citizens who saved judiciously and acted financially prudent. 
Opposite them, the “losers,” who, as a result of acting irresponsibly, bore the sole 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
315 Thiem, Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical 
Responsibility. 225 
	   153	  
responsibility for the dire straights they found themselves in. When Santelli 
suggested that the Obama administration “put up a website to have people vote on 
the Internet as a referendum to see if we really want to subsidize the losers' 
mortgages; or would we like to at least buy cars and buy houses in foreclosure 
and give them to people that might have a chance to actually prosper down the 
road, and reward people that could carry the water instead of drink the water,” he 
was met with overwhelming cheers in support.316 Rather than invoke 
responsibility as call to think collectively about human vulnerability and suffering 
or to reflect upon the complex ways in which global finance exposes everyday 
individuals to a host of factors beyond their control, Santelli’s rant, which was not 
unique in its tone or set of targets, was an explicit denial of collective 
vulnerability. The conception of responsibility at work in his rant proves 
insufficient for providing a foundation for ethical and political engagement that 
reflects the shared instability of human existence. It also fails to provide a 
sufficient framework for thinking about the ways in which, for example, global 
capitalism, simultaneously speaks the language of individual agency and personal 
responsibility while negating the actual force of individual decisions.     
It is not surprising then that from the economic crisis to fears of an 
uncertain and unsustainable future, the rhetoric of responsibility abounds in the 
face of events that are potentially destabilizing. As we’ve seen, responsibility 
rhetoric often acts as a mode of stabilization by appearing as that which is beyond 
the political, a moral truth about the world that lies beyond contestation. In these 
instances, responsibility and especially the personal responsibility of liberal and 
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neo-liberal discourse is used to deny the scariest and most destabilizing fact of 
political life and human existence – that our actions impact the lives of others, 
that we are implicated in the actions of others and that we live lives that are never 
wholly our own. What’s more, the things that impact our lives are often not even 
proximate to us – but instead exist only as distant abstractions. Furthermore, while 
we live lives often enhanced by others, we are sometimes compromised or made 
vulnerable by them. In the face of vulnerability, the violence of responsibility is a 
reactionary tool.  It is not surprising then that lamentations about the loss of 
personal responsibility in America often go hand in hand with expressions of 
regret over America’s decline and the loss of American power. It’s also telling 
that the same people often make these types of statements.317 
But what might it mean to rethink and reinvest responsibility in a different 
way - With an altogether different orientation toward the other and otherness in 
general? The answer lies not only in the practice of resignifying responsibility in 
the context of progressive political projects but also in establishing a normative 
basis upon which responsibility can be thought anew.318 Here, I am inspired by 
Judith Butler’s argument in Undoing Gender that while resignification is indeed 
an important political practice,  
The norms that we would consult to answer this question cannot 
themselves be derived from resignification. They have to be derived 
from a radical democratic theory and practice…One must make 
substantive decisions about what will be a less violent future, what will 
be a more inclusive population, what will help to fulfill in substantive 
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terms, the claims of universality and justice that we seek to understand 
in their cultural specificity and social meaning.319   
 
But on what basis can we begin to reclaim and resignify responsibility for 
progressive aims, especially considering that, as Oliver reminds us, “Butler’s 
theory of performative resignification needs to be supplemented with a theory that 
can explain how to distinguish between conservative and liberatory 
resignifications.”320 This is especially the case because while rhetorical analysis is 
indeed critical to unmasking responsibility as a production that relies upon, and is 
also constitutive of, an exclusionary set of norms, rethinking responsibility 
requires that we move to not only destabilize that normative foundation but also 
begin the process of asking what norms might work in their place. We must also 
ask on what grounds uses of the rhetoric of responsibility can be called out as 
evidence of bad faith in order to distinguish progressive and liberatory uses of 
responsibility from violent and reactionary ones. In this regard, Oliver’s theory of 
false witnessing can prove helpful. For Oliver, a false witness and false 
witnessing are narratives that, instead opening up a space for dialogue and 
thoughtful responsiveness, “attempt to close off response from others, otherness 
or difference.”321 I want to extend Oliver’s conception of false witnessing to think 
about ways in which we may begin to assess claims of responsibility and uses of 
responsibility rhetoric that actually run counter to a conception of responsibility 
that opens a space for understanding our sense of subjectivity and sense of self as 
rooted and embedded in a larger social context.  
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As opposed to the false witness of responsibility, rethinking and 
reclaiming responsibility requires learning to embrace the instability of political 
life as well as the ambiguity and the vulnerability that accompanies living in a 
world with others. Second, it means embracing a world and a nation steeped much 
more in difference than in the similitude so essential to the foundational 
components of Enlightenment morality and ethics. Third, it demands acceptance 
of the complexity of political life and the idea that events in the world cannot and 
will not be reduced to the simplicity of causal narratives, attributions of blame or 
accusations of guilt—in short, a willingness and a courage to confront the messy 
nature of political life. Any project that looks forward towards a normative project 
of reclamation must take seriously the idea that rhetorical constructions that 
disclaim responsibility in the name of responsibility, or (as in the case of Rick 
Santelli) that use responsibility to seek to deny the fundamental interconnections 
between individuals and their larger social/political contexts, would in fact be a 
form of responsibility as false witnessing. 
Given the ways in which, as I have highlighted throughout this project, 
responsibility as a form of political rhetoric derives its force from a host of 
ontological assumptions, norms, and discourses of power, reclaiming 
responsibility for progressive aims is certainly no easy task. Pierre Bourdieu 
argues that, “from a strictly linguistic point of view, anyone can say anything just 
as the private can order the captain to clear the latrines; but from a sociological 
point of view, it is clear that not anyone can assert anything or else does so at his 
peril.” In taking the rhetoric of responsibility as the focus of my project, I have 
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demonstrated the necessity of assuming the wager that Bourdieu’s private makes. 
It is imperative to assume the role of the private in Bourdieu’s formulation in 
order to assert all that the everyday uses of responsibility omit and attempt to 
silence. By struggling against the all too familiar deployments of responsibility 
that abound in American political life we begin to piece together a more 
comprehensive picture of what is actually taking place, producing a better 
understanding of what our present is. To borrow a phrase from Hannah Arendt 
“there exist today as many signs to justify hope as there are to instill fear.”322 We 
must continue to confront the discursive frameworks of power and its 
contradictions head on in an “attempt to think together what our present 
vocabulary presents to us in terms of opposition and contradiction.”323 This 
commitment will no doubt guarantee the development of counter-narratives, 
despite attempts to ensure otherwise. 
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